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Why do some religious groups protect victims of Genocide while others do not?
This dissertation argues that local religious minorities are more likely to save persecuted
groups from purification campaigns. Two reinforcing mechanisms link minority status
to rescue operations. First, religious minorities are better able to set up clandestine or-
ganizations because their members are more committed and inward looking. Second,
religious minorities empathize with targets of purification campaigns, imbuing their net-
works with preferences that lead them to resist Genocide. A geo-referenced dataset of
Jewish evasion in the Netherlands and Belgium during the Holocaust is deployed to
assess the minority hypothesis. Spatial statistics and archival work reveal that Protes-
tants were more likely to rescue Jews in Catholic regions of the Low Countries while
Catholics facilitated evasion in Protestant areas. Post-war testimonies and secondary lit-
erature demonstrate the importance of minority groups for rescue in other countries dur-
ing the Holocaust as well as other episodes of mass violence, underlining that it is the
local position of church communities -and not something inherent to any religion itself-
that produces networks of assistance to threatened neighbors.
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It is sometimes hard to escape the dark side of religion. Post-World War Two, thirty-
two percent of all conflicts have involved religious claims (Toft 2007). Rebels in Nigeria
killing hundreds to push for the introduction of Islamic law, sectarian overtones in the
Syrian civil war and stand offs between Baptists and Hindus in Nagaland, India all draw
attention to how robust religious networks in combination with absolute truth claims and
tight authority structures can produce devastating outcomes for outsiders. The divine,
however, also has a brighter side. Islamic, Buddhist, Jewish and Christian forces alike
have toppled repressive autocrats, constructed pluralistic civil societies, created humani-
tarian assistance movements and produced the most influential pioneers of non-violence
(Philpott 2007).
This dissertation aims to shed light on this “ambivalence of the sacred” (Appleby 1999)
by studying religious assistance to threatened neighbors. Why do some religious groups
provide protection to victims of mass persecution while others passively condone or even
support such attacks on outsiders? I aim to answer this question by looking at how the
Holocaust, one of the most gruesome and intellectually challenging episodes of mass
persecution, played out in the Low Countries, a laboratory of denominational diversity
spanning several religious fault lines. I argue that it is the local position of church com-
munities -and not something inherent in any religion itself- that determines which side of
the sacred prevails.
Throughout this study, I shed new light on abstract concepts such as empathy, civil
society and collective action, trace the roots of religious protection back to the reformation
in the 16th century and discuss the argument’s extension to different episodes of mass-
killing such as the Armenian and Rwanda Genocide. However, it begins in my home
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country where I stumbled over an empirical puzzle that formed the starting point of this
research project.
1.1 Puzzle and Research Question
About 200 kilometers from the Dutch capital Amsterdam, in the region of Twente, lie
the medium sized villages Almelo and Borne. Before the outbreak of World War Two,
Almelo and Borne had a similar socio-cultural outlook. The population in both cities
was relatively prosperous and labored in local textile factories. Ever since the turn of the
nineteenth century the villages were home to sizable Jewish communities. During the
German occupation both communities faced similar challenges and underwent identical
structural transformations. From 1941 onwards, Jews were no longer allowed to take
part in public life. After being segregated socially and spatially, German officers, helped
by local policemen, started organizing roundups to track down Jewish inhabitants and
send them to the infamous extermination camps in Eastern Europe (Presser 1965). De-
spite the socio-cultural similarity of the two villages, outcomes of these roundups dif-
fered fundamentally as we can see in figure 1.1. In Almelo, numerous Jews were able to
evade deportation with the help of Catholic Church chaplains Bodde and Middelkoop
who temporarily sheltered Jews in the Sint Gregorius Church before housing them with
loyal members of their parish. As a result, forty-two percent of the Jews in Almelo sur-
vived the war. Despite the presence of three Catholic congregations, no successful rescue
network emerged in neighboring Borne. Consequently, only twenty-two percent of the
Jewish population escaped deportation (Weustink 1985).
If we step back and look at the Netherlands as a whole, depicted in figure 2, we see that
this pattern is not unique to Almelo and Borne. Throughout the country we can discern
fine grained pockets of evasion. This raises an important question. Why are some Chris-
tian communities willing and able to protect victims of mass persecution while others are
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Figure 1.1: Evasion in Almelo and Borne.
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Figure 1.2: Jewish evasion in the Netherlands during the Holocaust.
not? It is important to note that this question is not only pertinent to how the Holocaust
played out in the Netherlands. Throughout occupied Europe, Church leadership proved
crucial for the emergence of defense movements that arrested the Holocaust by enabling
Jewish evasion (Fein 1979). Needless to say, religious help was far from universal as the
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Holocaust’s eleven million victims attest.
The importance of this question also travels beyond the borders of Holocaust studies,
as puzzling variation in religious resistance to violence abounds within conflicts, nations
and denominations across time and space. While clerics were key in creating defense
movements that tried to protect Tutsi’s from Hutu massacres in the Rwandan region of
Bigihu, religious help was almost absent in the rest of the country (Longman 2010). Chris-
tian protests prevented the escalation of violence in Kenya and South Africa, while its
absence facilitated killings of Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia (Sells 1996). Likewise, Islamic
leadership was a driving force of genocide against Christians in the Ottoman empire and
Darfur, but created pockets of protection for Tutsis in Rwanda (Ternon 2008; Viret 2008).
Closer to home, Protestantism was used to both legitimize and oppose the repression of
African-Americans (R. Miller 1957; Foner 2015). Even on an individual level, social psy-
chologists have shown that religious inspiration can provide the normative justification
for humanitarian assistance, passivity and violence (Fogelman 1994; Staub 2003).
1.2 Existing Research
The mere existence of all these contradicting patterns has forced some authors to con-
clude that religious protection is purely driven by idiosyncratic accidents of history or
randomly distributed personality traits that fall outside the explanatory realm of the so-
cial sciences (Gilbert 2010). Indeed, existing explanations of political violence, altruism,
religion and genocide seem to fall short in explaining why religious assistance to threat-
ened neighbors emerges.
Dominant theories of political violence focus on territorial control (Kalyvas 2006),
electoral dynamics (Kopstein and Wittenberg 2011) and cross-cutting civic organizations
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(Varshney 2003), yet these fail to explain subnational variation in Jewish rescue within
the Netherlands as Nazi authority was not seriously challenged anywhere in the country,
party politics were neutralized during the war, while no Jewish political parties existed
and inter-religious associations were extremely rare (Lijphart 1968). I believe this lack of
explanatory power is due to the fact that students of violence almost exclusively focus on
the warring parties, rarely theorizing the capacity of local civilian bystanders to protect
human rights (O. Kaplan 2013).
Although existing theories on religion, altruism and genocide recognize the impor-
tance of bystanders, they do not fare much better because their focus is either too micro
or too macro. On the macro-side of the spectrum, researchers tend to focus on how broad
social environments such as religious communities or nations produce norms that moti-
vate rescue. Often these branches of theory treat religions and nations as monolithic en-
tities whose motivations are driven by inherent doctrines or national leaders (Fein 1979;
Croes and Tammes 2004). On the micro-side, scholarship focuses on how religion trig-
gers a wide range of individual level dispositions such as altruism, compassion, inclusive
identities (Fogelman 1994), obedience (Waller 2007), conformity and antipathy towards
outsiders (Adorno et al. 1950) which either motivate or discourage help to those in need.
The first branch of research is too broad and overlooks subnational variation in resis-
tance altogether. Inherent doctrines, overarching institutions and national leaders are not
able to explain why two nearby churches in Borne and Almelo, belonging to the same
denomination and diocese, diverged completely in their response to the deportations.
Work focussing on how broad environments produce the norms to rescue ignore the fact
that orders by leaders are not automatically followed by everyone and that doctrine is
interpreted differently by different people depending on their social position.
The micro branch implicitly assumes the existence of a universal religious disposition
that operates the same for everyone regardless of social position, while failing to link in-
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dividual dispositions back to community level outcomes. Furthermore, this line of work
is indeterminate, expecting both negative and positive effects from religion. To make this
concrete, it is not clear why religion would create altruism and not xenophobia in Almelo,
while the opposite would happen five kilometers to the east in Borne.
Instead, this project disaggregates the role of religion and takes a relational perspec-
tive on Genocide(Tilly 2001).1 Instead of solely focusing on how broad social environ-
ments shape norms or how religious membership activates micro-level dispositions, this
perspective looks at how the local configurations enable the appropriation of existing net-
works for assistance to threatened neighbors. As such, it enables me to explore how na-
tional and religious norms, local inter-group relationships and individual dispositions in-
teract to produce resistance and weaves together elements from the different approaches
outlined above. In particular, it shows that the ways in which environmental norms and
individual dispositions shape resistance to Genocide is contingent on how religious com-
munities are embedded locally vis-a-vis other communities.
1.3 The Argument
The central argument of this dissertation is that local religious minorities are more likely
to protect victims of mass persecution because they have both the willingness and the
capacity to do so. Two distinct but partly reinforcing mechanisms link minority status to
rescue operations.
1It is important to note that this perspective is different from what Emirbayer would consider rela-
tional sociology. My research looks at how changes in social relationships affect the production of rescue
networks. However it incorporates these relationships in a what Emirbayer would call interactional per-
spective which still uses clearly defined entities as building blocks. To make things even worse I translate
relationships into variables that are then treated atributes of social groups. As such my work is still variable
centered abbott1988transcending. Despite my use of relational mechanisms in the Tillian sense, all faults,
limitations and problems of variable or interaction based approaches apply to my work as well.
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The first mechanism focusses on the capacity to rescue. Minorities are better equipped
to translate opposition to Genocide into action because they have an advantage in setting
up clandestine networks that are immune to individual betrayal (Berman and Laitin 2008;
Brewer and Silver 2000). Throughout the dissertation, I refer to this process as the capacity
mechanism. This mechanism derives from the fact that minority enclaves are embedded
in isolated hubs of commitment which:
• assure members that mobilization is possible (Elster 1979).
• make it easier for organizers to select good and diverse recruits (Marwell and Oliver
1993).
• reduce the chance that a movement gets dismantled by security forces (Aldrich
1999).
The second mechanism zeros in on the willingness to resist Genocide. Aristotle,
Homer and Rousseau taught us long ago, that compassion is largely a function of under-
standing the shared vulnerability of human beings and recognizing that what happens to
others can easily befall ourselves (Nussbaum 1992). As religious minorities themselves
depend on pluralism for group survival, they will be more likely to empathize with those
targeted by violent purification campaigns, imbuing their networks with preferences to
oppose Genocide (Hoffman 2001). Throughout the dissertation, I refer to this process as
the empathy mechanism.
Hence, the convergence of clandestine capacity and empathy with outsiders turns mi-
nority enclaves into bulwarks of resistance against Genocide. Consequently, it is the local
position of faith based communities -and not something inherent to any religion itself-
that produces networks of assistance to threatened neighbors.
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1.4 The Holocaust
Covert resistance poses enormous obstacles for empirical investigation. Gaining direct
access to contemporary clandestine cells is next to impossible exactly because these cells
need to reduce exposure in order to survive. Archival work on historical cases can allevi-
ate this challenge because it allows you to study groups that are no longer under immedi-
ate threat, reducing the urgency of secrecy. Moreover, when political structures open and
regimes change, former clandestine networks sometimes go public in order to gain recog-
nition for their activities against foes from the past. This often opens up a wide array of
archives and testimonies. Instead of focusing on contemporary cases, this study therefore
focuses on a historical episode of religious resistance against violence: the protection of
Jews in the Low Countries during the Holocaust.
The Holocaust is without doubt the best documented episode of mass-killing. Ex-
ploiting the extraordinary array of largely unused historical sources presented by the
Holocaust enables me to trace the capacity and willingness of religious actors to resist
Genocide on an extremely fine-grained level. In addition to secondary literature and pre-
existing data, I rely on:
• A unique geocoded Database constructed out of German administrative records
detailing the victimization for 123,000 Dutch and 52,000 Belgian Jews to explore
whether Jews living close to minority churches were more likely to evade deporta-
tion.
• A content analysis of more than 1,700 pre-war claims by opinion leaders to explore
attitudes of different religious and secular groups towards Jews between 1930-1939.
• A semi-automatic content analysis of 905 Dutch clandestine newspapers that ex-
plores attitudes of different religious and secular groups towards Jews during World
War Two.
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• A unique and underutilized collection of post-war testimonies collected in light of
an honors pension program to investigate whether and, more importantly, why mi-
nority churches in the Netherlands were better able to provide assistance to Jews.
• A unique collection of post-war trial data to explore why majority rescue networks
were not able to stay underground and got infiltrated by the security forces.
• A unique collection of Nazi archives that enable me to gauge the number of police
officers not collaborating with German security forces.
• A unique post-war survey conducted among Protestant and Catholic clerics in Bel-
gium that provides information about why some church communities did provide
assistance to Jews.
• Existing collections of testimonies collected by Yad Vashem for twenty-one coun-
tries to assess whether geographical patterns of evasion can be plausibly linked to
church communities that form local minorities beyond the Low Countries .
Of course, the use of post-war testimonies and archival material has serious limita-
tions as well. These data points do not throw a spotlight on a random or representative
sample of war experiences as a whole, but instead overrepresent the stories of winners
and survivors. Furthermore, interpretations of events are likely to be influenced by an
extremely powerful post-Holocaust commemoration culture. This is true for survivors as
well as archivists. During my archival work, several people hinted at the fact that some
materials were not stored or even destroyed when they did not fit the national narrative
the institute in question aimed to convey. Although, we will probably never find out
whether this is true or not, the possibility, merits pause.
However, it is unlikely that this study is reproducing an intentionally crafted narra-
tive as what I say goes against the strains of immediate post-war discourse. Right after
the war, Belgian Catholics prided themselves for protecting so many Jews, while the em-
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phasis in the Netherlands was on how resistance transcended existing social boundaries
in Dutch society and formed the starting point for a breakthrough movement that tried
to overthrow religious and political segmentation (Lagrou 1997). My research, on the
contrary, highlights the relatively limited role of the Catholic church in Belgium and em-
phasizes the salience of denominational differences on a local level in the Netherlands.
1.5 The Low Countries
The Holocaust took place in a wide range of contexts over a relatively long period of
time, enabling systematic comparative research on group-level variables and resistance.
The Shoah in the Low Countries provides a particularly unique, albeit tragic, opportunity
to investigate whether religious minority status affects the production of rescue networks.
Looking to the Low Countries allows me to test the minority hypothesis in a research
design that complements the strengths of a most-similar systems research design (Lijphart
1975) with elements of a research design that is most-different in scope conditions (Prze-
worski and Teune 1970). The former, employed in a sub-national study of the Nether-
lands, compares cases that are as similar as possible except on the key explanatory vari-
able, enabling the researcher to carefully investigate causal relationships while keeping
alternative factors constant. The latter matches more diverse cases, here drawn from the
Netherlands and Belgium, to assess whether similar causal processes operate the same
way in different contexts.
This research design makes use of the fact that the Low Countries were located at the
frontline of the reformation and counter-reformation. As a consequence:
1. the Northern part of the Netherlands is dominated by Protestantism.
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(a) Protestant and Catholic, 1942 (b) Jews, 1942
Figure 1.3: Religious Minorities in the Netherlands and Belgium.
2. the Southern part of the Netherlands is dominated by Catholicism.
3. Belgium is completely dominated by Catholicism.
However, missionary activities and interregional migration (of both Protestants and
Catholics), and disputed scripture (mostly within the Protestants church), created a dy-
namic religious landscape and, as is visualized in figure 1.3a, resulted in pockets of reli-
gious minority communities in both Catholic and Protestant parts of the Low Countries
(Rogier 1964). Importantly, Jews were living across all three areas (see figure 1.3b). This
mixed landscape allows me to assess whether religious deviance affected mobilization
for both Protestant and Catholic communities while keeping inherent characteristics of
religions constant. This is done by comparing the same religious groups in both minority
and majority environments. In particular, we would expect Catholics to be more likely
to rescue in Protestants parts of the Low Countries (area 1), while Protestants should be
more likely to rescue in Catholic parts of the Low Countries (area 2 and 3).
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This dissertation first examines resistance activities of religious groups within the
Netherlands (areas 1 and 2) before moving on to Belgium (area 3). The initial focus on
the Dutch case has the advantage that it controls for potentially confounding variables.
First, top down enforcement of mobilization between congregations was kept constant
as Protestant and Catholic leaders in the Netherlands protested anti-Semitic legislation
collaboratively at the national level (Snoek 2005), providing all Christians, regardless of
congregation, with the same moral message of how German persecutions went against
the tenets of their faiths. Second, minority and majority congregations in Protestant and
Catholic parts of the Netherlands were exposed to the same occupation regime and Jew-
ish population.
At the same time, comparisons of religious rescue activities in Belgium (area 3) pro-
vides variation in potential scope conditions and enable us to investigate whether the
minority hypothesis operates the same in diverse political contexts. With the Southern
part of the Netherlands, Belgium was home to sizable Protestant minority enclaves living
in the vicinity of Jews. However, there were fundamental national level differences be-
tween the Netherlands and Belgium in occupation regime, political cleavages, religious
diversity, national religious elites and Jewish populations (Kossman 1986). If religious
minorities were more likely to rescue Jews in Belgium as well as the Netherlands, we
can be certain that the minority mechanisms operate independently of these contextual
differences.
1.6 Contributions
This project makes a call for a relational perspective on religiously inspired humanitarian
movements that interrogates the interactions between individual dispositions, commu-
nity structures and national processes. As such, this project has implications for the study
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of civil society, altruism, social movements, political violence and humanitarian interven-
tion.
First and foremost, the arguments put forward in this project lie at the heart of two
intersecting debates about the role of civil society in times of social upheaval. The first
debate revolves around the question of whether civil society improves the coordination
of opposition against repressive authorities or to the contrary begets acquiescence (Gram-
sci 1935). The second debate centers around the relationship between civil society and
pluralism. Following Tocqueville, scholars have argued that through associational life
the “heart is enlarged” (Tocqueville 1840, p. 201) and violent conflict can be contained
(Varshney 2003), at least ,according to some, because “joiners become more tolerant [....]
and more empathetic to the misfortune of others” (Putnam 2000, p. 288). Yet, Tocqueville
himself was the first to admit that civil society could be perverted into a “cause of de-
struction” (p. 220) and it has been shown to sometimes legitimize participation in violent
attacks on pluralism (McDoom 2014). The theoretical argument put forward in this book
qualifies the relationships between civic life, coordinated opposition and ethic violence
by identifying an important structural conditions at the local level under which relations
between subgroups of civil society produce both the norms and networks necessary to
resist attacks on pluralism.
Second, while the micro literature on rescuers has helped us to better understand how
compassion and altruism motivate (some) individuals to help (Monroe 2001), the equally
important collective capacity to actually rescue has received less attention. Even if indi-
viduals are willing to save Jews, their environment does not always provide them with
the protective shell needed to reduce risk, impeding the impact they would want to have
on evasion. This dissertation suggests that whether religious altruists can turn into heroes
depends on the local networks in which they are embedded, linking micro-motives to
community outcomes (M. Gross 1994).
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Thirdly and relatedly, micro studies mainly provide insight into proximate causes of
rescue. This dissertation furthers this literature by suggesting that individual level mo-
tivations and networks to rescue are not distributed randomly but in part reflect the un-
derlying relational structures of civic life as members of groups are more likely to display
empathy and be embedded in subgroups capable of clandestine collective action when
they have distinctive relationship with the local community.
Fourth, this project highlights that even when national elites consistently protest geno-
cidal policies, the actual willingness and capacity of constituents to resist mass killing
depends on subnational networks and norms. It therefore urges (macro-) scholars of con-
flict to move beyond the study of bishops and other high-level national officials and dig
deeper into localized patterns of evasion to understand in what ways national forces of
restraint are conditioned by local level relationships (Straus 2012).
Fifth, traditional arguments on religion and genocide have focused on doctrines of
different congregations (Kuper 1990). The central finding of this dissertation is that it
is the local position of church communities -and not something inherent to any religion
itself- that produces collective networks of assistance to threatened neighbors (Longman
2010).
Finally, this project strengthens the under-theorized links between literatures on so-
cial movements and political violence by empirically investigating how outcomes of po-
litical violence are contingent on localized forms of clandestine mobilization (O. Kaplan
2013). Scholars of political violence traditionally depict civilians as powerless pawns in
the hands of warring parties who either support rebels or are coerced to provide local
intelligence (Kalyvas 2008). The rescue of Jews during the Holocaust, Armenians in the
Ottoman empire and Tutsis in Rwanda all illustrate how bystanders can also mobilize
non-violently and secretly to resist killings.
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Movement scholarship has overlooked this type of covert mobilization. In addition to
the data collection problems mentioned above, this is largely due to the subfield’s near
myopic focus on organizations that are eager to draw media attention. Understanding
how violence is conditioned by clandestine operations forces movement scholars to move
away from public claim making and highlight, like I have done in this project, the spe-
cific and understudied challenges of organizations that prefer to remain invisible. (Finkel
2012).
The few studies that do look at secretive movements focus explicitly on micro-level
recruitment, revealing that participation in different forms of high-risk collective action
depends on strong personal and organizational ties between nascent organizers and po-
tential members (DellaPorta 2013). However, strong organizational networks and per-
sonal ties abound, while covert resistance is rare. This micro focus is not in itself able
to explain why some networks produce clandestine groups and others do not. Nor do
they provide insight into where the particularly strong personal ties that create secret
resistance come from in the first place (Darden 2015).
The theory put forward here underlines that how groups are locally embedded deter-
mines the feasibility of this distinctive and important type of mobilization. As such, it
provides insight into the roots of protest waves that require covert mobilization to take
off. This is not a hypothetical class of cases. Clandestine organizations have formed the
back bone of revolutions, riots and insurgencies all over the world. When talking about
revolutions, Lenin, one of the more successful movement organizers in world history,
went as far as to say that “secrecy is such a necessary condition for this kind of organiza-
tion that all other conditions must be made to conform to it” (Lenin 1970).
Although further research is required to fully assess the ability of my argument to
travel to these contexts, it nonetheless holds potentially important implications for foreign
interventions in mass conflicts and other humanitarian crisis. When resources are scarce,
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targeted campaigns to bolster minority groups might be a successful means by which to
impede the spread of mass killings in the short run. In addition, building bridges between
different minority groups might produce large scale inter-regional resistance movements
against violence in the long run which could enable interveners to stop the violence alto-
gether.
More generally, the project draws attention to the role that local faith based actors can
play during humanitarian crises. My argument finds support, for example, in the after-
math of the Tsunami emergency in Indonesia where local religious groups were among
the first to provide assistance to threatened neighbors. While these organizations are in-
strumental for humanitarian assistance because they have large local constituencies on
the ground that are well positioned to respond promptly (Ferris 2005), they seldom get
the same amount of scholarly and public attention as foreign interventions,the United
Nations and international non-governmental organizations (Fortna 2008).
Finally, the projects also contributes to Dutch historiography. In particular, this find-
ing enables us to reconcile four stylized facts about religious rescue in the Netherlands:
1) Reformed Protestants were strongly overrepresented among rescuers (Jong 1969-1991),
2) Dutch Reformed Protestants were heavily underrepresented among rescuers (Moore
2010), 3) Catholics are slightly underrepresented among rescuers (Jong 1969-1991) and 4)
Despite (3), survival was higher in Catholic regions of the country (Tammes and Smits
2005). Reformed Protestants were a smaller and more conservative congregation that
formed a minority in almost every part of the country providing them with the net-
works deemed so important in this paper almost everywhere. The opposite is true for
Reformed Protestants in the North and Catholics in the South explaining fact two and
three. Given that more Jews were living in the North the underrepresentation of Dutch re-
formed Protestants was stronger as their deviants in Catholic parts of the country had less
opportunities to save Jews. Fact four, sometimes dubbed the Catholic Paradox (Tammes
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and Smits 2005), follows out of the theory because it would suggest that in Catholic re-
gions it were especially Protestants and not Catholics that were more likely to save Jews.
Extensive case studies of the Catholic areas Twente and Limburg seem to confirm this
(Rens 2013; Hilbrink 1989). Similar studies in Protestant areas outside the major cities
show that the flip side of the story, i.e. Catholics being more likely to save Jews in Protes-
tant areas, holds as well (RefWorks:849 ).
1.7 Road Map
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a more relational theory
of religious resistance against mass persecution. Building on a long tradition in political
thought and more recent insights about empathy, it argues that church-community rela-
tionships shape the preferences of religious elites to resist violent attacks on outsiders
(Nussbaum 1992). For religious majorities, religion and locality fuse, boundaries are
strengthened and solidarity with outsiders is weaker. In minority congregations, how-
ever, support for pluralism prevails, imbuing religious networks with empathy for other
minority groups. Still, once empathy and support for pluralism are present, resistance to
Genocide does not come about automatically. Pluralism only gets translated into resis-
tance if local factors allow for a solution to the clandestine collective action dilemma: the
dual challenge of coordination and secrecy. Extending simple formal models developed
by Iannaconne (Iannaccone 1992) Berman and Laitin (Berman and Laitin 2008) reveals
that local minorities have the capacity to translate pluralist norms into clandestine col-
lective action because they form isolated hubs of commitment that are insulated from
potential snitches.
In Chapter 3, I detail how the the religious landscape of the Netherlands evolved
from the reformation to the Holocaust. By combining this religious landscape with the
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theory developed in the previous chapter, I derive four empirical implications, which are
assessed in the following chapters.
The empirical analysis is structured in three separate parts. Whereas the first part
focusses on empathy and commitment of religious minorities in the Netherlands before
the German invasion, the second shifts its focus to the war-time period to further test the
minority hypothesis. The third part then explores the scope conditions of and exceptions
to the minority hypothesis. This part also introduces the Belgian case.
Chapter 4 traces the pre-war evolution of empathy with Jews. It reports the results
of a comparative content analysis of pre-war newspapers published by minority and ma-
jority communities. Regardless of congregation, Christian minorities were more likely
to display empathy and defend pluralism when debating Jewish issues and, as a result,
more pro-Semitic than majority groups. Hence, religious minority networks were imbued
with preferences to resist Genocide. Were they also able to translate these preferences into
action?
Chapter 5 establishes that they indeed had the capacity to do so, as religious minorities
in the Netherlands were more likely to form isolated hubs of commitment than majority
churches before the outbreak of World War II. National religious leaders attempted to
segregate their followers into sub-cultures with separate churches, labor unions, schools
and political parties. Participation in these subcultures is thus a good measure of group
commitment and isolation. Archival work and census data are utilized to compile a data
set of 2088 religious groups living in 1313 counties between 1900 and 1937. For each
of these communities, I calculate the strength of religious union membership, religious
school attendance, voting for religious parties and church ownership per capita. Pooled
time-series analysis with fixed effects for counties, years and denominations are deployed
to regress these proxies of commitment against religious minority status. In line with the
formal model presented in chapter 3, local religious minorities do indeed form isolated
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hubs of commitment as they are more likely to join their own labor unions, vote for their
own parties, found their own church communities and send their children to separate
schools.
The second part of the dissertation begins in Chapter 6 and focusses on the occupa-
tion period when deportations started. The chapter pairs German registrations of Jews
with commemoration books to construct a unique geo-coded database of Jewish victim-
ization in the Netherlands. Spatial regression models of ninety-three percent of all Dutch
Jews demonstrate a robust and positive correlation between the proximity to minority
churches and evasion. While proximity to Catholic churches increased evasion in domi-
nantly Protestant regions by more than twenty percent, proximity to Protestant churches
had the same effect in Catholic parts of the country. County fixed effects and the concen-
tric dispersion of Catholicism from missionary hotbed Delft are exploited to disentangle
the effect of religious minority groups from pre-existing differences in tolerance and other
omitted variables.
Statistical evasion patterns alone do not tell us whether clandestine mobilization of mi-
nority communities was driving the differential survival of Jews. In Chapter 7,therefore,
I explicitly focus on religious rescue activities to assess whether minorities were indeed
better able to set up clandestine missions to protect threatened neighbors.
For this purpose, I zero in on the region of Twente in the Netherlands, which en-
compasses the villages of Almelo and Borne discussed at the start of this chapter. Im-
portantly, Twente is an economically and socially integrated region located across the
Catholic-Protestant fault line that divided Western Europe, allowing me to keep impor-
tant economic and social factors can constant when comparing Protestant and Catholic
groups in minority and majority contexts. The extraordinary availability of unused post-
war testimonies and trial data presented by the Holocaust in Twente enable me to study
clandestine collective action in an extremely detailed fashion.
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In support of the minority thesis, the data reveal that a) religious minority leaders were
able to exploit the mobilizing capacity of committed members to overcome the clandes-
tine collective action dilemma; b) majority leaders that tried to do this were more likely to
get denounced early on; c) religious mixing undermined the minority advantage by un-
dercutting isolation and d) as a result of this, insulated pockets of Protestants were more
successful in protecting Jews in areas dominated by Catholics while the same was true for
Catholic enclaves in Protestant regions. This structured comparison also exposes an unan-
ticipated advantage that minorities had when setting up rescue operations. Dovetailing
with existing work on the important role that small religious groups play in creating and
sustaining long-distance economic collaboration (Weber 1985; Greif 2006), post-war testi-
monies show that minority congregations were better at fostering interregional ties that
helped Jews escape to other parts of the country.
Chapter 8 uses the same datasources to assess whether the minority advantage also
travels beyond the borders of Twente. Statistical analysis of the whole country and
case studies of four different provinces (two homogeneously Catholic and two homoge-
neously Protestant) back up the findings from Twente. In addition to providing support
for the minority hypothesis, chapters 7 and 8 also help me link deeply structural factors to
actual outcomes by suggesting three feedback mechanisms that translate the (somewhat)
abstract minority advantage into actual higher levels of clandestine mobilization. Group
commitment assures members that mobilization is possible (Elster 1979), helps leaders
to recruit the right operatives (Marwell and Oliver 1993) and improves the selective sur-
vival of groups by reducing infiltration from outsiders (Aldrich 1999). Whereas the first
two hinge on the recognition of opportunities by forward looking actors, the latter, selec-
tive survival, is evolutionary in logic.
While chapter 7 and 8 focus on the advantage that religious minorities have in solv-
ing the clandestine collective action dilemma, Chapter 9 shifts focus to look at religious
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minority status and increased levels of empathy. Clandestine newspapers published be-
tween 1940 and 1945 confirm that the pre-war differences in empathy presented in chap-
ter 5 carried over into the war period. Resistance organizations embedded in minority
churches were at least twenty percent more likely to report on the Jewish plight than
those encapsulated in majority congregations. A comparison of rescue operations for
Jews and Gentiles in the same chapter also confirms this picture. Although religious mi-
nority communities were also more likely to save their own, the difference with majority
congregations was less striking than when comparing Jewish protection networks. This
indicates that empathy with outsiders must have been a driving force behind differential
Jewish protection on top of clandestine capacity, which was required for both types of
operations.
Chapters 10, 11 and the conclusion form the third part of this dissertation, which looks
at the exceptions to and scope conditions of the minority hypothesis. Although Chapter
7 and 8 largely confirm the minority hypothesis, they also revealed some rescue mis-
sions conducted by majority groups. These and other “off-the-line” cases are explored
in Chapter 10. The empirical anomalies suggest that majority groups were able to mobi-
lize whenever residential isolation or interregional entrepreneurs compensated for a lack
of empathy, group commitment and interregional ties. In addition, the chapter demon-
strates the important role small left-wing groups played in protecting Jews. Often these
groups, which had many Jews among their members, functioned as religious sects in that
they combined discipline with a solemn commitment to the group (L. A. Coser 1974). A
recalibration of the statistical models presented in Chapter 6 confirms that evasion was
higher in communities that were home to small left wing factions, relatively isolated and
exposed to interregional networks. In brief, the data suggest that communities were able
to motivate and sustain clandestine collective action if rescue motives unrelated to plu-
ralism were rooted in small insulated enclaves or were part of interregional networks, in
other words if their social structure resembled that of minority groups.
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The 11th chapter explores religious assistance to Jews in neighboring Belgium. A geo-
coded database of Jewish victimization, secondary literature, a survey conducted among
clerics and post-war testimonies highlight two empirical patterns. First, in line with the
theory outlined in this book, Protestants, who formed local minorities everywhere, were
strongly over-represented among rescuers. As a result, Jews living in the vicinity of
Protestant enclaves had a five percent higher chance to evade deportation. This shows
that the minority mechanisms operate in both Belgium and the Netherlands despite large
differences between the two countries in terms of occupation regime, levels of resistance
and religious climate.
For their part, Catholic rescue operations, inspired by leaders who saw the Holocaust
as a opportunity to convert Jewish children, were most likely to succeed in places where
the Roman church was weak because of secularization. In these localities, conversion
related motives in conjunction with local isolation due to localized waves of seculariza-
tion produced assistance to threatened neighbors. So similar to what we saw in Twente,
an alternative form of isolation in combination with non-pluralistic motives combined to
instigate rescue among majority groups.
To further identify the scope conditions of my theory, I investigate whether the minor-
ity hypothesis travels to other countries under Nazi-Occupation and other episodes of
mass-killing in the concluding 12th chapter, which draws on secondary literature and
post-war testimonies from about 6,500 rescuers in twenty-one different countries col-
lected by Yad Vashem. Although minorities are overrepresented among rescuers almost
everywhere, the theory does not seem to travel to places where rescue missions were
highly individualized or where the persecuting regime permitted national elites to openly
cooperate with leaders of majority congregations to resist the Nazi occupation in general.
Put otherwise, the theory does not work in cases where resistance to Genocide is neither
collective nor clandestine. In line with this, Pentecostals Abarokore, Muslims in Catholic
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Rwanda; Kurdish sects, Western missionaries and small patches of Syrian Christians in
Armenia and the Quaker congregations that formed the backbone of underground rail-
way to Canada; suggest that the minority hypothesis travels to other episodes of mass
persecution, as long as Genocidal regimes not actively lured minority groups into the








In order to understand why groups provide humanitarian assistance to threatened neigh-
bors it is important to distinguish between willingness and capacity to protect. People
who are willing to shelter Jews may not be able to translate their motives into action be-
cause they lack the networks and resources to set up the complete operations that are
required to keep potential victims out of the hands of their oppressors. Communities
that have the ability to keep victims of persecution underground, on the other hand, may
never be motivated to do so.
Historians and social scientists working on humanitarian assistance almost always
start with the question of who is willing to rescue, drawing attention to the motivations of
potential helpers. Scholars have focussed on how individual dispositions and norms in-
duced by macro environments shape the willingness to protect. For two reasons, neither
of these two lenses shed light on why subnational variation in protection exists. First, both
dispositional and macro-environmental approaches are conceptualized at the wrong level
of analysis. Whereas the dispostional approach fails to link individual motivations to lo-
cal structural factors, the macro-environmental approach ignores subnational variation
in motivation altogether. Second, both approaches overlook the importance of mobiliz-
ing capacity. In times of mass killing, nascent protectors face a much stronger opponent
who they cannot exclude from their territory. As a result, they often need to rely on un-
derground organizations to save threatened neighbors and some communities are better
at producing illicit networks than others. Whether motivations translate into help, thus
depends on the extent to which they are anchored in communities capable of clandestine
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collective action.
In this dissertation, I therefore take a relational perspective that tries to explain how
changes in local relationships simultaneously shape the willingness and capacity to resist
Genocide. In particular, I argue that local religious minorities are more likely to protect
victims of mass-persecution. This is the case because minority status produces both 1)
empathy with outsiders that are under attack and 2) isolated hubs of commitment that
can be exploited for clandestine movement building. Whereas the former mechanism
motivates resistance, the latter makes it possible.
The next section discusses existing research on rescue and protection and distin-
guishes between dispositional and macro-environmental theories. It will highlight how
neither of these approaches can provide a satisfactory account of protection because they
ignore how subnational forces shape both the motivation and capacity to resist. Follow-
ing this critique, I introduce the first mechanism, outlining how a local minority position
affects anti-Genocidal motivations by creating attachment to pluralism and empathy with
other outsider groups. I then build on existing collective action theories that recognize the
importance of local capacity to develop the second mechanism. Although, these theories
form important building blocks for my own argument, they fall short by either focussing
on public claim making as opposed to secrecy or by failing to identify where local capacity
actually comes from. To drive this point home, I continue by introducing the clandestine
collective action dilemma, i.e. the trade-off between coordination and increased expo-
sure. I subsequently turn to a simple formal model to explain why minority communities
have an advantage in overcoming this dilemma as their members form isolated hubs of
commitment. In the last section, I outline three sub-mechanisms through which nascent




There is a vast literature on the pro-social protection of threatened neighbors in times of
mass persecution. Scholars from across the social sciences have interrogated the root mo-
tivations behind those who display restraint and remain resilient to genocidal impulses.
Most of these studies however tend to focus on how inherent characteristics of individu-
als (micro-level), religions and nations (both macro-level) affect the willingness to protect.
Whereas, the first approach is too micro and fails to link individual motivations to local
community relationships, the latter two are too macro and ignore how the impact of broad
norms is conditioned by local relationships.
On the micro-side of the spectrum, historians and psychologists alike have tried to
reveal the cognitive and emotional sources of (high-risk) altruism. For a large part, these
studies aim to identify personality traits and values that are overrepresented among those
who protect victims of mass persecution. All the usual suspects of demographic research,
such as gender, religion, class, occupation and age have been assessed (Wolfson 1975; S.
Oliner and P. Oliner 1992; Tec 1987; Fogelman 1994).
Maintaining an individual level focus but moving away from standard variables, other
scholars have zeroed in on the ways in which identities and norms shape morals. Build-
ing on social psychological studies of pro-social behavior (Dovidio et al. 2006), Monroe
for instance suggests that those who resist mass persecution see themselves as part of
“a common humanity” (Monroe 2001). Along the same lines, again others have tried to
incorporate altruism into a (very) soft rational choice framework. This approach is exem-
plified by the work of Opp, who suggests that individuals are more likely to rescue Jews
if they have internalized pro-social norms (Opp 1997).1
1Others combine both approaches into a framing perspective, arguing that altruism and rational decision
making are conditioned by situational triggers (Varese and Yaish 2000).
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Religion features quite prominently in most micro-level scholarship. It has been ar-
gued that religiosity or membership of a religious community shapes antipathies to per-
secuted groups, the acceptance of violence and the willingness to resist repressive author-
ities (Gushee 1993). In general, the conclusions of individual-level studies are deemed
tautological (Gushee 1993). The claim that altruistic people with inclusive identities are
more likely to display altruism and safe persecuted outsider is not particularly insight-
ful. In light of this dissertation project, it needs to be emphasized that micro approaches
do not shed much light on the question of why rescue is more common in some localities
than in others because they fail to link individual dispositions, cognition and traits to local
conditions. This accords with a general tendency in the social sciences and history to de-
pict the Holocaust as a story in which heroes exemplify universal values that do not vary
from one place to the other and are juxtaposed against the extraordinary evil of the Nazis.
This approach, however, provides no explanation for why certain individual traits, cogni-
tive biases, internalized norms, identities or religious sources of inspiration are present in
one village (lets say Almelo) and not in another (lets say Borne). In addition, they assume
that motivation in and of itself is sufficient to create mobilization.
A smaller body of work zeros in on how macro-environmental factors produce norms
of resistance among bystanders. Instead of looking at individual dispositions, these schol-
ars shift their focus to how widely carried norms produced by broad macro-environments
motivate the protection of threatened neighbors. Two social environments in particular
feature prominently in this line of work: nations and denominations. Helen Fein’s work
exemplifies the nation-centered approach. In her comparative study of Jewish survival
across Nazi-occupied countries, she finds that the destruction of Jews was less complete
in countries where Jews were considered part of “the universe of obligation”, i.e. the cir-
cle of citizens who deserve state protection (Fein 1979). In a similar vein, Yahil has found
that free social structures and democratic norms in society can restrain the impact of mass
persecution (Yahil 1983), while Strauss in a recent comparison of Rwanda, Cote d’Ivoire,
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Mali and Sudan stresses the importance of inclusive founding narratives of nations for
the deescalation of mass violence (Straus 2015).
These nation-centered studies demonstrate the crucial importance of responses by
governments and other national elites to human rights transgressions. Similar to what
we saw with individual level scholarship, religion plays an important role in this line of
work. Fein conceives of national religious leaders as “keepers of the key” who are instru-
mental in facilitating resistance against Genocide. If national representatives of a church
opposed the Nazis, their flock would automatically follow. Similar arguments have been
made about faith based elites in Kenya, South Africa and Rwanda (Longman 2010).
However, only rarely do we see that national elites save persecuted populations as a
whole. More frequently, protection varies from village to village. While illuminating im-
portant elements of their context, national-level analyses cannot explain why collective
rescue operations emerge in certain localities and not others. Again, we saw in the intro-
duction Catholics in Borne and Almelo received identical messages from their bishops but
their response to the Holocaust varied dramatically. As with the micro-level perspective,
scholars working in this tradition ignore that motivation is not enough to create rescue
operations.
The idea that inherent attributes of different denominations explain the rise of norms
that motivate protection is particularly well represented in Holocaust studies. It has been
argued that religious doctrine shapes antipathies to persecuted groups, the acceptance
of violence and the willingness to resist repressive authorities. This line of work is For
Catholics, it has been argued that their religion reduced solidarity with Jews because of
its reactionary tendencies and the traditional Jewish-Christian Schism (Blaschke 1997).
The hierarchical structure of the Catholic church has been claimed to be a detriment to
as well as a catalyst for resistance (Croes and Tammes 2004). Orthodox Protestantism
has been linked to fascism as it hinges on biblical racism (Scholder 1977), while others
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claim that Orthodox Protestants were willing to defy German authorities because of their
individualistic traditions and emphasis on the Old Testament in which the Jews were de-
picted as the chosen people (Moore 2010). The opposite has been said about Lutherans
who, the conventional wisdom goes, blindly accepted any form of secular political au-
thority in line with their religion (Tiefel 1972). In general, the results of studies that focus
on religious doctrine are mixed and its implications indeterminate (Gushee 1993). Why,
for instance, does Protestantism in one place result in support for National socialism and
resistance in the other?
In summary, existing scholarship either focusses on how inherent traits of individuals,
religions and nations shape the motivation to protect victims of mass persecution. These
studies results in two shortcomings. First, the theories cannot account for local level vari-
ation in motivations to resist Genocide. Whereas the latter two branches of scholarship
are too broad and ignore subnational variation altogether, the first is too narrow and
fails to link individual motives to differential mobilization on a local level. In this light
Scholarship on faith-based resistance in particular is problematic in its assumption that
religion is monolithic and operates the same for everyone regardless of local position and
mobilization opportunities. Second, by solely focussing on motivation, both branches of
theory also overlook that people who are willing to act do not always have the capacity
to do so. In the following sections, I will explain how a more relational focus on capacity
and empathy simultaneously, can help us understand when and where altruistic motiva-




Ancient political thought, provides a promising starting point to come to an understand-
ing of empathy. In order to comprehend compassion with others, Greek thinkers such as
Homer distinguish between agnosune and sungnomosune. Whereas the former refers to a
lack of concern for others that is natural to those who do not share or cannot conceive
themselves sharing related forms of suffering, the latter describes pity in humans that is
driven by the acknowledgement that the possibilities of impairment are very similar for
the pitier and the pitied. In short, it is the recognition of the shared vulnerability of hu-
man beings and understanding that what happens to others can easily befall ourselves
that generates empathy with those in need (Nussbaum 1992).
The relationship between shared vulnerability and empathy is also formulated quite
explicitly by Rousseau when he discusses morality in Emile: “Why are the rich so harsh
to the poor? It is because they have no fear of becoming poor. Why does the noble have
such content for a peasant? It is because he will never be a peasant. It is the weakness
of the human that makes it sociable, it is our common sufferings that carry our heart to
humanity; we would owe it nothing if we were not humans (Rousseau 1979).”
Long before Rousseau, Aristotle, had made clear in Poetics that similarity plays a cru-
cial role in who we see as fellow humans and who not. Alikeness creates a bond and
engenders identification that makes us see that what happens to others like us can also
happen to ourselves. Yet at the same time we do not care about the fortunes of the wicked
as we fail to see them as similar (Kenny 2013)
Social psychology has blended these insights, reformulating them in into the empathy-
altruism nexus, which positions empathy as the primary driver of altruistic behavior (Waal
2008). When individuals know that hardship and trauma can befall themselves, their
capacity to empathize with others increases, especially for those who suffer in similar
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situations to one’s own. These feelings of empathy transcend identity boundaries and
thereby motivate altruistic behavior toward in-group but especially out-group members
(Batson 1991; Krebs 1975).
Experimental research backs up the notion that perceived similarity with those af-
fected by hardship is crucial for the creation of empathy (Staub and Vollhardt 2008). It
compellingly shows that when subjects perceive another as similar, they are more likely
to feel sympathy and provide assistance, even in emergency situations (Karylowski 1976).
This is partly due to enhanced perspective taking and the greater capacity for a cognitive
understanding of anothers condition, which in turn activates vicarious arousal and sym-
pathy (Dovidio 1984).
So what creates similarity, identification and empathy with those who are being vic-
timized by purification campaigns? Social psychologists have deduced the answer from
the empathy-atruism theory. If similarity triggers empathy, outsiders suffering from pu-
rification campaigns are most likely to find support among other minorities because they
themselves depend on pluralism for group survival (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2006) and can
conceive of themselves as being persecuted if pluralism is under threat (Staub 2003). Ex-
ploiting this idea, scholars of immigration in the United States have observed that ethnic
minorities are significantly more likely to side with minority detainees and support pro-
civil rights policies for outsiders (Valentino, Villalobos, and Sirin 2014).
It was Max Weber who recognized the importance of minority status and support
for pluralism and applied it to religion early on: “A fully developed church -advancing
universalist claims- cannot concede freedom of conscious for others; wherever it pleads
for this freedom it is because it finds itself in a minority position [...] However if they
are strong enough, neither the Catholic nor the (old) Lutheran church, and, all the more
so, the Calvinist and Baptist old church recognize freedom of conscious for others (Weber
1978).”
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Hence, religious minorities should be more likely to empathize with victims of pu-
rification campaigns because they recognize the vulnerability they share with those in
danger. They themselves depend on pluralism for group survival and will perceive a im-
minent threat of persecution if this political toleration is under threat. When denomina-
tional lines crosscut or fall outside the national community, as is the case with minorities,
the mystical unity of the church is undermined and religious elites become accustomed
to defending pluralism and empathy because they need to. Put otherwise, when religious
dominance is not possible pluralism is the next best thing and needs to be cherished.
As Homer, Rousseau and Aristotle told us long ago, compassion is largely a function
of understanding the shared vulnerability of human beings and recognizing that what
happens to others can also happen to us (Nussbaum 1992). When other outsiders are
under attack and pluralism comes under fire, religious minorities will empathize and
imbue their networks with the preferences that lead them to oppose Genocidal policies,
while majorities will refrain from doing so. To use the words of the ancient Greeks, re-
ligious majorities have agnosune, while their minority counterparts have sungnomosune
when confronted with victims of mass persecution. As such empathy with outsiders is
shaped by the whether your community, regardless of inherent attributes, is in a minor-
ity relationship itself. Throughout the dissertation, I refer to this process as the empathy
mechanism.
2.4 Capacity
Certainly, local differences in empathy are crucial to understanding responses to geno-
cide. However, an exclusive focus on motivations that overlooks local constraints to mo-
bilization fails to fully account for local level variation in rescue operations. If we cannot
explain collective outcomes as the cumulative effect of individual interests (Hardin 1982)
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and if national level factors hardly ever have universal effects, it is wrong to assume that
motivations are sufficient for rescue operations to emerge. The explanation of pro-social
mobilization must be augmented by an analysis of the conditions that turn empathy into
successful mobilization against Genocide. This requires a shift towards the local and so-
cial social infrastructures of rescue operations (Klandermans and Tarrow 1988; McCarthy
and Zald 1977).
2.4.1 Resource Mobilization and Insurgency
This idea dovetails nicely with theories of resource mobilization (Jenkins 1983) which
claim that whether or not the motivation to engage in collective action translates into
behavior is conditioned by the resources available to movement entrepreneurs.2 This
perspective draws attention to how movement organizers exploit social networks for col-
lective action (Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980).
At least in part inspired by these theories, empirical studies of mobilization have in-
deed revealed that participation in different forms of high-risk collective action depends
on strong personal and organizational ties between nascent organizers and potential re-
cruits (McAdam 1986). Often, these scholars look at successful instances of mobilization
and observe that participants are more likely to be embedded in dense networks than
non-participants. The fact that mobilization is embedded in networks that facilitate col-
lective action is in itself not informative as these networks are inherently part of the mo-
bilization process. At the same time, strong organizational networks and personal ties
abound, while resistance and collective action is both rare and diverse. This literature is
therefore not able to explain why some dense networks produce different forms of high-
risk mobilization while others remain unmobilized altogether (Darden 2015).
2Some go even further and state that motivations are actually transformed by the available resources
(McCarthy and Zald 1977).
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Related branches of social movement scholarship have tried to answer this question
but tend to overlook mobilization done in secret. Instead, they focus on groups that aim
to bring about social change by making themselves heard, i.e. by becoming visible. They
show that networks get activated when they are embedded in broader political oppor-
tunities, broader institutional coalitions or broader issue networks (Loveman 1998). All
three of these are less useful to understand clandestine organizations that purposively
stay within the narrow confines of underground communities and actively avoid broader
opportunities, coalitions and issue networks in order to reduce exposure.
Scholars of insurgency and terrorism encounter this very problem, examining secre-
tive forms of collective action at length (Shapiro 2013; DellaPorta 2013). These scholars
zero in on how underlying social bases of mobilization shape insurgent success. This line
of work however does not delve into the question of where distinctive networks struc-
tures actually come from and as such only provide insight into the proximate causes of
collective action. The few Studies that do address the roots of clandestine collective action
tend to focus on legacies of state repression in authoritarian settings. Finkel for instance
powerfully shows how Jewish underground movements were more likely to emerge in
ghettos where a significant proportion of the population had been targeted by selective re-
pression before World War Two (Finkel 2012). Although insightful, this analysis provides
less information about how underground mobilization emerges in historically pluralist
states with strong civil societies. This project furthers this literature by suggesting that
networks that facilitate clandestine mobilization are not randomly distributed but reflect
the underlying structure of civic life as members of minority groups are more likely to be
embedded in subgroups capable of clandestine collective action.
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2.4.2 The Clandestine Collective Action Dilemma
Protecting victims of mass persecution poses two interrelated challenges that are unique
to underground mobilization and which together constitute what I call the clandestine
collective action dilemma. Firstly, one needs to mobilize. This involves the already men-
tioned and well studied high-risk collective action problem (McAdam 1986). A resistance
organization requires the establishment of communication lines, safe houses, forged doc-
uments, infiltration into the persecuting apparatus and the procurement of sufficient food
for its members. As this is too much work for one person or family alone, cooperation
and delegation are needed.
Yet, attracting people to participate is far from easy. Engagement in any of these ille-
gal activities entails enormous personal risks as the costs of getting caught are often high.
German authorities were very clear about the fact that Gentiles assisting Jews would
be confined in special prison camps, which the Dutch rightfully equated with certain
death(Boom 2012).
The odds of getting caught are often considerable as well. The Nazis deployed tor-
ture and other methods to extract information out of captured Jews and helpers in order
to trace other nodes in the network, often resulting in complete eradication of assistance
movements (Liempt 2013). As a consequence, only one person motivated by ideologi-
cal conviction (Liempt 2013), personal grudges (Kalyvas 2006) or induced by monetary
rewards (Liempt 2002) can put a whole operation at risk. Its collective nature makes res-
cue operations extremely sensitive to such defections. Jews had to pass through a large
number of hands in order to see the end of German occupation and each change of hands
required a new relationship of trust - at the same that it posed a new risk of detection
(Bastholm-Jensen 2007). Beyond the actual participants, the people in the social environ-
ment of rescue networks are also bound to find out about illegal activities, increasing the
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hazard of denunciation even more.
Second, in addition to solving the high-risk collective action problem, resistance net-
works need to be sustained. This requires that secrecy be maintained because resistance
movements cannot exclude oppressors from the areas in which they operate. Indeed, be-
coming known to the persecuting power leads to operational failure and results in further
security threats as perpetrators will try to arrest associates of captured individuals (Finkel
2012).
The secrecy challenge is related to the high-risk collective action problem because
more secrecy reduces the odds of getting caught and makes participation more attractive
for forward-looking actors. However, underground mobilization faces a unique trade-
off that distinguishes it from other forms of high-risk collective action (McCormick and
Owen 2000); mobilization requires recruitment, coordination and communication more
generally, all of which increase the chances of detection and a group being compromised
(Finkel 2012). Hence, the tools needed to increase the collective capacity of a group are
the very tools that put these groups at risk (Shapiro 2013). This has led some specialists of
clandestine organizations to draw the general conclusion that the clandestine collective
action dilemma cannot be solved: “Absolute secrecy guarantees absolutely that nothing
works properly” (Bell 1989).
To reduce exposure, clandestine rescue necessitated careful recruitment of helpers and
the formation of secretive shells around Jews. In confronting these challenges, move-
ment leaders often draw on selective material incentives to reduce the risks of defection
and attract good recruits. Distributing economic endowments to both active and passive
supporters can induce cooperation for a considerable period of time, making high risk
mobilization viable (Lichbach 1998; Popkin 1979). But with the exception of extremely
rich Jews that could afford to pay for their own private networks and some commercial
rescue groups (Moore 2010) such a mechanism rarely operated in this particular context.
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As rescue activities themselves did not create any immediate pay offs, members of most
communities could not be lured into cooperation through payment. So while the potential
risk made rescuing Jews unattractive, material resources to reduce hazards and increase
attraction were often absent.
Local clergy and other religious opinion leaders with few material resources have to
develop alternative strategies to overcome these problems. In particular, they have to ap-
peal to existing group commitment (i.e. the motivation of individual members to fulfill
their group obligations (Hechter 1988)) among their followers to create networks that are
insulated from defection. The literature on insurgency and social movements provides
a wide array of non-material mechanisms that create (Klandermans 1984) and sustain
(Whittier 1997) collective action in high risk contexts, including: honor (Friedman and
McAdam 1992), reputation (Chong 1991), emotional satisfaction (Jasper 1997) believe in
leadership (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young 1971), fear for being excluded from group
networks in the future (McAdam and Paulsen 1993), norms of fairness (Gould 1993), reci-
procity (Petersen 2001) and joy in deploying agency to obtain group goals (Wood 2003).
Their enormous variety notwithstanding, these motives all depend on how much mem-
bers are committed to their group. Group honor, norms, reputation, leadership and rela-
tions do not mean anything -neither instrumentally nor emotionally- when attachments
to a community are only superficial (Hunt and Benford 2004). As group commitment is
something that is hard to shape and develop in the short term, it functions as a structural
constraint on mobilization (Jeremy Weinstein 2006).
Whereas the classic collective action problem requires creating a core of committed
partners that are willing to mobilize, overcoming secrecy necessitates that information
actually stays within this core and does not spread outwards to undedicated outsiders
who could potentially reveal clandestine activities. Hence overcoming both challenges
at once requires hubs of commitment without weak ties that could potentially transmit
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secrets to the uncommitted. The same process that makes weak ties strong when looking
for jobs, i.e. the flow of new information, turns them into a weakness for clandestine
collective action (Granovetter 1973).
This high premium on commitment and secrecy restricts recruitment. It is easier to
generate group commitment between similar actors that already engage in frequent inter-
action. Recruitment into illicit collective action therefore often proceeds through existing
bonds of trust, typically resting on kinship ties or other strong relationships. As a result,
clandestine collective action in times of upheaval often inherits group-structures present
in uneventful times (Erickson 1981). Indeed, earlier mentioned micro-level studies indi-
cate that participation in different forms of secretive collective action such as criminality,
terrorism and resistance depends on strong personal network ties between recruiters and
the recruited, with the latter appropriating existing social bases in service of emerging
movements (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Chains of heroin traffickers tend to be
embedded in family ties (Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004), a large majority of recruits in the
Italian red brigades had friends within the movement already (DellaPorta 1988), while
seventy-five percent of early mujahideen had preexisting bonds of trust before they joined
(Sageman 2004).
Since existing relationships play such a prominent role, structures of group relation-
ships during regular times will create the confines within which clandestine mobiliza-
tion emerges in times of crisis. Although clandestine mobilization might be hard, some
groups are better equipped at doing it than others due to their structural position. In the
next section I will show how minority communities have an advantage in overcoming
the clandestine collective action dilemma because they combine group commitment with
isolation.
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2.4.3 The Minority Advantage
Minority groups are not only more motivated to resist Genocide, they also have a nat-
ural advantage in producing and sustaining the clandestine networks that are required
to turn anti-Genocidal motives into effect. This is the case because they are anchored in
isolated hubs of commitment which provide relatively safe places for illicit mobilization.
Religious groups are almost alway mutually exclusive. One cannot be both a member
of both a Protestant and a Catholic congregation. In order to understand why minority
groups often coalesce into isolated hubs of commitment, it is important to look at the rea-
sons why people are part of one group and not the other. Group membership provides
economic, political and social benefits. Yet, these individual benefits tend to inversely
related to minority status.
Compared to majorities, minorities:
• have less political influence as they can mobilize fewer votes (Posner 2005; Chandra
2007).
• have less legitimacy as they deviate from majority culture (Christian Smith and
Emerson 1998; L. Coser 1956; Ellison and Sherkat 1995; Perl and D. V. Olson 2000).
• are less likely to have access to economically influential people (Wuthnow 1996),
large markets, or jobs (Laitin 1998).3
The pivot of my argument is that membership entails a trade off between different
individual benefits and group commitment and that this trade-off creates isolated hubs
of commitment anchored in minority communities. If individual benefits of group mem-
bership are extremely low and an actor still decides to stay within or become a member
3There is an extensive literature on the benefits that minority membership provides. However, all these
benefits are explained by the higher levels of commitment and isolation of the group which is the explicitly
theorized explanandum of this model (Greif 1993; Portes 1995).
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of this group, her commitment to the respective group must be extremely high. As a
result, the commitment of minority members must be higher relative to majority mem-
bers. In a way, a local minority position acts as a natural screening device because the
exclusive nature of group membership imposes unproductive costs on members by in-
hibiting participation in dominant networks (Iannaccone 1992). Even if the prohibitions
on interaction do not vary locally, the costs that they impose do.4 A formalization of this
argument can be found in the appendix to this chapter.
Although the underpinnings of my theory are strictly rational, it is important to high-
tlight that the strategies are activated by non-rational processes. For the above theory
to operate on a purely rational basis, there need to be a substantive number of people
of people who consider switching religions. A combination of post-war data and infor-
mation on religious intermarriages before the war suggests that this might indeed be the
case as around ten percent of the Dutch population converted (P. Leeuwen 1959; Need
and Graaf 2005). However, most people do not independently make their decision to join
a minority or majority group. Often people automatically enter the groups in which their
parents are already part. But in a similar vein as group membership, group commitment
is also transmitted from one generation to the other (Campbell 1975; Buss 2015; Schwartz
and Bilsky 1990; Geert Hofstede, Gert Hofstede, and Minkov 1991). At one point in time,
one ancestor was forced to choose to join a group or not based on its relative size. With
membership, group commitment of the ancestor who made the choice gets transmitted
to later generations (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981).
Non-rational dynamics also reinforce the minority advantage. Building on the distinc-
tiveness postulate (McGuire et al. 1978), social psychologists have shown that people rely
on perceptual selectivity to make sense of who they are and what groups they are willing
4Here my argument differs from classical accounts in the economics in religion. Where existing expla-
nations stress that the severity of prohibitions increases costs, I am arguing that in segmented societies the
same prohibition imposes different costs depending on local conditions.
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to commit to. Individuals tend to commit most to characteristics that are relatively rare
in their social environments because deviant traits provide the most information about
who you are (Nelson and D. Miller 1995). In line with this argument, social psycholo-
gists studying collective action have demonstrated that minority groups, groups orga-
nized around relatively rare traits, display strong group identification (Mullen, Brown,
and Colleen Smith 1992) and are more likely to invest in within-group networks (Mehra,
Kilduff, and Brass 1998). These network choices and levels of identification in turn in-
crease internal cohesion (R. Kramer et al. 2001), compliance with group norms (Terry and
Hogg 1996), overall loyalty (Mullen, Salas, and Driskell 1989) and voluntary self sacrifice
among members (Brewer and Silver 2000), as well as social isolation (Mehra, Kilduff, and
Brass 1998).
In addition, there has been a long-standing literature that links small group size to
commitment because the former facilitates internal monitoring (M. Olson 1965) . In small
communities it is easier to enforce commitment as monitoring behavior is more straigh-
forward. Although I believe that monitoring might explain some of the rescue operations
that are embedded in tiny enclaves, it provides less analytical leverage to understand
the many rescue groups produced by large groups (in absolute numbers) that formed in
relative minorities. 5
2.4.4 From Isolated Commitment to Clandestine Mobilization
In the previous section I showed why minorities groups are embedded in hubs of com-
mitment that are isolated from undedicated outsiders. As such, these groups have an ad-
vantage in setting up clandestine operations. As outcomes cannot be explained by their
consequences, the minority advantage in clandestine capacity does not manifest itself au-
5Some of the rescue operations discussed in this project had over one hundred members and grew out
of congregations with more than 1000 adherents (Flim 1998).
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tomatically (Hollis 1996; Elster 1989). Reliable and committed volunteers who happen to
be embedded in isolated networks can not simply walk to a recruiting office, nor do all
organizers automatically possess the cognitive skills and information to seize the oppor-
tunity provided by social enclaves (Simon 1982).
This study exposes three feedback mechanisms that translate the abstract minority ad-
vantage into higher levels of clandestine mobilization among deviants: selective survival,
organizer’s assurance and organizer’s selectivity. Whereas the first mechanism is evolu-
tionary in logic, the latter two zero in on the recognition of the minority advantage by
forward looking resistance organizers when recruiting helpers.
First, selective survival refers to the process through which entities with favorable
traits perpetuate themselves because they are more likely to survive environmental con-
ditions (Aldrich 1999). During the Nazi regime, selective pressures for resistance groups
were severe as repressive authorities had consistent strategies to detect, infiltrate and up-
root clandestine networks (Carley, Lee, and Krackhardt 2002). These strategies depended
on intelligence about where illicit activities take place. Given their isolated nature, mi-
nority groups are less likely to reveal this information than majority groups and are con-
sequently less likely to see their mission interrupted by intelligence agents.
Selective survival also amplifies the overall segregation of clandestine organizations.
Expansion of recruitment outside the confines of existing groups is appealing to some
because it can enlarge an organization’s impact and scope. Unfortunately, networks that
scale outwards often create internal differences in ideology, strategy or style. This triggers
innate strife and in turn increases the demand for coordination, as such, it reduces the
likelihood that a rescue organization can keep intelligence out of the hands of their much
stronger opponent.
Second, the importance of social deviance for clandestine collective action reveals it-
44
self to forward looking organizers and recruits via an assurance mechanism (Elster 1979).
As followers, embedded in minority groups, were more willing to take on risk for group
and leadership, rescuers simply recognized that clandestine coordination was possible
within the confines of their enclave, something which was reinforced by the religiously
segregated structures that were already in place before the war. The mere assurance that
fellow church members would cooperate in this way increases the overall motivation
among group members to set up and engage in clandestine missions (Heckathorn 1996).
Third, organizer’s selectivity refers to the leaders ability to distinguish individuals
who are valuable from those who are not. For minority leaders it is easier to acquire
this internal intelligence. In part this ability derives from deep inside knowledge of the
community. Due to the isolated nature of enclaves, minority organizers take up more cen-
tral network positions. Centrality allows leaders to better tap into information flows and
increases the number of signals available so that they can recognize the preferences, trust-
worthiness and capacities of different followers (Marwell and Oliver 1993). Networks in
which close primary relationships were provided in this way not only assured leaders
about the feasibility of mobilization, it also produced an inventory of the different skills
and resources available within the group, all of which could be accessed without having
to leave the enclave of trust (Nepstad and Bob 2006). The network closure of minorities,
as a result, cut across individuals with different skill sets, allowing for coordinated action
among actors that could be trusted (Burt 2009).
2.5 Conclusion
Existing work on the protection of threatened neighbors suffers from two shortcomings.
First, it focusses on micro and macro level factors at the expense of subnational processes
and outcomes. Second, it solely focuses on motivations and overlooks the necessary abil-
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ity to translate motivations into action.
I depart from existing research by emphasizing how subnational relations simultane-
ously affect the willingness and capacity to resist Genocide. The convergence of will-
ingness and capacity make religious minorities particularly likely candidates to provide
protection to persecuted neighbors. Two distinct mechanisms link minority status to res-
cue operations.
First, minorities are better able to provide shelter because they can more easily over-
come the clandestine collective action dilemma, the need to coordinate collective action
while reducing exposure. A combination of group commitment and isolation is required
to transcend this dual problem. Minorities are embedded in self-segregated hubs of
commitment and, as a result have a structural advantage to set up secretive operations.
Through selective survival, organizer’s assurance and organizer’s selectivity, this struc-
tural advantage manifests itself in increased mobilization for those in need.
Minorities are secondly more willing to protect victims of mass persecution because
they empathize with persecuted outsiders and because they themselves depend on plu-
ralism to survive. Whereas the latter mechanism imbues minority networks with the
motivations to resist, the former enables the translation of these motivations into action.
No one less than Durkheim already anticipated the important role of minority churches:
“Obviously, the less numerous confessions facing the hostility of the surrounding popu-
lations, in order to maintain themselves are obliged to exercise severe control over them-
selves and subject themselves to an especially rigorous discipline. To justify the always
precarious tolerance granted them, they have to practice greater morality (Durkheim
1897).”
To test the minority hypothesis, one would want to reveal differences between empa-
thy, networks and commitment of recruits active in minority, majority and mixed groups
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and link these to higher rates of mobilization and lower rates of denunciation. Minority
groups should display more empathy with Jews, be more committed to group and lead-
ership, be easier to mobilize and have less ties with potential snitches compared to their
counterparts in majority or mixed groups.
However, the same problem that hinders clandestine collective action makes it diffi-
cult to do clean empirical research: who is committed and who is not cannot be observed
directly. Nevertheless, the minority hypothesis outlined above suggests a number of em-
pirical patterns to look for when analyzing rescue attempts. I expect that a) minority lead-
ers are willing to set up clandestine rescue networks because they identify with victims
of mass persecution; b) minority leaders are more successful in mobilizing in general and
in setting up clandestine rescue networks in particular; c) if the mobilize majority groups
are less likely to sustain minority operations because they suffer from denunciation by
marginal members or bystanders. As we will see in the next chapter the Low Countries
provide an unique opportunity to investigate this while keeping constant the micro- and
macro-level factors suggested by previous research.
2.6 Appendix: Formal Model
A series of formal games, presented in figures 2.1 thru 2.3, illuminate how the trade-off
between membership benefits and commitment triggers a self-reinforcing spiral, turn-
ing local minority groups in isolated hubs of commitment (Iannaccone 1992; Berman and
Laitin 2008). The world according to these models consists of two types: actors who are
committed (Com) and uncommitted (Un) to their group. These actors make decisions
about whether to join majority or minority groups and how much time to commit as
a member. Both actors try to maximize their pay-offs, which depends on membership















(a) Uncommited members in majority group end game.
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(b) Uncommitted members minority group end game.
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(c) Committed members in majority group end game (If b > 1).
Figure 2.1: Pay offs end games uncommitted (COM) and uncommitted
(UN) group members choosing to commit (C) or not commit
(NC) themselves to the group in majority and minority com-
munities. Chosen strategies in red. Nash Equilibrium in bold
font.
value being part of a well functioning group. Compared to uncommitted actors, the com-
mitted receive an additional pay off when they participate fully in a group where overall
participation is high.
Figure 2.1a describes the outcomes and pay-offs for members of a majority group that
is homogeneously uncommitted (consisting of only uncommitted actors, UN). For sim-
48
plicity’s sake, we assume that the model consists of only two actors who play a sequen-
tial game in which each actor determines how much he or she is willing to commit to
the group. In the first round, an uncommitted member decides whether to fully commit
herself or not, before the second uncommitted actor makes the same choice. If both un-
committed actors choose to fully commit themselves, they produce a strong group and
each get a pay-off of two. If one actor commits herself while the other does not, the actor
with the lower participation free-rides on the other, receiving a pay-off of three, while
the other actor gets zero. In essence, this game yields to a prisoner’s dilemma written in
extensive form in which both uncommitted actors have an incentive to free-ride and not
commit themselves to the group because, regardless of what the first members chooses,
displaying no commitment is always the best choice. As a result and not surprisingly,
a group with uncommitted members turns into a group in which overall commitment is
low. Figure 2.1b shows the pay-offs and strategies for minority groups that solely consists
of uncommitted members. This setup differs from the former in only one respect. Re-
gardless of what strategies are chosen, all members have to pay an additional penalty, c,
because they forego the social, economic and political benefits that majority group mem-
bership has to offer. Needless to say, the outcome of the game is the same: both actors
will choose low commitment and end up worse off than majority group players because
they are penalized for belonging to a minority group.
The situation is drastically different for groups with committed members, Com. These
actors receive an additional pay-off of b if their group turns into an bastion of commit-
ment, i.e. when all members commit themselves to the group. When solving the games
presented in figure 2.1c and 2.2a through backward induction, it is not hard to see that
if b > 1, homogeneously committed groups will result in strong communities in which
overall commitment is high.6 Again, this result is the same, regardless of whether the
committed come together in minority or majority groups. In the former, overall pay-offs




2 + b − c, 2 + b − c
C






1 − c, 1 − c
NC
NC
(a) Committed members in minority group end game (If b > 1).
Com
Un











(b) Mixed members in majority group end game.
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(c) Mixed members in minority group end game.
Figure 2.2: Continued: Pay offs end games uncommitted (COM) and un-
committed (UN) group members choosing to commit (C) or not
commit (NC) themselves to the group in majority and minority
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(b) Outcome 2: No minorities ( if b − c < −1).
Figure 2.3: Pay offs committed (COM) and uncommitted (UN) group
members choosing minority (Min) or majority (Ma j) commu-
nities. Chosen strategies in red. Nash Equilibrium in bold font.
remain of course lower because of the penalty c mentioned above.
The results of the previous four games were straightforward and tautological: groups
with committed members become committed while the opposite is true for groups that
consist of uncommitted members. But what happens if we mix committed and uncom-
mitted members? The pay-offs and strategies for mixed environments are shown in figure
2.2b and 2.2c for minority and majority groups respectively. In mixed groups, committed
actors will often make the first move, but regardless of whether they commit to the group
or not, the uncommitted will always respond with low commitment as this maximizes
their pay-off. The committed first mover will, as a result, also decide to not fully commit
herself to limit the damage of being in a group with free-riders. So even though mixed
groups are joined by committed members, they will ultimately spiral down into a situ-
ation in which overall levels of commitment are low. The additional penalty paid by a
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minority community worsens the overall pay-offs even more.
Now that we know the outcomes of varying group compositions in minority and ma-
jority communities, we can determine how committed and uncommitted members end
up in different groups. Again, I use simple sequential games to visualize this process in
figure 2.3. In the first round, committed actors choose whether to join a majority or mi-
nority group. After that, an uncommitted actor living in the same county chooses which
group to join. Figure 2.3a shows the result for b − c > −1. As we can see, committed
actors segregate themselves into minority enclaves while uncommitted members end up
in dominant groups. By paying the minority penalty c, committed actors weed out the
undedicated and take advantage of their commitment bonus, b. The penalty of joining
an enclave acts as a barrier to entry that deters the undedicated, but not the dedicated.
As such, a minority position acts like a natural screening device that repels potential free-
riders, turning minority church communities into self-reinforcing and isolated hubs of
group commitment that are insulated from uncommitted outsiders. This is the combina-
tion of isolation and commitment required to set up clandestine organizations.
If the costs of minority membership exceed the commitment bonus, such that b−c > −1
the results change dramatically. Instead of isolating themselves in minority hubs, com-
mitted actors join the uncommitted in majority communities. As a result, minority groups
disappear altogether. However we know that religious minorities exist in and outside the
Low Countries. In order for minority groups to exist, the commitment bonus needs to
be larger than the the minority penalty, such that b − c > −1. I established above that
the social, economic and political costs of joining a minority are inversely related to size.
Given that the costs increase the smaller the community becomes, we can deduce that
commitment needs to be enormous in order for tiny enclaves to emerge.
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CHAPTER 3
RELIGIOUSMINORITIES IN THE LOW COUNTRIES: FROM THE
REFORMATION TO THE HOLOCAUST
3.1 Introduction
I substantiate the claim that minorities are more likely to protect victims of mass perse-
cution by exploiting evidence drawn from the religious rescue of Jews in the the Low
Countries during the Holocaust. Religious rescue of Jews in the the Netherlands and Bel-
gium provides a unique albeit tragic opportunity to investigate the minority hypothesis
for five reasons.
First, there is sufficient variation on the minority variable. The Low Countries were at
the frontline of the reformation, counter-reformation and Protestant secessions. Mission-
ary activities (of both Protestants and Catholics) and disputed scripture (mostly within
the Protestants church) created a religiously pluralist society and resulted in pockets of
minority communities in both Catholic and Protestant parts of the region (Rogier 1964).
This mixed landscape allows me to assess whether religious deviance affected mobiliza-
tion for both Protestant and Catholic communities while keeping ideology constant.
Second, comparisons within the Netherlands allow me to keep both top down enforce-
ment of mobilization and cross-national differences, constant. Protestant and Catholic
leaders alike protested anti-Semitic legislation collaboratively at the national level, pro-
viding all Christians with the same moral message of how German persecutions went
against the tenets of their faiths regardless of congregation (Snoek 2005).
Fourth, there is enormous variation on the dependent variable. As Jews lived spread
out over the Low Countries, both Protestant and Catholic congregations were presented
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with the challenge to provide protection. How they responded however varied from one
place to the other.
Fifth, a comparison of subnational patterns between the Netherlands and Belgium
enables me to explore whether the minority hypothesis operates the same in places where
the Holocaust evolved differently.
In the next section, I briefly describe the religious landscape of the Low Countries lead-
ing up to World War Two and highlight the enormous religious diversity of the region. I
will then discuss the similar ways in which religious diversity was managed by political
elites in both countries. This involves a brief discussion of what Arend Lijphart dubbed
pillarization. Next, I describe the Jewish community in the Low Countries at the onset
of World War Two, before moving on to outline how the Holocaust played out in both
countries. In the last section, I discuss the specific empirical implications of the minority
hypothesis in the context of the Low Countries.
3.2 Frontline between Rome and Reformation
In 1506, about a decade before becoming both the King of Spain and the Emporer of Ger-
many Charles V inherited large parts of the Netherlands and Belgium from the Dukes of
Burgundy. Exploiting his powerful position, Charles brought together a territory he re-
ferred to as the Seventeen provinces or the Low Countries, a well demarcated area locked
in between the Rhine and Meuse rivers, to the North of France which, corresponded to
present day the Netherlands and Belgium (Blom 2006).
The Low Countries had historically been a breeding ground for new religious move-
ments. While traditions of tolerance attracted religious dissenters from all over the world,
its expansive trade system, advanced printing industry, waterways and high levels of
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urbanization created fertile soil for different streams of Lutheranism, Anabaptism and
Calvinism, with the latter congregation becoming the most dominant during the refor-
mation (Van Eijnatten and Lieburg 2005).
Together with urban patricians and lower nobility, who were attracted to more fiscal
autonomy, Calvinists organized an insurgency against the Catholic King Phillip, who
inherited the seventeen provinces from his father Charles, and pursued intense anti-
Protestant policies. Compared to other dissenting religions, Calvinism formed the most
natural ideological underpinning for this revolution given its believe in bottom-up re-
form (differentiating it from Lutheranism) and emphasis on a public display of identity
(as opposed to Baptism). In addition, its international infrastructure and organizational
structure provided a strong backbone for the independence movement (Van Eijnatten and
Lieburg 2005).
After the uprising, the Seventeen Provinces were cut in half in 1579. Whereas large
parts of the South East were reattached to Phillip’s territory, the northern parts broke
away from the Spanish crown, forming the Republic of the United Provinces. These po-
litical processes had an enormous impact on the effectiveness of the reformation as well
as the counterreformation, i.e. a combination of internal Catholic reform and active recon-
version. While the Catholic church could uproot newly founded Protestant communities
and reinstate Catholicism in South Eastern the Netherlands as well as Belgium under the
reign of the Spanish king, the re-establishment of Catholicism in the North was largely
impaired and depended heavily on the passion of individual missionaries (Rogier 1964).
Here, the Protestant church could establish a unified religious infrastructure (Van Eijnat-
ten and Lieburg 2005). As we can see in figure 3.1a this resulted in Protestant territory in
the North West and Catholic territory in the South East of the Low Countries.
In 1648, Dutch troops re-conquered some Southern provinces from the Spanish crown
(Blom 2006). This military development proved to be a defining moment in the history
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of the Low Countries. For the next century, Catholic Belgium and religiously mixed the
Netherlands, separated by a national border, would follow different paths both politically
and culturally (see figure 3.1b).
The constitutional protection of religious pluralism in the Netherlands prevented the
complete conversion to Calvinism. For the same reason, the Netherlands never be-
came religiously homogenous despite Calvinist privileges in education and politics in the
North. Instead, local elites in the Southern provinces were granted autonomy in religious
affairs, sustaining Catholic dominance (Van Eijnatten and Lieburg 2005).
Being literally at the fault line between Rome and Reformation, the Netherlands now
became a hotbed of missionary activity as both Protestants and Catholics started to make
inroads into each others’ territories. These activities created religious enclaves on both
sides of the religious boundary. While the Catholic mission in the North was more suc-
cessful than its Protestant counterpart in the South, small pockets of Protestantism were
able to grow over the years due to economic integration of industrialized regions near the
Belgian border (Rogier 1964).
Apart from conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism, conflicts within the
Protestant church added to the emergence of minority enclaves throughout the country.
In the nineteenth century, Orthodox Protestants broke away from the dominant Dutch Re-
formed church out of discontent with enlightened undertones of modern Protestantism.
Although these communities were spread out all over the country, they were more con-
centrated in the South West and Center, an area known as the Dutch bible belt (Knippen-
berg 1992).
Figure 3.2 shows the relative strength of Catholicism versus Protestantism and the
strength of Orthodox Protestant movements per municipality, a geographic unit roughly
comparable with a U.S. county, in 1930. Whereas completely red municipalities were
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(a) Frontline Insurgency 1579. (b) Conquest of Southern Provinces and national
split, 1648.
(c) Religion in Low countries before outbreak
WW2.
Figure 3.1: Evolution of religion in the Low Countries, 1579-1945.
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Figure 3.2: Protestants, Catholics and Orthodox Protestants in the Nether-
lands, 1930 (CBS 1931).
dominated by Catholics, green municipalities were dominated by Protestants. The po-
litical geography of three centuries was still visible in the interwar period (CBS 1931).
Catholics were dominant in the South, while Protestants dominated the North. In addi-
tion to the Orthodox Protestant churches that were spread throughout the country, mi-
58
nority enclaves of Protestants and Catholics also emerged in the East and North-West as
well as near the religious fault line (municipalities represented in yellow and orange in
Figure 2).
Figure 3.3: Protestant communities in Belgium, 1950 (Katholiek Jaarboek
1950).
Under Habsburg rule, the counterreformation in Belgium continued with success.
The Spanish king rejected pluralism and succeeded in completely restoring Catholic
hegemony. Through educational reform, theological centralization, clerical oversight
and the mobilization of religious orders, Protestantism was slowly weeded out, though
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small hubs of Protestantism remained. Ironically, the reformation had historically been
strongest in Belgium (Van Eijnatten and Lieburg 2005). Dedicated hubs of Protestants
therefore sustained themselves at the the margins of society. These small pockets of re-
ligious dissent were strengthened throughout the centuries by immigrants from nearby,
France, Germany and Holland (Dhooge 1985).
Right before the German invasion, Catholic Belgium was home to twelve different
Protestant denominations. Although it is not possible to retrieve census data on religion,
estimates based on subsidization requests suggest that around 50,000 Belgian citizen be-
longed to one of these twelve communities during the interwar period (Saerens 2007b).1
According to the 1950 yearbook of the Catholic church these protestant churches were
organized in 248 congregations spread out through the country, as is displayed in figure
3.3.2
3.3 Pillarization
When looking at the Dutch religious landscape in figure 3.2, one question jumps out:
how did a small state deal with so much religious fractionalization?3 This exactly is the
puzzle that made both Lijphart and the Netherlands famous among social scientists in
the United States. Following more casual and often normatively loaded observations
by Dutch sociologists notably Kruijt and Thurlings, Lijphart systematically conceptual-
ized and mapped how elites were able to pacify conflict between secular and different
religious groups (Rigthart 1986). According to Lijphart’s theory, Protestant and Catholic
leaders alike stabilized society by preventing members of different religious communities
1For an overview see (Dhooge 1985).
2Katholiek jaarboek voor Belgie (1950). Brussel.
3Dutch political scientist Daalder famously wrote that a American colleague had once remarked that
given its combination of religious diversity and strong democratic institutions the Netherlands should in
theory not exist (Daalder 1974).
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from interacting with each other at a local level, while allowing for elite cooperation on a
national level (Lijphart 1968).
As Lijphart would soon find out, this strategy was not unique to the Netherlands
(Lijphart 1981). In neighboring Belgium, religious elites organized society along similar
lines. Here, self-segregation was not used as a way to prevent interaction between fol-
lowers of different congregations, but solely as a protection mechanism against the rise of
the secular forces of socialism and liberalism (S. Hellemans 1988).
Indeed, church leaders in both countries actively encouraged religious segregation in
at least three ways. As a first step, clear markers were developed that enabled one to
establish someones religious identity in a few seconds. Simply looking at a persons’ full
name or wedding ring would enable one to identify “the other”. Whereas Catholics wore
their ring on their left hand, Protestants wore it on the right (Chorus 1964).
Second, a collective identity was built along religious lines. Church leaders mutu-
ally stigmatized adherents of different religions to further strengthen group boundaries.
While Protestant leaders openly doubted the loyalty of Catholics to the Dutch state,
Catholic leaders lamented the way in which Protestants discriminated against Catholics
in the domains of health care, education and civil service jobs (Sengers 2003). Ortho-
dox churches at the same time considered other religions as too liberal (Klinken 2000).
All religious groups saw seculars as a force that could potentially destroy society, while
seculars in return viewed religious all people as backwards (Rigthart 1986). On some
occasions these antagonisms even resulted in inter-religious riots on a local level (Groot
2000). Group boundaries were further reinforced by the creation of national networks
that unified different local religious organizations (Luykx 1978) and the initiation of ma-
jor national sermons dedicated to collective devotion (Margry 2002).
Third, an impermeable wall of associations formed to seclude the different groups.
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Most importantly, both Catholics and the different Protestant communities were encour-
aged to build their own churches and schools and were prohibited from participation in in
religious and educational activities of the other group. In response to the growth of civil
society, religious leaders in both countries, regardless of denomination, established par-
allel organizations under exclusive clerical control. In addition to schools, church com-
munities maintained general youth organizations, sport teams, mass media and labor
unions as well as associations for highly specific activities such as goat breeding or hom-
ing pigeons to make sure inter-denominational contact as well as contact with seculars
was limited to a bare minimum. Although data for the pre-war period is not available,
statistics from 1950 reveal that less than five percent of the population participated in the
activities of other groups (Kruijt and Goddijn 1962).
Whereas associations controlled segregation in the public sphere, house visits by cler-
ics monitored whether believers interacted with members of other denominations in the
private sphere. Non-compliance with norms of segregation resulted in deprivation from
religious rewards. Religious intermarriage which was often referred to as with sleeping
with the devil, for instance, resulted in excommunication and was relatively rare (P. V.
Leeuwen 1959).
It has been argued that pillarization in and of itself reduced help for Jews as local level
segregation inhibited interaction between Jews and Gentiles (Croes and Tammes 2004)
and the hierarchical set up induced obedience to authority (Blom 1987). The central ar-
gument advanced here refines this thesis by highlighting that whether pillarization had
a positive or negative impact on evasion opportunities depended on how a pillar was
embedded in local communities. Whereas a majority pillar induces passivity and reduce
empathy with outsiders, the opposite is true for local minority pillars, where identifi-
cation with fellow minorities is stronger and leaders are able to exploit tight authority
structures and group commitment to set up rescue operations.
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3.4 Jews in the Low Countries
The Jewish community hardly registered as an independent pillar in the Low Countries
(Romijn 2002). Despite the emergence of some smaller Jewish associations, attempts to set
up distinct unions or schools largely failed. Numbers were too small, identification too
low and internal divisions too large to constitute a cohesive and independent community
(Wasserstein 2012).
This was the logical outcome of a long history of Jewish migration. Jews had already
established themselves permanently in the region around the turn of the sixteenth century
when the counterreformation was unfolding. Large groups of Sephardic Jews, fleeing the
Catholic inquisition, arrived in the Low Countries that had recently introduced freedom
of worship. The Sephardic immigrants spoke Ladino and were highly educated as well
as prosperous (Israel 1989).
The contrast with the Ashkenazic Jews who entered the country around the same time
was stark. This Yiddish speaking group from Eastern Europe was driven to the West
by extreme levels of poverty and the Thirty years war. For a century, the Ashkenazic
Jews from the east and the Sephardic Jews from the South enjoyed religious freedom
and formed communities that were separate both from each other and Gentile society (Y.
Kaplan 1989; Abicht 2006).
This all changed with the French revolution, the core values of which were imposed
on the the Dutch and Belgians directly through the Napoleonic occupation. From that
point forward foreign rulers and subsequent native governments actively pursued inte-
gration of Jews into their host societies (J. Michman, Beem, and D. Michman 1999). These
policies proved to be quite successful. Both Yiddish and Ladino slowly disappeared and
Jewish elites from either subgroup started aligning themselves with neutral or secular or-
ganizations, minimizing the influence of organized Zionism and Orthodoxy. The gradual
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disappearance of a distinctive Jewish identity was enhanced by the fact that anti-Semitism
was mild and had never been an obstacle to social assimilation (Blom and Cahen 2002).
Among the lower classes, Jewish identification remained somewhat stronger, express-
ing itself through low intermarriage rates and more residential segregation, mainly in
Amsterdam, Brussels and Antwerpen. This continued with 79.000 Jews who came as
refugees from Nazi-Germany or Eastern-Europe in the thirties. These recent arrivals
formed their own separate group who leaned towards more culturally distinct practices
than those born in the Low Countries (Houwink-ten-Cate 1989).
At the onset of the German occupation in May 1940, the Netherlands had a Jewish
population of about 140.000, of whom fifty-six percent lived in Amsterdam. Still, due to
their long history in the Netherlands, Jews lived throughout the country in both Catholic
and Protestant regions, as we can see in the figure below. This is important because it
urged minority and majority congregations on both sides of the religious fault line to
engage in rescue activities when the Germans invaded and the Final solution started un-
folding.
Belgium was home to between 66,000 and 70,00 Jews right before the outbreak of
World War Two. When the deportations started, this number had fallen to 52,000, as
several thousand Jews were able to escape the country. These 52,000 Jews are mapped in
figure 3.5 and lived throughout Belgium, with large concentrations in Antwerp and Brus-
sels (Saerens 2006b). When we compare maps 3.3 and 3.5 we can see that Jews and Protes-
tants largely overlapped in where they lived. As a result, like their Dutch counterparts,
minority Protestant enclaves in Belgium were exposed to the Jewish plight throughout
the 20th century.
It is important to highlight that despite historical similarities, the Jewish populations
in both countries were not completely comparable at the onset of the war. The biggest
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Figure 3.4: Jews in the Netherlands, 1942.
difference was that only ten percent of all Dutch Jews were foreign nationals while the
this was true for ninety percent of all Belgian Jews. These differences were driven by three
processes. First, early pluralist traditions in religiously mixed the Netherlands made the
country more attractive for Jews than homogeneously Catholic Belgium in the nineteenth
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Figure 3.5: Jews in Belgium, 1942.
and twentieth centuries. Second, economic differences between the two countries in the
nineteenth century triggered substantial migration of well integrated Jews from Belgium
to the Netherlands. Third, Belgium was more attractive for refugees in the 1930s because




The Nazis invaded the Low Countries in 1940. Contrary to what happened in Eastern
Europe which was ruled through terror, plunder and exploitation, German occupation
policy in the Netherlands and Belgium was aimed at preserving public order and inte-
grating the national economies into the war effort. This resulted from the fact that Ger-
many did not have enough man-power and resources to administer all foreign territory
directly. Instead, they established supervisory administrations (Aufsichtsverwaltungen),
leaving day-to-day matters, whenever possible, to native authorities and local civil ser-
vants (Griffioen and Zeller 2011).
When implementing the Final Solution, both countries, together with France were also
considered to be a single unit by central planners in Berlin. With help from domestic in-
stitutions, the Nazis isolated Jews socially, economically and administratively (Herzberg
1978; M. Steinberg 2004). When the major deportations started in June and July 1942, Jews
were no longer allowed to travel without a permit, enter public spaces or own more than
250 dollars. More importantly, the SS institutions responsible for Jewish persecution had
been able to exploit lower echelons of local bureaucracies, which had remained intact,
to obtain detailed residential information on all Jews living in the country (Wielek 1947;
Van Doorslaer, Debruyne, et al. 2004).
In both countries, the Nazis tried to deport Jews to extermination camps under the
guise of work. At first they hoped all Jews would obey orders and show up for depor-
tation themselves after receiving a call. When this did not turn out to be true for large
portions of the Jewish population, the German security forces started organizing round-
ups in collaboration with either local police forces or new troops of native volunteers. In
the last stage of the deportation, between October 1943 and September 1944, the Germans,
helped by newly established police units and bounty hunters, started tracking down Jews
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who had gone underground (Meershoek 1999; Croes and Tammes 2004; Liempt 2002;
Liempt 2013; Saerens 2007a; Saerens 2000).
At the end of 1944 the Netherlands was declared Judenrein. The result of the preceding
years was nothing less than a disaster: more than seventy percent of the Jews were killed
(Hirschfeld 1991). Jews fared much better in neighboring Belgium where sixty percent
was able to survive the war (M. Steinberg and Schram 2008). This considerable difference
can be largely explained by three factors: Jewish responses, the autonomy of persecuting
agencies and, most important for this dissertation, resistance by the Gentile population
(Griffioen and Zeller 2011).
First, the Jewish populations in the two countries reacted differently to anti-Jewish
legislation. These differences largely reflected demographic differences between Belgian
and Dutch Jews. Jews in the Netherlands, a large majority of which were well-integrated
Dutch citizens, had a tendency to trust local institutions and rely on legal ways that
(falsely) appeared to enable escape (Blom 1987). The importance of the Jewish Council in
implementing anti-Jewish legislation was indicative of this process. This representative
body was imposed on the Jews by the occupying forces and was completely subordinated
to the SIPO-SD, the persecuting agency in the Netherlands. Members of the council were
highly regarded Jewish leaders who participated in the hope that they could limit the
damage for their followers. Unintentionally however, they legitimized and streamlined
the registration and deportation process by collecting information and inducing Jews to
cooperate with the authorities (D. Michman 1992).
In Belgium, a large majority of the Jews were of foreign descent and had witnessed
violent persecution before. As a result, they were defiant when faced with deportations
and were more inclined to turn to underground movements in order to escape (Moore
2010). With the establishment of the Association for Jews in Belgium (AJB), the Nazis hoped
to create a tool similar to the Dutch Jewish Council. However, the AJB lacked legitimacy
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and was immediately contested by Jewish underground councils. The Nazi police was
never able to attain full control over this Jewish body as it had to share authority with
other German agencies (Van Doorslaer and Schreiber 2004).
This brings us to the second difference between the Netherlands and Belgium: the
autonomy of the persecuting police agencies. Following the quick capitulation by the
Dutch armed forces, a Nazi civilian government led by Reichs Commissioner Seys-Inquart,
gave carte blanche to the SIPO-SD. The German persecutors in the Netherlands created
a system which enabled them to organize and implement the deportations seamlessly.
The SIPO-SD had around 5,000 German police officers to its disposal and were given full
control over the newly centralized Dutch police forces that had been wrestled from the
control of Dutch authorities (Griffioen and Zeller 2011).
Initially, Belgium was considered a launch pad for attacks on Germany’s nemesis
Great Britain. The Nazis therefore ruled the country through a military government,
which had to let defense interests prevail over purely ideological goals. Within this gov-
ernment the agencies in charge of deporting Jews were simply one of many authorities
vying for influence. The 2000 German police officers in the country could in principle
be used for arresting Jews, but they were also needed for other tasks. Except for some
round-ups in Antwerp, the Nazis could also not exploit the man power of the local po-
lice apparatus. As a result, the Nazis had to rely on relatively chaotic and brutal arrests,
which soon alienated everyone (Meinen 2009).
This alienation in part explains the third important difference between the Nether-
lands and Belgium: mobilization by the Gentile population. As crossing the national
border was extremely difficult, Jews who wanted to escape deportation had to find hid-
ing inside the country which depended heavily on the aid of others, whether through
sharing of resources, providing shelter or allowing mobility (Varese and Yaish 2000).
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How did Gentiles in both countries respond? After some smaller ad-hoc roundups in
the spring of 1941, civil servants in the Dutch capital of Amsterdam instigated a furious
strike that diffused to surrounding cities and private industries, paralyzing the economic
center of the country for a few days (Sijes 1954). This rebellious attitude, however, dis-
solved after the strike was brutally repressed by German security forces. Although most
gentiles were aggrieved about what happened to the Jews, they remained inactive in the
face of repressive threats. Feelings of powerlessness and fear dominated as helping Jews
entailed the risk of getting deported oneself (Boom 2012). Occasionally, isolated altru-
ists were able to assist Jews but more often sheltering was too much work for one or
two people alone (Flim 1998). With the exception of some student networks, most res-
cue activities remained geographically isolated and disjointed (Jong 1969-1991). It was
not until late 1943, when forced labor was extended to include Gentiles as well, that the
willingness to provide shelter started to grow and something resembling a national res-
cue movement emerged. By then it was ”little too late” (Moore 1997) as most Jews had
already been rounded up and those that had not lived in Amsterdam and The Hague,
strongholds of German security forces that were difficult to escape (Presser 1965).
After a short period of indifference among Gentiles, help was more readily available
in Belgium. In addition to the outrage over police brutalities and willingness of Jews to
ask for help, this was largely due to general discontent among the Gentile population
with general Nazi politics. Unhappiness was particularly driven by the early and more
radical introduction of compulsory labor for Gentiles in October 1942. As a consequence,
the availability of escape opportunities exploded nine months earlier than in the Nether-
lands, when both non-Jewish and Jewish citizens were forced to participate in working
programs (Moore 2010).
Despite overall passivity in the Netherlands, one group of actors that did openly stand
up for the Jews and protested anti-Semitic policies early on were national church lead-
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ers. Contrary to almost all other organizations, such as political parties and labor unions,
church networks were never dismantled because the Germans were afraid to alienate reli-
gious elites. Their denominational differences notwithstanding, the three major religious
groups - Protestants, Orthodox Protestants and Catholics - all saw anti-Semitism as being
in conflict with the inclusive underpinnings of Dutch society (Braun 2016).
Motivated by this fear, Protestant leaders were the first to protest discriminatory
Nazi policy. The Dutch Reformed church and the two smaller Orthodox churches (Re-
formed and Christian Reformed) collectively sent an open petition to Reichskommissar
Seyss-Inquart in October of 1940 to denounce the declaration of Aryan ancestry that civil
servants had to sign in order to stay employed (Touw 1946). The petition was also de-
livered from the pulpit in all Dutch Reformed churches. In the meantime, the Reformed
and Christian Reformed Protestants also organized fundraisers “to support their Jewish
brothers” (Delleman 1949). Over four years, all Protestant churches openly protested
anti-Semitic legislation twenty-two times, five of which were read from the pulpit during
public sermons in the whole country. Four of these acts of defiance explicitly rejected the
deportations of Jews, others targeted prohibition signs, sterilization measures or persecu-
tions more in general (Tammes and Smits 2005).
The Roman Catholic Bishops expressed their outrage with anti-Jewish measures for
the first time in September 1941. In response to legislation that forbade Jews to attend
Christian schools, the Catholic leaders openly challenged German authorities for strip-
ping Dutch citizens from their civil rights (Aukes 1956). This protest was followed by
sixteen others, two of which were read out during mass (Tammes and Smits 2005). In
addition, Archbishop De Jong donated 12,000 dollars to an organization that provided
shelter to Jewish children (Jong 1969-1991) and secretly encouraged local clergy to help
Jews “by any means possible” (Stokman 1945).
From January 1942 onwards, leaders of the three churches, for the first time in Dutch
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history, combined forces. In an unprecedented display of inter-religious solidarity, Chris-
tian churches agreed to read joint statements from their pulpits during local services
throughout the whole country in July 1942 and February 1943, declaring the culpability
of anyone who contributed to the deportations of Jews (Snoek 2005).
In line with the moral impetus sent out by their superiors, local clergymen (and
woman) and other religious opinion leaders played a key role in instigating the small
assistance networks that were so crucial for evasion early on (J. Michman, Flim, et al.
2004). However, protests and sermons told congregants what not to do rather than what
to do. As a result, religious help to Jews was far from universal. At a local level, some
religious groups produced rescue networks while others did not.
Interestingly, although overall resistance against the Nazis was more widespread in
Belgium, its church leaders did not stage open protests against anti-Jewish legislation.
Although some claim that this had to do with anti-Semitic traditions within the domi-
nant Catholic church (Saerens 2006a), other suggest that the churches remained silent not
to attract attention and, as such, facilitate clandestine rescue operations (Gevers 2006).
Indeed, both Bishop Van Roey and Protestant leaders expressed their indignation about
the deportations in private correspondences. Moreover, local clerics and believers seem
to have played an important role in providing assistance to Jews. Again, as we saw for
the Netherlands this varied from one place to the other (Saerens 1998). How can we ex-
plain this variation in religious protection? The minority hypothesis introduced in the
preceding chapter sheds light on this question.
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3.6 Empirical Implications
In the previous chapter I have outlined why religious minorities are at the same time more
willing and better able to protect victims of mass persecution. While group isolation pro-
vides the capacity to stage clandestine collective action, shared dependency on pluralism
creates empathy with other outsiders, inculcating networks with the preference to resist
Genocide.
When we combine the mixed religious landscape of the Low Countries with the mi-
nority hypothesis, we end up with the following empirical implications:
1. Catholics were more likely to protect Jews in Protestant parts of the Netherlands
because their members had more empathy with Jews and formed isolated hubs of
commitment, taken together this enabled them to both initiate and sustain clandes-
tine rescue networks.
2. Mainstream protestants were more likely to protect Jews in Catholic parts of the
Netherlands because their members had more empathy with Jews and formed iso-
lated hubs of commitment, taken together, this enabled them to both initiate and
sustain clandestine rescue networks.
3. Orthodox Protestants were more likely to protect Jews throughout the Netherlands
because their members had more empathy with Jews and formed isolated hubs of
commitment, taken together, this enabled them to both initiate and sustain clandes-
tine rescue networks.
4. All Protestants were more likely to protect Jews in Belgium because their members
had more empathy with Jews and formed isolated hubs of commitment, taken to-
gether, this enabled them to both initiate and sustain clandestine rescue networks.
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To test these implications, this dissertation first examines subnational rescue patterns
within the Netherlands before moving on to Belgium. The first three empirical implica-
tions about the Netherlands together constitute a tailored, most-similar systems research
design that keeps constant numerous confounding variables, including any inherent char-
acteristics of religions and cross-national variation.
Comparing the same religious groups in areas of different religious composition
within one country achieves three goals. First, it provides variation in minority/majority
status for both Protestants and Catholics. Second, it allows for comparisons between mi-
nority and majority groups in different geographic areas. Third, national level differences
in deportation policies, Jewish populations and top-down mobilization are kept constant.
The latter is unique to the Netherlands, where religious leaders regardless of congrega-
tion, collectively and consistently protested anti-Semitism, providing all Christians with
the same message about how the Holocaust went against the tenets of their faith.
The fourth empirical implication allows me to explore whether the minority hypothe-
sis operates in a completely different national context. The Netherlands and Belgium dif-
fered fundamentally in occupation regime, Jewish population, overall levels of resistance,
Nazi strength, religious pluralism, and religious protests. If the minority hypothesis op-
erates in both contexts, we can be more certain that these powerful factors do not act as
scope conditions for my theory.
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Part II




RELIGIOUSMINORITIES AND EMPATHY 1930-1940
4.1 Introduction
According to the minority hypothesis religious minorities should be more willing to pro-
tect targets of Genocide as they empathize with victims of mass-persecution and are at-
tached to pluralism. This chapter investigates this hypothesis through an in-depth anal-
ysis of public debates on Jewish issues for the years 1930-1939. During the decade pre-
ceding World War Two, Judaism was politicized world wide and in Europe in particular.
Major political events such as the Spanish civil war in which many Jews fought at the
side of the republican army, developments in Palestine, religious persecution in the So-
viet Union, and of course, anti-Jewish legislation in Nazi Germany all made Jewish issues
salient. The latter two events also resulted in an enormous flow of Jewish refugees to
the Low Countries. In addition, Dutch Jews had become active participants in the po-
litical process, either representing secular movements or claiming special cultural rights.
The response of Gentiles to all these developments varied enormously. On the one hand,
real problems related to the economic crises, immigrant flows and anti-Semitic tendencies
among Gentiles spurred the rise of anti-Jewish mobilization. On the other, Gentiles came
to the defense of Jews and decried both international and domestic anti-Semitism.
In this turbulent environment, elites representing different groups tried to make sense
of events and formulate both problems and solutions pertaining to perceived Jewish prob-
lems. (Snow and Benford 2000). This chapter presents a comparative content analysis of
Catholic claim making about Jews in Catholic and Protestant parts of the country for the
time period 1930-1940 to substantiate the minority hypothesis. In particular, I will an-
alyze the frames and positions that majority and minority Catholics as well as secular
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individuals employed when talking about Jews.
Following Habermas, I distinguish between first order identity frames and second order
utilitarian frames. The former pinpoint how Jews were perceived in relation to society in
general and Catholicism in particular. These perceptions in turn activate the latter type
of frames, which justify sentiments towards outsiders by emphasizing the importance
of attaining specific goals. Based on the minority theory outlined in chapter two and
an extensive reading of secondary literature on Anti-Semitism/Philo-Semitism, I identify
four identity and six utilitarian frames.
I code the frame, evaluation of Jews and the claimant for each public statement re-
garding Jews that appeared in two different news outlets using a semi-automatic con-
tent analysis. I compare a Catholic newspaper published in the Protestant North of the
Netherlands with a Catholic newspaper in the Catholic South to allow for cross-group
comparisons between minority and majority Catholics. Unfortunately, it was not possi-
ble to conduct a parallel analysis for Protestant newspapers as no Protestant newspapers
were digitally available for the whole time period.
The analysis underlines the importance of minority status for the formation of senti-
ments towards Jews before the outbreak of World War Two. In Protestant areas, Catholic
leaders were more positive towards Jews than Catholics living in Catholic parts of the
country. The content analysis suggests that this was due to the fact that minority Chris-
tians were more likely to perceive themselves as similar to Jews, highlighting the im-
portance of pluralism when discussing anti-Semitism and Jewish rights. During these
discussions, Jews were often conceived as an pious ally in the fight against secularism,
deserving protection from religious persecution.
Catholic elites in Catholic Limburg, on the contrary, were more likely to represent
Jews as religious deviants that had to be assimilated. When comparing themselves with
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Jews majority Catholics often highlighted important differences and even went as far as
to claim that Jews were given a preferential treatment by international and Dutch elites.
This focus on cultural contrast and assimilation occasionally kindled separate strands of
religious anti-Semitism into a Christian discourse that was more hostile towards Jews.
Taken together these findings indicate that before the outbreak of World War Two
Catholic elites in Protestant Holland were more likely to imbue their networks with the
pluralist values that led followers to resist anti-Semitism and attacks on pluralism, com-
pared to their counterparts in Catholic areas.
In the next section, I will explain what is meant by a frame and introduce the cate-
gorization mentioned above. I then discuss the data sources and coding strategies. The
discussion of results that follows is split into four parts. The first part compares the dif-
ferent ways in which minority and majority Catholics in the Netherlands evaluated Jews
in public debates. The second provides a bird’s eye view of the argumentative structure
underlying this difference by comparing the frames that minority and majority Catholics
deployed. I then illustrate differences in framing by zeroing in on two particular salient
debates: responses to anti-Jewish persecutions and demands for religious rights, with the
aim of tracing the roots of divergent framing.
4.2 Frames
In line with Entman’s influential conceptualization, most scholars define a frame as a se-
lection of perceived reality that emphasizes certain problem definitions, prognosis, and
causal chains over others (Goffman 1974; Entman 2004; Snow and Benford 2000) in order
to justify certain moral evaluations (Ferree 2003). Frames are almost always attributed to
actors, enabling researchers to see not only how the world is perceived and evaluated, but
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also by whom (Bail 2012). Despite this vast convergence on what a frame is, no agreement
has been reached about the best way to identify them (Vreese 2005). On a epistemolog-
ical level, little consensus exists about how abstract or specific identified frames need
to be. Some scholars suggest that frames should be tailored to the actual problem and
context under study (McCombs and Shaw 1993), while others argue in favor of more gen-
eral categorizations that transcend a wide range of issues and contexts (Helbling 2014).
Methodologically, scholars quibble about whether frames should be detected deductively
versus inductively. Whereas the former strategy analyses discourse with pre-defined and
operationalized frames in mind to test already formulated hypothesis (Vreese 2005), the
latter allows frames to emerge during the course of analysis and is more descriptive in
nature (Gamson 1992).
Instead of taking a strong stance in these debates, I mix and match elements of all the
different approaches and tailor them to the specific analysis at hand. In this chapter I want
to deploy frame analysis to assess the importance of the minority hypothesis across a
wide range of different political issues that all involve one specific ethnic-religious group:
the Jews. I therefore use pre-defined general frames derived from the minority hypoth-
esis in combination with more tailored frames established through extensive reading of
secondary literature on attitudes towards Jews.
Following Habermas, I distinguish between identity related frames and utilitarian frames.
Identity related frames highlight the inherent nature and values of the communities of
which actors are part. They also demarcate different groups and specify relationships be-
tween them. Utilitarian frames justify positions based on whether that position may help
an actor attain a specific goal or defend a particular interest. It is easy to see that utili-
tarian frames are largely shaped by identity related frames as group boundaries, values
and relationships shape the goals and interests of all actors involved. As such, utilitarian
frames are activated by identity related frames (Habermas 1993). In the next section I will
79
focus on four identity related frames before introducing the utility frames.
4.2.1 Identity Related Frames
The central hypothesis put forward in this book would lead us to expect that compared to
majorities, religious minorities had different attitudes towards themselves and Jews and
consequently embraced different identity frames when debating the role of Judaism. Reli-
gious minorities were historically dependent on pluralism to survive in the Netherlands.
This should be reflected in the ways in which they perceived the ideal Dutch society that
they wanted to be part of. In line with their own experiences as minorities, they should be
attached to the ideal of pluralistic community that embraces diversity, exchange of ideas
and the coexistence of various cultural and religious groups. Inequalities in education,
politics and the labor force should be reduced to foster diversity. I refer to this frame as
the pluralism frame.
Religious majorities conversely, should be more inclined to support a homogeneous
society grounded in one dominant religion into which everyone should assimilate. Di-
versity should be depicted as a threat that undermines this state of affairs while dialogue
should be aimed at converting outsiders. Finally, institutions should work to benefit the
dominant groups at the expense of those who refuse to adopt. I call this frame the assimi-
lation frame.
Differences in religious demography are also likely to affect how religious elites
present the relationship between Christians and Jews. For minority groups, other out-
siders are kindred allies in defending (religious) group rights and pluralist values. This
should result in empathy for and feelings of alikeness with fellow minorities. For reli-
gious majority groups, this motivation is absent and ethnic as well as religious differ-
ences are reinforced. Therefore, I expect Catholics in Protestant areas to be more likely to
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identify with Jews and stress inter-religous similarities, while Catholics in Catholic parts
of the country should be more focussed on differences with Jewish communities. I dub
these frames similarity and difference respectively. As said, these four identity frames acti-
vate a series of utilitarian frames which will discussed now.
4.2.2 Utilitarian Frames
Because identity related frames shaped how religious elites perceived community val-
ues, relationships and boundaries, it also affected whether Jews were considered either
a threat to or a means to attain specific group goals. As such, the four identity related
frames discussed above activate a series of utility frames that conceive of Jews as either
threatening or contributing to group goals. Whereas similarity and pluralism frames are
more likely to induce utilitarian frames that emphasize opportunities, difference and as-
similation frames will activate threat based frames.
Historical case studies of anti-Semitism and philo-Semitism make clear that attitudes
towards Jews are and alway have been multifaceted. Evaluation of other minority groups
often centers around either religious, economic, political or racial cleavages. Interestingly,
twentieth century popular opinion towards Jews combined elements of all four these di-
mensions (Brustein 2003).
Depicting Jews as a religious threat is arguably the frame with the longest history in
Western European thought. Religious Anti-Semitism stems from Jewish refusal to give
up their religion, which, according to some, was indicative of their association with sa-
tan (Langmuir 1971) and accusations of collective responsibility for the death of Christ
(Lindemann 1997) or the perceived overrepresentation among secular movements such
as socialism, liberalism, freemasonry and communism that aim to destroy religion alto-
gether (Birnbaum 1992).
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Christianity, on the other hand, also inspired a voluminous body of pro-Semitic think-
ing which considered Jews as a religious opportunity. This view highlighted that Christ
himself was Jewish and that the Jews in general had formed an important stepping stone
from Paganism and multi-theism towards Christianity. In the twentieth century, this view
was reinforced by the notion that Judaism functioned as a pious ally in the fight against
the rise of godless ideologies. In addition, and in line with the parable of the Good Samar-
itan, Jews provided an opportunity to display Christian compassion (Carroll 2002).
While not as old as the religious threat frame, the portrayal of Jews as as an economic
threat dates back to the early medieval period. Restrictions on property ownership and
employment as well as widespread literacy within the Jewish community pushed Jews
into urban middle men positions that were looked down upon by Christian elites. As a
result, Jews over the centuries have been characterized as miserly manipulators of money
and extremely materialist accumulators of wealth who engaged in unproductive and un-
ethical business practices such as second hand trade, petty commerce and money lending
(Weiss 1997). These sentiments surfaced especially in times of economic hardship as Jews
were often held responsible for international financial crises, as was foretold in the infa-
mous pamphlet “the Protocols of the learned elders of Zion” (Friedlander 1997).
As we saw for religiously inspired attitudes, economic reasoning was deployed in de-
fense of Jews as well. Economic skills, widespread literacy and financially motivated am-
bition also provided an economic opportunity. This frame was commonly deployed when
comparing the divergent economic faiths of territories populated by Jews and Muslims
in Palestine. Whereas Muslims were said to squander their land, Jews turned dessert into
paradise (Gilman 1997).
At numerous points in modern history, ideologies framing Jews as a political threat
attracted adherents. Jews have been accused of undermining political order and seek-
ing to take over the world as well as be originators of subversive movements aiming to
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transform the status quo (Bauer and Keren 2001). A combination of Jewish dispersion
over the world and messianistic tendencies in Judaism were often blamed for their lack
of political loyalty and their predisposition to join internationalist movements such as
socialism or Zionism (Shatz 2004). None other than Winston Churchill linked Jews to
Bolshevist rule in the Soviet Union (Lindemann 1997). Thinkers who were a bit more
down to earth pointed out how this regime persecuted religious Jews and presented the
sons of Abraham as an ally in a shared fight against communism (Golding 1939). This
political opportunity frame often deployed by Christians frequently overlapped with the
religious opportunity frame as religious Jews and Christians together were fighting secular
forces challenging political order.
Finally, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, Jews were increasingly depicted
as members of a separate race rather than a religious community. Theories of scientific
racism stressed that man kind could be divided up in different groups based on physical
characteristics. This notion challenged ideas of equality as it assumed a racial hierarchy
in which some groups are superior and more deserving than others. The Jewish race,
according to this line of thinking, constituted a lower strain that had only been able to
maintain itself unnaturally through craftiness (Gilman and Katz 1991). As such, Jews
were framed as a racial threat who, by their mere and unnecessary existence, degenerated
racial pureness of societies. Unlike the religious, economic and political threat frames the
race frame did not have a positive opportunity oriented counterpart. However, the race
frame met with so much resistance that rejecting race in and of itself became a powerful
frame to defend Jews in public debates.
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4.3 Data and Coding
In order to get insight into elite attitudes towards Jews, I conduct a content analysis of
news print media for the years 1930-1939. As other information gathering tools such as
surveys are rarely available for the pre-World War Two period, newspapers provides the
most powerful instrument to trace elite opinions. The 1930-39 period falls in what has
been called the “the golden age of Journalism”, during which the newspaper was the
most important medium though which average citizens were informed about their lead-
ers positions (Gannon 1971) and could make sense of the world around them (Gamson
1992). This was particularly true for the segmented society of the Netherlands, where reli-
gious elites at the head of different pillars utilized print media as a mouthpiece to control
their base (Lijphart 1968).
Needless to say, newspaper data has shortcomings when assessing elite discourse be-
cause only a small portion of all elite claims being made get covered by the media (Fran-
zosi 1987). Moreover, newspapers tend to overreport statements of influential actors.
However, it is exactly this publicly visible and elite part of public discourse that interests
us here as claims remain unreported can never affect public opinion of followers.
The data for this study was retrieved from De Tijd the biggest Catholic news outlet
published in the Protestant province of North-Holland and Het Limburgs Dagblad, the
biggest Catholic news outlet published in the Catholic province of Limburg. I used two
criteria to select these newspapers. First, they had to be digitally available for the entire
time period under study and second, they had to have the broadest readership within
their local pillar. The newspapers were accessed via computer portals available at the
Royal Libraries in The Hague. Unfortunately, it was not possible to conduct a parallel
analysis for Protestant newspapers as no Protestant newspapers were digitally available
for the whole time period.
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The time-period, 1930-1939, is chosen for both pragmatic and substantive reasons.
First, newspapers appearing before 1930 have not yet been fully digitalized, making a
semi-automatic content analysis more difficult. Second, 1939 is the last year during which
newspapers were not censored by the Nazis, providing a more truthful look into elite at-
titudes. Third, as was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter Jewish persecutions
in other parts of the world featured prominently in media debates during this time pe-
riod. This provides ample opportunity to investigate how religious discourse evolved to-
wards persecution elsewhere immediately before the Nazis started deporting Jews closer
to home.
Based on a straightforward search string,1 I identified all newspapers articles that
could potentially include information about Jewish issues. However, instead of taking
the newspaper article as the unit of analysis, as is common in many media analyses,
this research zeros in on more fine grained acts of public claim making (Koopmans and
Statham 1999). I focus on claimmaking because one newspaper article often contains mul-
tiple actors from different political backgrounds making claims with separate and often
contradicting frames.
An act of public claim making is defined as the public articulation of political de-
mands, critiques, proposals and policies targeting specific collective actors. This includes
conventional forms of public claim making, such as editorials, parliamentary statements,
interviews, opinion articles, protests, and more indirect forms of claim making, such as
the introduction and implementation of policies. In particular, I coded all claims against,
about or on behalf of Jews. For each claim I coded the claimant, issue, target of the claim,
evaluation and underlying frame.
To code the frames I made use of a series of sensitizing yes or no questions (Roggeband
and Verloo 2007). Answering these questions enables me to assess whether a particular
1Joden* OR Joodsch* OR Jood* OR Israel*
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frame is present in a claim. The questions for each frame are depicted in table 4.1.
[Table 4.1 about here.]
This study relied on only one coder. I used percentage of agreement (Stemler 2001) to
assess intra-coder reliability. The coder double-coded one hundred claims at the begin-
ning and end of the data collection process, a procedure that involved 600 coding deci-
sions. The rate of perfectly matching decisions was ninety-four percent, almost ten per-
cent above the cutoff point suggested by Holsti (Krippendorff 2004). A similar procedure
was deployed with an outside coder to assess overall reliability of the coding scheme.
This resulted in a level of agreement of eighty-six percent. This reasonable but arguably
somewhat low performance is probably due to the fact that coding twelve different and
partly overlapping frames involves complex coding decisions.
4.4 Pro-Jewish Claims
In total, I coded 1,705 claims. As a first step in the frame analysis, I compare the percent-
age of pro-semitic claims for Catholics in both parts of the Netherlands. The results are
visualized figure 4.1. In line with the minority hypothesis, Catholics in minority Catholic
areas were almost two times more pro-semitic than their majority counterparts. While
close to eighty-two percent of all Catholic claims in majority Protestant areas were pro-
semitic, the same was true for less than forty-two percent of all Catholic claims in majority
Catholic parts of the country.2
It is striking that secular claim making regarding Jews is relatively similar in both
Catholic and Protestant areas. This indicates that the difference between minority and
2Unpaired T-tests of these differences suggest that these differences are significant with P-value<0.00001
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majority Catholics is not purely driven by regional differences in anti-Semitism, but in-





























Figure 4.1: Pro-Jewish claims for Catholics and Seculars in different parts
of the Netherlands, 1930-1940.
Unfortunately, no major Protestant newspapers have been digitalized yet, inhibiting
a parallel comparison for this religious group. However, if one codes the location of all
Protestant claimants in Catholic newspapers, it does become possible to conduct a small
scale comparison of Protestant minority and majority claims regarding Jewish issues. The
outcomes of this analysis are very similar to the one done for Catholics. Whereas majority
Protestants are pro-jewish seventy-three percent of the time, this is the case one hundred
percent of the time for their minority counterparts. Hence, minorities appear to have been
more pro-Jewish compared to their religious fellows living in majority areas. In addition,
in Catholic areas of the country, Protestants were slightly more Pro-Jewish than Catholics
whereas the reverse was true in Protestant areas.3
3Needless to say, the outcomes for Protestant claims should be taken with a grain of salt as the numbers
are too small for a serious statistical analysis.
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Where do these different patterns come from? The next section investigates the differ-
ent arguments religious elites deployed to justify their positions towards Jews. In partic-
ular it will compare the identity related and utilitarian frames discussed above.
4.5 Birds Eye View of Frames
Figure 4.2 and 4.3 describe the frames that made up Catholic discourse towards Jews in
the Netherlands between 1930-1939. Each circle denotes a frame, with white circles rep-
resenting frames that are positive towards Jews and black ones representing frames that
are negative in tone. The size of each circle reflects the overall influence the frame exerted
on Catholic discourse.4 Ties between each frame depict the co-occurrence of frames in
particular claims.5 The frames are positioned using a statistical technique that clusters
them based on overall co-occurrence.
Figure 4.2 shows the framing environment of claims made by Catholic elites in Protes-
tant parts of the Netherlands. Given the fact that more than eighty percent of all claims
towards Jews were positive in tone, it is not surprising that all negative/black frames take
in rather isolated positions and are smallest in size, indicating that they had only limited
influence and rarely ever reinforced each other.
Only three frames obtained a prominent position in Catholic minority discourse. To-
gether with the religious opportunity frame, the two positive identity frames highlighting
pluralism and similarity take center stage. Together, they seemed to have activated a re-
ligious opportunity frame. The strong network ties between the three frames reveal that
similarity, pluralism and religious opportunities mutually reinforced each other in public
debates about Jews.
4Size is calculated by the taking the percentage of claims deploying the frame in question.














































Figure 4.3: Catholic majority framing of Jews, the Netherlands,1930-1940.
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Figure 4.3 reveals that the contrast with discourse in Catholic majority areas is stark.
Whereas the positive framing was dominant among Catholic minorities, the opposite is
true for their majority counterparts. The religious opportunity, similarity and pluralism
frames that formed the self-perpetuating center of Catholic discourse in Protestant ar-
eas remained relatively isolated in majority claim making. Instead, the negative identity
related frames emphasizing difference and assimilation exerted strong media influence.
Together they created room for a religious threat frame to emerge.
Hence, whereas potential sources of anti-Semitic discourse remained isolated and dis-
connected among Catholic minorities due to a strong emphasis on pluralism and similar-
ity, Catholic majorities were more likely to stress cultural differences and to a lesser extent
assimilation. I zero in on two particular debates to get more of a sense what the deployed
frames actually looked like. The first debate focusses on responses by Catholics to Anti-
Jewish persecution in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The second deals with the
conception of Jewish religious rights.
4.6 Illustration 1: Responses to Jewish Persecution
The emphasis on similarity by minority Catholics when talking about Jews came to the
surface most clearly in response to Jewish persecutions in the Soviet Union and Nazi
Germany. During a parliamentary debate in 1938, Roman Catholic politician Laurentius
Deckers highlighted that anti-Semitic persecution by the Nazis has the special interest of
Catholics as “they themselves know what it is like to be persecuted.”6
Often, claims by Catholics evoke their own history of persecution and the notion that
they would be next in line if they would not resist anti-Semitic legislation. This argu-
6Dagblad De Tijd 3/12/1938.
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mentation is often deployed to convince other Catholics not to endorse or passively sit by
while anti-Semitism is raging. This is nicely illustrated by the following editorial in De
Tijd from 1933, which rejects an endorsement of Jewish persecutions by the Nazis in a dif-
ferent Catholic media outlet: “If the Hitlerians seize power here as well, the Catholics,
knowing what has happened in Munich, will regret participating in creating an anti-
Jewish climate.”7 Elsewhere the same newspaper writes: “One of the things we need
to do is pray for those who suffer from the persecutions. It is definitely not unthinkable
that what is happening in neighboring Germany will also befall the Catholics.”8
More generally, Anti-Jewish violence in Germany was seen as a important reason to
defend the Dutch model of pluralism, as this editorial in De Tijd from around the same pe-
riod indicates: “Much like Catholics, protestants, liberals socialists et cetera openly and
with restraint tell each other the truth and live with each other in peace, that is how it
should be with Jews as well. The way it is going right now is really dumb and embarrass-
ing. (....) What is happening in Germany should be a warning that we should never let it
come so far.”9
Although not absent, these sentiments where much less prevalent among majority
Catholics. Instead they often emphasized differences between Jews and Christians when
talking about religious persecutions. Instead of unequivocally rejecting Nazi violence
against Jews, editorials in the Het Limburgs Dagblad, repeatedly attacked socialists, liber-
als and others for expressing outrage about ant-Jewish legislation while not standing up
Roman Catholics undergoing a similar fate. In July 1933, the newspaper wrote:“When
the Jews were persecuted in Germany the whole world was outraged. But now. When it
happens to Catholics? Silence. The international press is silent. Is it not sad? We catholics
can only rely on ourselves.”10 In 1936, De Tijd went even further by stating that the brutal
7Dagblad De Tijd 14/6/1033.
8Dagblad De Tijd 14/11/1938.
9Dagblad De Tijd 31/8/1933.
10Dagblad Het Limburgs Dagblad 6/7/1933.
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attacks on Catholics in Germany were much worse and more damaging to the German
image than the relatively minor persecutions of Jews.11
4.7 Illustration 2: Religious Rights
There was also a marked differences between the way in which majority and minority
Catholics conceived Jewish group rights. In the North, Catholic politicians and pundits
alike openly argued for the protection of Jewish rights in debates about opening times for
shops. A new law would force all store owners in the Netherlands to close shop on Sun-
days in order to obey the Christian principle of Sunday rest. This, of course, would put
Jewish shop keepers at a disadvantage as they observed Sabbath on Saturdays. As we
saw with debates on religious persecutions, Catholic politicians in the Protestant north
again identified with their fellow minority group and proposed to make an exception
for Jewish merchants.12 A similar response emerged when talking about religious educa-
tion. Catholic minority leaders who themselves had to fight for their own schools were
univocal in that Jews should be granted their own educational instutitions.13
Sometimes cooperation with Jews was also given in by mutual self-interest. This was
the case for instance when the idea emerged to reform the Gregorian calendar which was
organized around the old testament. For both Jews and Christians, this reform was an
affront to their religious values that had to be stopped. In Amsterdam, a Jewish-Catholic
consortium emerged that orchestrated demonstrations and compared resistance against
the reform with the shared fight against religious persecution: “After being brought to-
gether earlier in their protest against Russian persecutions, Catholics and Jews are not
11Dagblad Het Limburgs Dagblad 6/17/1936.
12Dagblad De Tijd 27/11/1930.
13Dagblad De Tijd 23/12/1930.
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surprised to meet each other again in their battle against the Calendar reform.”14
Following the same logic, minority Catholics also allied with Jews in their fight against
profanation. In response to anti-Semitic rhetoric of the Dutch National socialist parties, a
debate emerged about the abolition of hate speech. The editors of De Tijd held a impas-
sioned plea in favor of a law limiting such speech.
However, instead of focussing on the issue of anti-Semitism in and of it self they made
a more abstract argument about protection for religious groups in a pluralist system more
in general: “In the same way that one measures Christian quality by looking at behavior
of one of its followers, it is not acceptable to hold Jews as a group responsible for deviant
acts by some individual members. [...] One has to insist that the depraved stream of
hate against Jews because they are Jewish needs to be stopped. Otherwise the dire con-
sequences will be unforeseeable, not only for Jews but for everyone.”15 Shortly thereafter,
the newspaper published a very similar editorial suggesting that Catholics should talk to
Jews “In the same way that Catholics, Protestants, Liberals and socialists talk with each
other openly but respectfully and consequently live with each other in peace.”16
An even more explicit similarity frame was deployed when discussing hate speech in
1937. Instead of considering Jews one of many religious groups that deserve protection,
this logic drew an clear parallel between Jews and Catholics. The following editorial in
De Tijd gives a flavor of this line of defense: “Presenting Dutch Jews as enemies of the
country. How long is it ago that anti-Catholic Holland, misled by similar propaganda,
accepted the notion that a good Catholic could never be a good Dutch men?”17
Although some majority Catholics recognized the importance of respect for religious
14Dagblad De Tijd 16/6/1930.
15Dagblad De Tijd 29/3/1937.
16Dagblad De Tijd 31/8/1933.
17Dagblad De Tijd 7/11/1937.
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rights, others struck a different tone.18 Several Catholic elites in the South insisted that
Jews gave up their distinct position completely and instead assimilated into Southern
culture. This sentiment expressed itself most clearly in claims about conversion. Catholic
professors, priests and journalists alike contended that “Jews did not understand God’s
word”19 and “had to be brought back from the synagogue to the mother church”20 as the
Roman Catholic church was “the real completed Judaic church.”21 Meanwhile bishops
organized prayers dedicated to conversion22 and celebrated every notable conversion in
public ceremonies.23
4.8 Historical Roots of Divergence
What were the origins of this divergence in claim making between minority and majority
Catholics? Due to limited data availability, it is impossible to systematically trace dis-
course towards Jews further back in time than 1930.24 However, secondary literature on
Jewish-Gentile relations might shed light on the origins of this difference. Developments
at the turn of the 20th century provide a good starting point for this comparison. Be-
fore the late 1800s, anti-Semitism, often religiously inspired, remained isolated and at the
margins of society. Following the economic crisis of 1870, revolutionary developments
across Western Europe and the infamous Dreyfus affair in France, however, anti-Semitism
gained traction across the Netherlands. Throughout the country, gentiles in general and
Catholics in particular started blaming Jews for secularization, occupational windfall and
political turmoil (Klinken 2000; Saerens 2007b).
18Interestingly, the majority claim most clearly expressing this sentiment was only picked up by minority
newspaper De Tijd Dagblad De Tijd 4/7/1931 n.d.
19Dagblad Het Limburgs Dagblad 23/12/1933.
20Dagblad Het Limburgs Dagblad 27/10/1932.
21Dagblad Het Limburgs Dagblad 1/10/1932.
22Dagblad Het Limburgs Dagblad 1/8/1938.
23Dagblad Het Limburgs Dagblad 24/9/1930.
24Digitalized newspapers are sparse for the pre-1930 period.
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Roman Catholic weeklies were among the first outlets to start blending religious, polit-
ical and economic forms of anti-Semitism. According to a Dutch translation of Jesuit mag-
azine Civilta Cattolica, for instance, the Jew “invented the sectarian, Masonic,communist,
socialist, international and nihilistic idea [...] causing the total decay of Christian soci-
ety.” Similarly, a conservative cleric claimed that “Jews were the biggest proponents of a
separation of Church and state. One understands why. They have never been willing to
accept Christ as their king” (Ramakers 2006).
Although these types of statement were largely contained within small clerical com-
munities, comparable sentiments sporadically emerged in popular Catholic magazines
such as De Katholieke Gids, Het Dompertje as well as minority newspaper De Tijd, which
was analyzed extensively above (Poorthuis and Salemink 2006).
In this respect, there seemed to be little variation between majority and minority
Catholics. What did vary between Catholics in the North and South however was the
ways in which elites responded to this rise of anti-Semitism in Christian circles. Iden-
tification and the defense of Pluralism played a big role in the responses to anti-Jewish
sentiments of minority Catholics.
Important Catholic elites in the North, part inspired by a shared fight for group rights,
stepped up to defend Jews. On February 6, 1900 Piet Aalberse, a prominent member of
parliament representing Protestant Leiden, rejected any form of economic and political
Anti-Semitism during a meeting of the Roman Catholic party in Amsterdam: “Socialism
is too complex of a problem to be explained as a Jewish issue. [...] anti-Semitism is in itself
an unintentional form of socialism of those who are blinded by the glinstering coins of
the Rothschilds.” He continued to argue against the introduction of specific laws targeting
Jewish practices. He pointed out that Catholics themselves had fought for equal rights.
Revoking these rights for Jews would be the beginning of the end: “On commence par
le Juif, on finit par le Jesuite” (Ramakers 2006). Aalberse kept repeating his warnings
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against anti-Semitism throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century, until
the conservative sentiment within the Catholic community disappeared (Poorthuis and
Salemink 2006).
These pro-Semitic messages of Catholic party elites were reinforced by the Bishop of
Protestant Utrecht. Despite the fact that he himself was a renowned specialist in substitu-
tion theory, i.e. the theory that Jews eventually would be replaced by Christians, he fully
endorsed Catholic attacks on all kinds of anti-Semitism because he saw Jews, pagans and
Christians alike as “part of a unified community.”25
Jews in the Protestant north also recognized that Catholics were stepping up on their
behalf. In 1868, the biggest media outlet for Jews in Protestant Amsterdam Nieuw Is-
raelitisch Weekblad, observed the threatening rise of Anti-Semitism among some part
of the Catholic community but nevertheless kept referring to Amsterdam Catholics as
“brothers-in-arms” with whom they fought for equal rights” (Ramakers 2006).
A comparably strong response against anti-Semitism did not emerge in the South.
Neither political nor clerical elites seemed to have taken an open stance against the rise
of anti-Jewish sentiments. As a result, numerous historians have observed, Catholic anti-
Semitism was still quite prevalent in the Southern provinces before the German inva-
sion (J. Michman, Beem, and D. Michman 1999; Blom and Cahen 2002; Hilbrink 1989;
Weustink 1985). It is therefore not surprising that, despite the fact that almost fifty per-
cent of all Catholics lived in Protestant parts of the country, Catholic inspired anti-Semitic
movements were largely based in Southern provinces (Zondergeld 1986; Poorthuis and
Salemink 2006). At the onset of the German occupation, National socialist propagandists
also pointed out that Roman Catholicism historically had a more exclusive and nationalist
character in areas dominated by Catholics.26
25Dagblad de Tijd 27/2/39.
26Archives Stokman collection, Katholiek Documentatie Centrum Nijmegen (Stokman 939).
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4.9 Conclusion
In this chapter I compared attitudes towards Jews among Catholic minorities and majori-
ties before the outbreak of World War Two. In line with the minority hypothesis, we saw
that Catholic elites in Protestant areas were more pro-Semitic than their counterparts in
Catholic regions. Importantly, this difference was not driven by general regional differ-
ences, as secular claim making looked remarkably similar in both parts of the country.
The comparison reveals that attitudes towards Jews evolved similarly until the turn
of the nineteenth century when Catholic anti-Semitism started to fuse with economic and
political forms of anti-Semitism throughout the Netherlands. The response of Catholic
elites to these trends differed enormously between Protestant and Catholic regions.
Whereas Catholic minorities in the Protestant North identified with Jews and openly
combatted anti-Semitism, their counterparts in the South seemed to have been less re-
sponsive. It was the local position of Catholic communities that created these different
responses. Catholic minorities considered Jews as religious allies in their fight for minor-
ity rights and the battle against secularism. Although pluralism and empathy were not
absent from Catholic discourse in the South, they exerted less influence than ideas about
conversion and assimilation.
Now that we have established that minority elites in the Netherlands were indeed
more pro-Semitic than leaders of majority groups, the question becomes whether they
were also able to mobilize their followers to act upon these norms. In order to do, iso-
lated hubs of commitment are required. The next chapter will zero in on religious group




Table 4.1: Sensitizing questions for coding of frames.
Frame Does claim mention:
Pluralism Group rights?
Intergroup cooperation?
Diversity as cultural enrichment?
Assimilation Denial group rights?
Critical of diversity?
Conversion?
Similarity Jews as allies
Similarities Jews and Christians?
Difference Jews as opponents
Differences Jews and Christians?
Religious Threat Jews as undermining Christianity
Jews as secular threat?
Killing of Christ?
Critique of Jewish religious practices?
Religious Opportunity Judaic roots Christianity
Critique of Jewish religious practices?
Jews as dam against secularism?
Christian compassion?
Praise Jewish religious practises?
Economic Threat Jews causing economic problems?
Jews taking Jobs?
Malicious economic practices?
Economic Opportunity Jews strengthen economy?
Praise for economic practices?
Political Threat Jews as communists/socialist?
Jews as revolutionaries?
Jews as undermining society?
Political Opportunity Jews as force against communism?
Jews as good/loyal citizens?
Race Racial distinctions?
Reject Race Rejection of racial distinctions?
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CHAPTER 5
RELIGIOUSMINORITIES, ISOLATION AND COMMITMENT IN THE
NETHERLANDS, 1900-1939
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter showed that Catholic church leaders in the South created a dis-
course in which differences between Jews and Gentiles were emphasized. Jews were con-
ceived of as a religious threat and had to be assimilated. Because the boundaries of their
religious identity cross-cut the Dutch nation, Christian minorities, on the contrary, were
eager to vend off attacks on pluralism, the ideational construct on which they themselves
depended for survival. As a result, minority groups imbued their church networks with
the preference to protect victims of mass persecution.
However, whether motivations translate into help, depends on the extent to which
they are anchored in communities capable of clandestine collective action. The formal
model introduced in chapter 2 suggests that local minority communities are also bet-
ter able to translate pluralist norms into action as their members form isolated hubs of
commitment. These hubs can be exploited in times of crisis to produce the clandestine
collective action required to protect those in danger. Needless to say, commitment and
isolation should also be present in the absence of upheaval. If this model holds true we
would expect minority enclaves to display more group isolation and commitment than
majorities. This empirical implication is tested in the current chapter with data on church
construction, religious voting, school attendance, union membership and the production
of national leaders for the forty years before World War Two broke out.
As we saw in chapter 3, church leaders at the national level actively encouraged re-
ligious segregation by creating strong religious identities and building walls of associ-
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ations, effectively secluding groups from different denominations. Leaders encouraged
their followers to self organize in separate church communities, labor unions and parties.
It would follow from the minority argument that members of minority enclaves would be
more likely to listen to appeals from religious elites as they are more committed to group
and leadership.
In line with the minority hypothesis we indeed find that members of religious minori-
ties are more likely to build their own churches, vote for religiously based political parties,
attend religiously segregated schools, join religiously segregated unions and produce re-
ligious elites at the national level. With the exception of the finding on religious elites,
which relies on a more limited set of cases, these results are robust to potential omitted
variable bias if we are willing to assume that there is as much selection on observables as
there is on unobservables (Oster 2014).
In the next section, I will introduce the data deployed to assess whether religious
minorities are indeed more committed than their majority counterparts. After that the
result will be discussed.
5.2 Data
Based on historical census data obtained from the Institute of Human Geography at the
University of Amsterdam, I compiled a database of religious communities. The original
file provides county level information of the size of Protestant and Catholic communities.
I use this information to construct a database of religious groups, nested in counties. For
each of these groups, I then created five dependent variables to assess whether minority
groups were indeed more committed than their majority counterparts:
• Number of churches per 1000 members. The first measure counts the number of
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churches per 1,000 members by religious community in 1942, right before the de-
portations started. The logic behind this measure is that more committed church
communities would be able to raise more funds to build houses of worship. Data on
church buildings is obtained from the Dutch inventory for Church buildings com-
piled by Sonneveld and maintained by the Free University in Amsterdam (IKGN
2011). I was able to retrieve information on church buildings for all 1,288 Catholic
communities, 1,388 Dutch Reformed communities and 1,200 Orthodox protestant
communities living in 1,032 counties.
• Percentage of members voting for corresponding religious parties. A second
proxy for group commitment is the percentage of group members who vote for
the corresponding religious party. The Dutch electoral system included both a uni-
fied Roman Catholic and several Protestant parties. Religious leaders encouraged
their followers to vote for parties that organized around the same denomination.
If minority groups were indeed more committed to their group and leadership we
would expect them to more consistently vote for the corresponding religious party.
I pool voting data for six different elections (1918, 1922, 1925, 1929, 1933, 1937). This
results in a database of 10,599 observations nested in again 10,032 counties. Election
data are obtained from the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS n.d.).
• Percentage of members going to corresponding religious schools. In a similar
vein, I also look at the percentage of group members that went to religious schools.
Much like the electoral system, the school system had distinct religious schools for
Protestants and Catholics. Christians of different denominations were encouraged
to send their children to these schools by their church leaders. Data on religious
school attendance for the years 1910, 1920 and 1930 is obtained from annual reports
of the Provincial deputies and collected by De Kwaasteniet(De Kwaasteniet 1990).
I was able to obtain attendance information on 3144 religious communities in 854
different counties. For 178 counties the annual reports were missing.
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• Percentage of members joining corresponding religious labor unions. In much
the same way I also look at the percentage of religious members who joined a reli-
giously segregated labor union. Information on union participation is collected by
Paul Pennings at the Free University. Union information could be found for 1728
religious communities from 492 counties (Pennings 1991).
• Number of national leaders per 1,000 members. For Catholic communities it was
also possible to retrieve information on the birthplace of the 744 leaders of all na-
tional Catholic organizations active in 1948 right after the war had ended (Duffhues,
Felling, and Roes 1985). If members are more committed to the religious group we
would expect them to be more likely to develop the ability to produce national lead-
ers.
5.3 Results
The results of a series of simple OLS-models are presented in Table 5.1 and 5.2 as well
as figure 5.1. For the models with information on both Catholic and Protestant groups, I
include county and year level fixed effects and county level clustered standard errors to
neutralize omitted variable bias due to differences between localities and time periods.1
Hence, for theses analyses I compare minority communities with majority communities
in the same county and year. This analytical strategy is not possible for the leadership
data as we only have information on one religious group (Catholics) per county at our
disposal. When analyzing the production of leadership I therefore rely on the inclusion
of province fixed effects and province level clustered standard errors.
[Table 5.1 about here.]
1No year dummies were included for the church analysis as information on only time point was used.
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As we can see, minority communities displayed considerably more group commit-
ment. A one standard deviation increase in relative size leads to three fewer churches
per 1000 followers, a 3.5 percent decrease in religious voting, a more than four percent
decrease in segregated school attendance, a two percent decrease in union membership
and a half percent decrease in the production of national leaders.
ΔEffect of Increasing Relative Size one SD
Production National Leaders (RC only)
% Religious Union Membership
% Religious School Attendance
% Religious Votes
DV: Church Buildings/Believers*1000
-6 -4 -2 0
DV: Church Buildings/Believers*1000
% Religious Votes
% Religious School Attendance
% Religious Union Membership
Production National Leaders (RC only)
Figure 5.1: Effect of relative size on religious commitment.
Although the local level fixed effects powerfully address issues of omitted variable
bias there might still be within locality confounders that are driving the results. To test
for the plausibility of such confounders I follow the approach suggested by Oster (Oster
2014) to estimate corrected bounds on the coefficients. These conservative bounds are
created by allowing all the variation in the dependent variable of concern to be explained
(hence R2=1), while assuming that the potential confounders have the same explanatory
power as county level fixed effects, a plausible assumption given the already high R2 of
the estimated models. The bounds are presented in the bottom panel of table 5.1 and 5.2.
[Table 5.2 about here.]
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The implied bounds of the first three models are very close to the normal estimates,
while the corrected estimate in the fourth model even exceeds the original coefficient. This
suggests that including omitted variables will either strengthen or not affect the findings.
The lower panel of table 5.2, however suggests that the significant correlation between
a minority position and the production of national leaders, is likely to be driven by one
or more omitted variables, as the conservative bound of the effect is positive while the
original coefficient was negative.
The unique religious landscape of the Netherlands detailed in chapter 3 also allows
us to assess minority commitment while controlling for denomination. If minorities are
indeed more committed than majorities, we would expect Catholic groups to be more
committed than Protestants in Protestant parts of the country and vice versa. To inves-
tigate this, I create a dummy that marks Catholic groups and interact this variable with
the overall strength of Catholicism in the region measured as the percentage of Catholic
believers in a county. If the minority hypothesis holds, we would expect the Catholic
dummy to have a positive effect in areas with few Catholics and a negative effect in re-
gions dominated by Catholicism.
The analysis with interaction effects is presented in table 5.3 and visualized in figure
5.2. Catholic communities have more than five more church buildings per 1000 members
in counties that are mostly Protestant while the reverse is true in Catholic areas of the
country. In a similar vein, Catholics in Protestant Holland are twenty percent more likely
to vote for the Roman Catholic party than Protestants are to vote for one of the Protestant
parties. Protestants are slightly more likely to vote for segregated parties in the Catholic
south. We see the same pattern for school attendance and union membership. While
members of the Catholic church are ten percent more likely to send their children to re-
ligiously segregated schools and fifty percent more likely to join faith based unions in
Protestant countries, these effects flip around in Catholic counties. Since we only have
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(d) % Religious Union Member-
ship
Figure 5.2: Effect of Catholic community on respective dependent vari-
ables with 90 percent confidence.
information about Catholic leaders we are not able to explore leadership effects in a re-
gression framework with interaction effects.
[Table 5.3 about here.]
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5.4 Conclusion
This chapter showed that before the outbreak of World War Two religious minorities in
the Netherlands were more likely to listen to their leadership, build their own churches,
vote for religiously segregated parties, join religious unions, attend religious schools and
produce Christian leaders.
This provides support for capacity mechanism introduced in chapter 2 as it shows
that members of minority congregations were more likely to form isolated hubs of com-
mitment compared to their majority counterparts. The question now becomes whether
minority commitment indeed facilitated the ability of church communities to act upon
pluralist norms and set up rescue organizations for Jewish neighbors. The next chapters
will investigate this systematically using a geo-referenced database of Jewish evasion and




Table 5.1: Commitment among religious communities in the Netherlands,
1900-1939: Relative size
OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Churches/Believers % Votes % School attendance % Union membership
Relative size % −0.011∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.582∗
(0.003) (0.010) (0.014) (0.288)
Constant 0.009∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.464∗
(0.001) (0.006) (0.010) (0.210)
County FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y Y
Counties 1024 1024 845 492
Religious communities 2883 10376 3111 1728
R2 0.41 0.42 0.67 0.41
Relative size % (Selection corrected) −0.014 −0.088 −0.120 −1.343
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
County clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001.
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Relative size % (Selection corrected) 0.274
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
Province clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001.
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Table 5.3: Commitment among religious communities in the Netherlands,
1900-1939: Interaction effects
OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Churches/Believers % Votes % School attendance % Union membership
Catholic community 0.008∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.453∗
(0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.230)
Catholic community*Catholic strength −0.014∗ −0.250∗∗∗ −0.188∗∗∗ −1.089∗
(0.007) (0.018) (0.029) (0.568)
Constant 0.005∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.250
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.159)
county FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Counties 1024 1024 845 492
Religious communities 2883 10376 3111 1728
R2 0.40 0.53 0.69 0.42
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.








RELIGIOUSMINORITIES AND EVASION IN THE NETHERLANDS
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we learned that Christian minorities in the Netherlands were
pro-semitic and imbued religious networks with pluralist norms. In addition, they were,
compared to their majority counterparts, more likely to form isolated hubs of commit-
ment. Were these hubs really exploited to translate Christian pluralism into clandestine
help for persecuted neighbors? In this chapter I exploit a unique micro-level database of
Jewish victimization to assess whether Jews living close to minority enclaves were more
likely to evade deportation.
By pairing German registrations of Jews with commemoration books and camp lists,
I am able to map where Jews lived and whether they evaded deportation or not. This
data is combined with geocoded information on Catholic and Protestant communities
throughout the country. Auto-logistic models of 93 percent of all Dutch Jews show a
strong and positive correlation between the presence of minority churches and evasion.
Whereas proximity to Catholic churches increased evasion by more then 20 percent in
Protestant parts of the Netherlands, vicinity to Protestant communities had the same ef-
fect in Catholic areas.
Using distance from Delft, the working terrain of the first vicar to the Catholic mission
in the Protestant Northern Netherlands, as an instrument for Catholicism enables me to
isolate the effect of minority churches from pre-existing levels of tolerance for subsets
of cases. County level fixed effects and spatial lags are deployed to reduce local level
omitted variable bias.
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Although this data does not directly measure rescue operations it has a big advantage
over more commonly deployed post-war testimonies of rescuers and survivors, in evalu-
ating the minority argument. People are more likely to remember striking characteristics
of people (Kahneman 2011). Religious deviants will therefore be more memorable than
those who belonged to dominant congregations. Consequently, minorities are probably
overrepresented in post-war testimonies. Using actual survival data allows use to ob-
jectively asses whether minority mobilization played a role in protecting victims of the
Holocaust.
The next section will discuss how the German registration lists are deployed to retrieve
exact residential information for over 120,000 Jews. Following that, I will describe how
information on registered Jews is paired with commemoration books to obtain individual
level data on evasion. Geocoded data on church communities is discussed in section 3.
The following two sections detail the chosen statistical techniques. Baseline results are
presented in section 7, while the instrumental variable is analyzed in section 8. In the
conclusion, I will briefly highlight the limitations of the chose approach.
6.2 Data: Registration
In order to systematically test the hypotheses outlined in chapter 2, I have constructed an
individual level dataset of Jews based on German registration lists (Croes and Tammes
2004). At the end of 1941 the German authorities forced local governments to collect
individual level data on all Jews living in their counties. These lists recorded religion,
address, birth date and country of birth for all Jews (see figure 7.1).
The Germans created 496 lists, one for each county, on which they listed information
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Figure 6.1: Registration list for the city of Eindhoven.
of 140,000 Jews.1 In July 1942, shortly before the deportations started, the registration
lists were updated. This was done to obtain information on 9,000 Jews living in coastal
regions, Noord-Holland and Utrecht that were recently evacuated to Amsterdam as part
of German residential concentration efforts (Presser 1965). Copies of these lists are avail-
able at the Dutch Institute of War Documentation (NIOD), the Jewish History Museum,
1Citizens were considered full Jews if at least three grand parents were members of the Jewish church.
Citizens with two Jewish grandparents were only considered Jewish if they themselves or their spouse were
members of the Jewish church.
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local archives, the Central Bureau for Genealogy and Yad Vashem. As less than a 100 Jews
refused to register (Jong 1969-1991), I can be confident that registration lists provided a
complete picture of the Jewish population right before the deportations.
I have been able to digitalize the information of 128,921 Jews living in 464 counties.
It is important to emphasize that in order to create this database, I have built on the
efforts of other scholars. Croes, Tammes (Croes and Tammes 2004; Tammes 2011) and
Van Rens (Rens 2013) together had already digitalized names and birth dates of 107,000
Jews living in 288 counties. Information of around 1,647 Jews from 32 counties is missing.
The missing cases are depicted in figure 7.2. As one can see they were spread out over the
country.
As we saw in chapter 3, Dutch Jews lived throughout the country (see Figure 3.2) in
regions of different religious composition due to their long history in the Netherlands,
creating sufficient variation on the dependent variable. Since we are interested in how
rescue organizations shaped survival chances, two groups of Jews are disregarded in the
analysis because they were never at risk for deportation or evaded deportation through
legal means. First, I took out 1,647 Jews who died a natural death or committed suicide
before July 1942. Data on cause of death is obtained from the Dutch Digital Monument
described below. Second, I identified Jews who were able to evade deportation legally
by appealing their Jewish identity. This information was obtained from lists compiled by
the Referat Innere Verwaltung that included all Jews who were exempted from deportation
(Jong 1969-1991).
A third group was taken out mostly for pragmatic reasons. For most counties the most
up-to-date 1942 lists were available. For Amsterdam however this was not the case and
I had to rely on a 1941 list instead. By taking this list however I automatically excluded
information on Jews who were evacuated to Amsterdam from other parts of the country.
Disregarding this group however also makes sense substantively. Since this group was
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Figure 6.2: Missing registrations.
technically already inside the bureaucratic system of the Germans the chances that they
would be able to make use of rescue networks in a region in which they had just arrived
was pretty slim.2
2Additional analyses were done excluding Jews living in the Amsterdam area. I also estimated mod-
els including Jews who evaded legally or died a natural death. All results were consistent with the ones
presented below. However, in models without the Amsterdam area the effect of Orthodox Protestant Mi-
norities became insignificant using some buffers. This is in line with historical evidence that highlights the
importance of Orthodox rescue for the Amsterdam region (Flim 1998).
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The addresses recorded in the registration lists were used to retrieve fine-grained co-
ordinates of residential location for all Jews in the dataset. As a first step, addresses were
automatically geo-coded using Googles Geocoding API. Addresses for which no precise
coordinates were returned were then coded manually. This was done by consulting infor-
mation compiled by Jewish history museum on address names that were changed after
the war. For 3,578 Jews it was not possible to identify exact coordinates because address
information was missing or only neighborhood codes were provided. As a result the pre-
sented analysis was based on 122,694 Jews who lived in 439 counties. In an additional
analysis I randomly assigned coordinates within counties for these 3,578 cases. Results
were almost identical to the ones presented below.
6.3 Dependent Variable: Evasion
In order to determine which of the registered Jews were able to evade deportation, I match
the digital registration lists against the Dutch Digital Monument (DDD) and lists of Jews
returned from camps after the liberation. The DDD is an online portal maintained by
the Jewish History Museum that commemorates all Jews who died during the war. It is
constructed out of a wide array of sources: commemoration books, the Netherlands Red
Cross, registers from transit Camps Vught, Westerbork and Amersfoort, obituaries from
Jewish weeklies and honor rolls of resistance fighters. Figure 3 shows an example of an
online profile. As one can see the DDD lists name, date of birth and the place of death.
Based on this information I selected all Jews who died inside camps and marked them
as deported. In addition, I matched the 122,214 names against lists of 5,400 Jews who
were found in camps alive after the liberation. These people survived the war so were
not recorded in the DDD but did get deported so need to be coded as such.
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Figure 6.3: JHM-profile: Rosa Aron.
All the files were linked using the following matching procedure. For each case I cre-
ated three identification strings that taken together uniquely identified all Jews on the
lists. The first two strings contained the first and last name while the third string con-
tained the date of birth.3 Simply matching all the files based on these strings would
be a bad idea. Due to spelling errors, coding mistakes, formatting variation, and miss-
ing information this would result in an vast number of mismatches. Therefore I made
use of a two-stage matching procedure that combined statistical and manual techniques.
For the first part I used a statistical matching procedure developed by Blasnik (Blasnik
2010). When pairing cases this procedure calculates an overlap percentage for all pairs of
observations. This percentage was used to identify potential matches that needed to be
inspected manually. To do this, I first had to determine what overlap percentages indicate
potential matches and which ones do not. I did this by coding 1,500 matches manually
and compared the number of manual matches per overlap score.
This procedure suggests that cases with an overlap-score below sixty did not include
any actual matches (see figure 7.4). Based on this I decided to manually inspect all pairs
3For 43,788 cases collected by Tammes and Croes only the first two letters of first and last name were
digitalized.
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Figure 6.4: Percentage of matches per overlap score.
that had an overlap score above 60 percent. After matching all cases the overall evasion
rate was 28 percent; this is close to the overall estimate of 26 percent for the Netherlands
provided by Hirschfeld (Hirschfeld 1991). To make sure our matching procedure did not
introduce any regional bias, I compared it with completely manually matched data for the
407 Jews living in the province of Limburg provided by historian Van Rens (Rens 2013).
Overall, individual mistakes are rare. Of the 407 Jews, six were incorrectly identified
as deported and for 2 cases the opposite mistake was made. Mismatches were due to
incomplete information because civil servants forgot to provide information on dates of
birth. The correlation between county level evasion rates, graphed in figure 7.5, was high
(r.=.95), indicating regional bias is limited.
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Figure 6.5: County level deportation rates according to manual and auto-
matic matching.
6.4 Independent Variable: Minority Churches
I pair this data with a geo-referenced database of all Christian churches in 1942, the year
the major deportations started. Address information for churches is retrieved from the
Dutch inventory for Church buildings compiled by Sonneveld and maintained by the Free
Universty in Amsterdam (IKGN 2011). These two geo-referenced databases are exploited
to assess whether Jews living close to minority churches were better able to evade de-
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portation. The assumption underlying this operationalization is that the extent to which
networks of religious groups intersect increases with geographic proximity. Research has
pointed out that pre-war friendships, acquaintances and other face-to-face contacts were
crucial to bring Jews in contact with rescue networks (Varese and Yaish 2000). In Heerlen,
Reverend Pontier actually approached Jews in his neighborhood himself and encouraged
them to go underground (Flim 1997). Others suggest Jews often took the first step in con-
tacting nearby rescuers (Varese and Yaish 2000). Regardless of who took the initiative, the
bridges between rescuers and rescued often clustered in space.4
I assume Jews live close to a minority group when a church in their immediate envi-
ronment belongs to a minority congregation. To capture the spatial clustering of religious
groups, I draw a circular buffer area around each Jewish individual. In Figure 4 this is
illustrated for Protestant county Vriezenveen and Catholic county Tubbergen. Within this
buffer I count the number of churches for each denomination. Based on these counts I cre-
ate two religious proximity measures: a) the proportion of Catholic (i.e. non-Protestant)
churches to tap the relative strength of Catholic versus Protestant groups in the immedi-
ate environment (Catholic Proximity) and the proportion of church buildings that belong
to Orthodox Protestant communities to assess the strength of other minority groups (Or-
thodox Protestant proximity). The Catholic proximity measure is interacted with the overall
proportion of all Christians in the region that belongs to the Roman Catholic church and
not to any of the Protestant churches (Catholic strength). Region is defined as the county
in which a Jew lives and all adjacent counties. This is done to do justice to the fact that
churches falling within a buffer are sometimes located in a neighboring county.5 Since all
4A coding of 2,798 postwar testimonies also suggested that 89 percent of all Jews who found shelter
mentioned local social contacts. 63 percent of 11,421 Jews for which information of hiding is available
found shelter in the region where they were living legally in the first year of the war. Needless to say a
much larger percentage made use of local networks to illegally migrate within and between regions (Braun
2016).
5In a supplemental analysis I also interacted the Catholic proximity measure with the proportion of the
population that belongs to the Catholic church and the proportion of the population that belongs to any of
the Protestant churches. Result are very similar but asymmetric due to the presence of seculars and Jews.
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churches and Christians in the Netherlands are either Protestant or Catholic the Catholic
proximity measure is exactly the inverse of the Protestant proximity measure and Catholic
strength is exactly the inverse of Protestant strength. Hence, if the minority theory holds
one would expect Catholic proximity (non-Protestant proximity) to have a positive effect
on evasion in Protestant parts of the country and a negative effect in regions dominated
by Catholics. In addition, one would expect a direct and positive correlation between
the presence of Orthodox Protestant churches and survival regardless of context since
they form minorities everywhere. Data on religious membership is obtained from the
1930 census (CBS 1931). To further explore the separate effects of Catholic and Protestant
churches I also present analysis with counts of Protestant and Catholic churches instead
of one single proportion. The count measures are logged to deal with skewness.
Since the threshold for what constitutes proximity is not obvious I conduct different
analysis in which I vary the radius of the buffer from 10 minutes (1 km) to 20 minutes
(2 km) walking distance. This lower threshold is chosen because the number of Jews
not living close to a single Christian church increases enormously when we use a 1 km
kilometer radius (3,064 versus 877 for a 1.25 km threshold).6
6.5 Analysis: Auto-logistic Regression
Conventional statistical methods assume the independence of observations. The data
described above are likely to violate this assumption as Jews living in the same county,
village, street or street corner are dependent on each other for two reasons. First, they
share the same social and political context that might affect their evasion chances. Second,
6When the catchment area of the buffer does not include any churches the measure gets the same value
as when using a 2 kilometer buffer.
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Figure 6.6: Example Buffer; Vriezenveen and Tubbergen.
the deportation of one Jew is likely to affect the deportation of a Jew living nearby as
Germans often extracted information from their prisoners to trace down families, friends
and acquaintances. Both these forms of spatial dependence create autocorrelation and
typically introduce bias in standard errors and coefficients (Ward and Gleditsch 2002).
Our observations are similar to point data analyzed in geo-statistics. It is common practice
in this field to deploy variogram modeling to detect spatial auto-correlation of a variable
Y at location xi for all pairs of observations N separated by distance h for a number of
distance intervals d. A sample variogram reflects the extent to which nearby observations
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Figure 6.7: Semivariogram: variance between points and distance in km
(pairs of observations on which computation is based in red).









(Y(xi + h, d) − Y(xi, d))2) (6.1)
The intuition underlying this approach is that autocorrelation will result in lower vari-
ation γ(h) between nearby observations while no relationship between distance and varia-
tion exist between observations that are far removed. Typically, this will result in a sample
variogram with an initial steep increase that slowly plateaus. The distance at which the
line flattens out is called “the range” and captures the point at which spatial autocorrela-
tion is no longer present.
The Estimated variogram indicated that variance increases sharply until we reach the
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5 km threshold. This suggests that autocorrelation is present between observations that
are 5 km apart.7 Following ecologists, I model spatial autocorrelation by including an Au-
tocovariate in the analysis tapping the average evasion rate of all other Jews living within
a 5 km radius (Ward and Gleditsch 2002). In addition, I allow errors to be correlated
across observations within the same county by deploying county clustered standard er-




1 − pii j ) = β1autocovi j + β2cathP + β3cathS + β4cathP ∗ cathS
+β5orthP + β6 jews + β7church
(6.2)







, k,l, yl = 1 if observation l evaded de-
portation and Wkl is a binary weight matrix that marks observations within 5 km distance
of each other. In the absence of spatial autocorrelation β1 = 0 and this model is identical
to a standard logistic regression.8
This equation includes six variables in addition to the Autocovariate. Naturally the
model contains the Catholic (cathP) and Orthodox Protestant proximity (orthP) mea-
sures described above. The Catholic proximity measure is interacted with the strength of
Catholicism in the region (cathS ) to test for heterogeneous effects. As said, we would ex-
pect Catholic (or non-Protestant) proximity to have a positive effect on evasion in Protes-
tant regions and a negative effect in Catholic regions. To make sure we are not comparing
7In an additional analysis I estimated separate variograms for the four major cities and the rest of the
country. It is likely that spatial dynamics differ between densely and sparsely populated areas. However,
for both big cities and other parts of the country the variance tapered off around 5 km.
8I also estimated models with a distance decay weight matrix. Results were consistent with the ones
presented below.
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regions that differ completely in terms of Jewish and gentile population size the model
also includes a count of the Number of Jews ( jews) and the Number of churches in the direct
environment (church).9 The last two measures are divided by 1000 to reduce the number
of digits. Descriptives are presented in Table 6.1.
[Table 6.1 about here.]
Auto-logistic models with binary dependent variables are difficult to estimate be-
cause they do not have closed solutions in MLE. Therefore I rely on Maximum pseudo-
likelihood estimates for the baseline analysis and linear probability models estimated via
OLS to allow for the inclusion of county-level fixed effects (Besag 1974).10
6.6 Omitted Variable Bias
Investigating the effect of minority churches on evasion requires evaluation of a counter-
factual claim: would the possibility to evade have been lower if no minority church was
present? In observational settings these types of claims are hard to assess because regions
are likely to vary along multiple other dimensions related to both evasion and the clus-
tering of religious minorities. In the results section I will rely on a) county fixed effects b)
geocoded controls and c) an instrumental variable to assess the robustness of the overall
results. Scholars have pointed out that county characteristics resulted in the geographical
clusters of evasion (Croes and Tammes 2004). To make sure that this is not driving our
9What constitutes the direct environment is again varied in different analyses.
10Ward and Gleditsch(Ward and Gleditsch 2002) recently suggested a simulation approach that obtains
approximations that are closer to the full likelihood function. However this approach is computationally
not tractable with the present data because it requires one to work with extremely large (125,000 x 125,000)
matrices. In addition to the unified analysis presented in the paper I therefore also drew 100 samples of
1000 Jews who were not within a 5 km radius of each other. For 81 draws the results were identical to
the overall results. For the 19 other draws the results were in line, but the Catholic proximity measure was
insignificant. Inspection of generalized Moran’s I indicated that autocorrelation disappeared after inclusion
of the spatial lag for 100 random samples of the data (1000 observations) (Cressie 1993).
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results fixed effects for counties are included in the analysis. Linear probability models
are estimated via OLS to allow for the inclusion of these fixed effects.
In addition, I include two sets of control variables. The first set deals with regional
differences in repressive capacity. It is plausible that remote areas in which deviance
flourished were harder to reach for the repressive apparatus of the Germans. I deal with
this by controlling for the distance to the nearest SS-office and city center. The second
set of controls tap social integration. Previous research suggests that social integration
affected evasion both positively and negatively (Moore 2010; Finkel 2012). It is also likely
that integration was impacted by the religious environment as you would expect deviant
groups to be more inward looking and less interested in outsiders. Four measures of
social integration are included in the analysis: whether a Jew 1) lived near a Synagogue
(using varying circular buffers), 2) converted to Christianity, 3) had Dutch citizenship and
4) was married to a gentile.
Another major methodological concern stems from migration patterns. As neither
Jews nor deviant churches were randomly distributed over counties, it is possible that
factors determining where they ended up also affected deportation. There may be reason
to believe that this is indeed the case. Both Jews and other religious minorities might have
decided to move to places that were more pluralistic or tolerant overall (Knippenberg
1992). This is a factor that is hard to capture empirically but does potentially influence
the willingness of the local population to provide shelter. In order to solve this problem I
employ a two-stage procedure using distance to missionary hotbed Delft as an instrument
for Catholic church strength in the Protestant Northern Netherlands. This procedure will
be described in more detail below.
128
6.7 Baseline Models
Results of the statistical analysis are presented in models 1 to 6. Model 1 demonstrate
that even when we control for repressive reach and levels of Jewish integration the pro-
portion of Catholic churches in a 1.25 km radius improved evasion in regions dominated
by Protestants. However, this effect becomes less strong once a region becomes more
Catholic and turns negative once Catholics start dominating an area. This is because in
these parts Protestant churches form the minority11 In these are Because it is somewhat
difficult to interpret interaction effects in a logistic regression environment, I plotted the
effect of moving the proportion of Catholic churches from its minimum to its maximum
value for varying levels of Roman Catholic strength in Figure 6.8.
[Table 6.2 about here.]
Catholic church proximity increases evasion with more than 30 percent in mostly
Protestant counties, has no effect in mixed regions and reduces evasion with almost
33 percent in Catholic regions.12 Hence, Catholic networks formed shells of protection
around Jews in Protestant parts of the country, while Protestant networks had the same
effect in Catholic regions. An average Jew in a Protestant region had a 17 percent chance
to evade deportation. Living close to Catholic churches increased this chance to 47 per-
cent. Inversely, for an average Jew living in a Catholic region living close to Protestant
churches would increase evasion from 26 to 59 percent.
Models 2 to 4 suggest that these interaction effects are not driven by the threshold of
the radius used to calculate proportions. Regardless of whether we count churches within
11Remember that Catholic proximity measure is exactly the inverse of the Protestant proximity measure
and Catholic strength is exactly the inverse of Protestant strength.
12Remember that Catholic proximity measure is exactly the inverse of the Protestant proximity measure
and Catholic strength is exactly the inverse of Protestant strength.
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Figure 6.8: The change in predicted probability of evasion with 90 percent
confidence intervals as Catholic proximity moves from its min-
imum to its maximum value conditional on Catholic strength
in region using 1.25 km buffer.
a 2, 1.75, 1.5 or 1.25 km radius, Catholic churches protect Jews in Protestant regions while
Protestants did the same when they were a minority. Figure 6.9 shows the interaction
plots. Although the shelter effect of Protestant communities in Catholic regions becomes
a bit stronger when using larger buffers the results overall are the same.
Model 1 to 4 also suggest that the presence of Orthodox Protestant churches increased
evasion rates. This suggests that proximity to Orthodox Protestant churches made it eas-
ier for Jews to find shelter. Changes in the predicted probabilities of evasion when moving
the Orthodox church measure from its minimum to its maximum value are shown in the
box plot above. When using a 1.25 km radius to calculate proximity, the presence of Or-
thodox communities increases evasion by 19 percent. For the average Jew, living close to
Orthodox churches would increase the chance of evasion from 29 to 48 percent.
[Table 6.3 about here.]
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(a) 1.5 km buffer

















(b) 1.75 km buffer



















(c) 2 km buffer


















(d) county FE: 1.25 KM


















(e) county FE: 1.5 KM














(f) county FE: 1.75 KM














(g) county FE: 2 KM
Figure 6.9: The change in predicted probability of evasion with 90 percent
confidence intervals as Catholic proximity moves from its min-
imum to its maximum value conditional on Catholic strength
in region.
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Δ in Evasion (%)
Municipality  FE: 2 km
Municipality  FE: 1.75 km
Municipality FE: 1.5 km










Municipality FE: 1.25 km
Municipality FE: 1.5 km
Municipality  FE: 1.75 km
Municipality  FE: 2 km
Figure 6.10: The change in predicted probability of evasion as Orthodox
Protestant proximity moves from its minimum to its maxi-
mum value. Point estimates are represented by points with
90 percent confidence intervals.
[Table 6.4 about here.]
Models 5 to 8 show that our results are robust to including county fixed effects. This
indicates that the results are not driven by county level omitted variable bias. It also
suggests that the theory explains both within and between county variation at a fine-
grained level. The predicted probabilities are presented at the bottom of figure 6.9 and
6.10. Overall the effects of minority churches become stronger and more precise when
county fixed effects are included, increasing my confidence in the minority hypothesis
even more. According to the fixed effects specification with a 1.25 km buffer Catholic
church proximity increases evasion with almost 40 percent in mostly Protestant counties
and has the reverse effect in Catholic regions. When the Orthodox proximity measure is
moved from its minimum to maximum value evasion increases with 21 percent. In table
6.4 I use logged counts of protestant and catholic churches instead of church proportions
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(a) Catholic (1.25 km buffer)





















(b) Protestant (1.25 km buffer)
















(c) Catholic (1.5 km buffer)















(d) Protestant (1.5 km buffer)




















(e) Catholic (1.75 km buffer)























(f) Protestant (1.75 km buffer)























(g) Catholic (2 km buffer)























(h) Protestant (2 km buffer)
Figure 6.11: Marginal effect of number of Catholic and Protestant churches
(logged) on probability of evasion with 90 percent confidence
intervals.
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to tap proximity to minority churches with separate measures. Results are plotted in
figure 6.11. In line with the minority hypothesis the number of Catholic churches has
a positive effect on evasion in largely protestant regions but not in Catholic parts of the
county. With the exception of the 1.25km buffer the reverse is true for the number of
Protestant churches.
6.8 Instrumental Variable
To rule out worries about tolerance being a confounder, I use a particular aspect of the
diffusion of Catholic minority enclaves that is unlikely to be correlated with local toler-
ance. As mentioned above, some of the denominational variation in the Netherlands can
be traced back to acts of individual missionaries. The existence of Catholic deviance in
the Protestant Northern Netherlands is largely due to one man: Sasbout Vosmeer.13 In
1602 Vosmeer was appointed the first Vicar to the Catholic mission in Protestant Holland
by Pope Clemens VIII. Right after his appointment, he had to move back in with his par-
ents who lived in strictly Protestant Delft because the reformation had destroyed most
Catholic resources in the North (Rogier 1964).
Historians of Catholicism refer to the counterreformation as a wildfire, spreading from
Delft outwards to other parts the Northern Netherlands. Whomever was closest to Vos-
meers’ fire was most likely to return to the Roman Catholic church. Rogier even goes as
far as to say that the religious map of the Northern Netherlands would have looked fun-
damentally different if Vosmeers’ parents had decided to move to Dordrecht or Utrecht
(Rogier 1964). Given the absence of strong Catholic networks in this region, Vosmeer had
13The province of North-Holland however forms an exception. Because its bishop stayed in place during
the religious wars of the sixteenth century the influence of missionary activities on local level Catholicism
in this province was reduced. In the analysis I therefore exclude the province of North-Holland (see chapter
10).
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to travel by night dressed up as a land worker and relying on personal networks to win
back the hearts and minds of the Hollanders. Vosmeer initially met with limited success,
but over time his efforts began to pay off as he built enclaves of Catholics in the region
(Rogier 1964). Due to the arduous nature of 16th century travel his successes undoubtedly
declined with distance.
I assume that the concentric spread of Catholicism around Delft has created a lasting
imprint on religious deviance in the Northern Netherlands that is unrelated to latent tol-
erance towards minority groups. In the first stage regression, I deploy an OLS-model to
predict a Jew’s proximity to Catholic churches in Northern Netherlands with a variable
that measures Distance to Delft in kilometers. The measure is divided by 1000 to reduce
the number of digits. Again standard errors are clustered on a county-level. As is evi-
dent from the large F-Statistics distance in Models 13 and 14, Distance to Delft is a strong
instrument for the share of Catholic churches, regardless of whether we control for the
number of churches, Jews and spatial autocorrelation or not. The reduced form analysis,
presented in model 15, shows a negative relationship between evasion and Distance to
Delft. Model 16 presents the second stage of a two-stage probit model. This second stage
uses only the Catholic proximity that is due to Distance from Delft (Instrument) to predict
individual level evasion. The effect of Catholicism on evasion in the Protestant Northern
Netherlands is robust in the IV-specification. Increasing the instrument from its minimum
to its maximum value increases evasion by 28 percent. If we compare model 16 and 17
we see that the effect in the IV-specification is stronger than if the regular measure is used
suggesting that the relationship between the presence of minority churches and evasion
is stronger if omitted variable bias is reduced.
[Table 6.5 about here.]
I corroborated the assumption that Distance to Delft is unrelated to overall tolerance
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by regressing it against the presence of other religious minorities. As one can see in Mod-
els 18, 19 and 20 the instrument is not significantly related to the presence of any of the
Orthodox Protestant churches or Jews in the region. Models 22 to 25 regress Distance
to Delft against data obtained from post war trials and show that the instrument is not
correlated with membership among citizens and police officers of the anti-Semitic NSB-
movement, the percentage of the population that volunteered to arrest Jews and the per-
centage of the population that spied for the Nazis. Taken together these models suggests
that Distance to Delft indeed affected the diffusion of Catholicism in ways unrelated to
tolerance for minority groups. To assess whether Distance to Delft might affect other
socio-economic characteristics of regions related to Catholicism, I regress the measure
against unemployment levels, population and the percentage of people working in trade,
industry, agriculture in the relevant counties. Data was obtained from the 1930 census
(CBS 1931).
[Table 6.6 about here.]
[Table 6.7 about here.]
[Table 6.8 about here.]
Table 6.6 shows no considerable relationships exist. Finally, I also conducted a placebo
test, testing whether Distance to Delft affected the Catholic church share in the nearby
south where missionary effects should not be visible given the overall dominance of the
Roman Catholic church. As model 21 suggests, Distance to Delft did not influence the
proximity to Catholic churches for Jews living in this predominantly Catholic region, pro-
viding further evidence for the notion that it captures the imprint of missionary activities
unrelated to other factors.
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6.9 Conclusion
The analysis presented in this chapter exploited extremely fine-grained data to assess how
proximity to specific church communities affected the opportunities for Jews to evade. In
line with the minority hypothesis, Jews in Catholic parts of the Netherlands were more
likely to escape deportation when they lived close to protestant churches and vice versa.
In addition proximity to Orthodox minority enclaves also increased evasion.
Although this analysis shows that spatial patterns of evasion are in accordance with
our theoretical model, it does not tell us whether actual rescue mission by minority Chris-
tians were driving this result. Therefore, I will complement this analysis with focussed
comparative case studies in Twente, a region in the east of the Netherlands that spans the
Catholic-Protestant fault line and cuts the country in half. Based on these case studies I
hope to identify whether minority enclaves, regardless of congregation, were more likely
to set up clandestine operations.

























Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Evasion 122694 0.28 0.449 0 1
Catholic proximity (1.25 km) 122694 0.414 0.156 0 1
Catholic proximity (1.5 km) 122694 0.413 0.145 0 1
Catholic proximity (1.75 km) 122694 0.413 0.137 0 1
Catholic proximity (2 km) 122694 0.417 0.13 0 1
Catholic strength 122694 .369 0.121 0 .999
Orthodox proximity (1.25 km) 122694 0.31 0.137 0 1
Orthodox proximity (1.5 km) 122694 0.31 0.12 0 1
Orthodox proximity (1.75 km) 122694 0.303 0.107 0 1
Orthodox proximity (2 km) 122694 0.29 0.094 0 1
Number of Jews (1.25 km) 122694 14.884 13.825 0 41.204
Number of Jews (1.5 km) 122694 19.072 17.394 0 50.611
Number of Jews (1.75 km) 122694 23.171 20.58 0 60.461
Number of Jews (2 km) 122694 27.075 23.328 0 64.673
Number of churches/1000 (1.25 km) 122694 0.034 .017 0 0.071
Number of churches/1000 (1.5 km) 122694 0.028 .014 0 0.064
Number of churches/1000 (1.75 km) 122694 0.021 .011 0 0.056
Number of churches/1000 (2 km) 122694 0.016 0.008 0 0.046
Autocovariate 122694 0.278 0.084 0 1
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Table 6.2: Auto-logistic regression of Jewish evasion.
Auto-logistic regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Evasion Evasion
Catholic proximity 1.839∗∗ 1.965∗∗ 1.950∗∗ 1.660∗∗
(0.684) (0.719) (0.724) (0.610)
Catholic strength 2.369∗∗∗ 2.397∗∗∗ 2.511∗∗∗ 2.649∗∗∗
(0.670) (0.609) (0.625) (0.700)
Catholic proximity*Catholic strength −3.175∗∗ −3.262∗∗∗ −3.413∗∗∗ −3.357∗∗∗
(1.059) (0.998) (1.014) (0.987)
Orthodox proximity 0.948∗∗ 1.047∗∗ 0.923∗ 0.838∗
(0.351) (0.415) (0.419) (0.459)
Number of Jews/1000 −0.021∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.008∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of churches/1000 −20.071∗∗∗ −15.016∗∗∗ −11.721∗∗∗ −9.495∗∗∗
(2.496) (1.991) (1.898) (1.922)
Constant −2.616∗∗∗ −2.706∗∗∗ −2.685∗∗∗ −2.601∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.229) (0.226) (0.209)
Autocovariate Y Y Y Y
Controls N N Y N
County FE N N N N
Buffer 1.25 km 1.5 km 1.75 km 2 km
Counties 439 439 439 439
Jews 122694 122694 122694 122694
Log-Likelihood -69915.042 -69981.341 -70133.912 -70268.557
Entries are logistic regression coefficients.
County clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001.
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Table 6.3: Regression of Jewish evasion: county fixed effects.
OLS
(1) (6) (7) (8)
Evasion Evasion
Catholic proximity 0.418∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.085) (0.083) (0.120)
Catholic proximity*Catholic strength −0.764∗∗∗ −0.947∗∗∗ −1.151∗∗∗ −1.103∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.179) (0.187) (0.293)
Orthodox proximity 0.211∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗
(0.068) (0.070) (0.068) (0.079)
Number of Jews/1000 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of churches/1000 −5.334∗∗∗ −4.055∗∗∗ −3.533∗∗∗ −3.220∗∗∗
(0.616) (0.300) (0.341) (0.292)
Constant 0.609∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.106) (0.118) (0.131)
Autocovariate Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y
Buffer 1.25 km 1.5 km 1.75 km 2 km
counties 439 439 439 439
Jews 122694 122694 122694 122694
Log-Likelihood −70072.942 −70092.196 −70194.982 −70248.593
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
County clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001.
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Table 6.4: Auto-logistic regression of Jewish evasion: church counts.
Auto-logistic regression
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Evasion Evasion
Catholic churches 0.192∗ 0.213∗∗ 0.219∗∗ 0.182∗∗
(0.089) (0.091) (0.093) (0.069)
Prot churches −0.142∗ −0.153 −0.161 −0.109
(0.080) (0.099) (0.109) (0.088)
Catholic strength 0.593∗ 0.413 0.349 0.447
(0.269) (0.275) (0.288) (0.281)
Catholic churches*Catholic strength −0.362∗∗ −0.325∗∗ −0.332∗ −0.316∗
(0.139) (0.139) (0.145) (0.153)
Prot churches*Catholic strength 0.491∗ 0.558∗∗ 0.594∗∗ 0.573∗∗
(0.215) (0.231) (0.234) (0.213)
Number of Jews/1000 −0.018∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.008∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of churches/1000 −26.639∗∗∗ −23.333∗∗∗ −18.639∗∗∗ −15.432∗∗∗
(7.808) (3.652) (2.457) (2.530)
Constant −1.532∗∗∗ −1.525∗∗∗ −1.561∗∗∗ −1.682∗∗∗
(0.304) (0.297) (0.295) (0.238)
Autocovariate Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
county FE N N N N
Buffer 1.25 km 1.5 km 1.75 km 2 km
counties 439 439 439 439
Jews 122694 122694 122694 122694
Log-Likelihood −70052.869 −70097.943 −70200.027 −70293.910
Entries are logistic regression coefficients.
County clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001.
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Table 6.5: The effect of religious minorities on evasion: Results based on
Distance to Delft.
1st stage: 2nd stage: No instrument:
OLS Probit Probit
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Catholic proximity Evasion Evasion






Number of Jews/1000 0.001 −0.078∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗
(0.009) (0.032) (0.019) (0.022)
Number of churches/1000 0.149 −6.0873∗∗ −6.09∗ −5.001∗
(1.484) (2.467) (3.534) (2.584)
Constant 0.412∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ −0.963∗∗∗ −1.678∗∗∗ −1.228∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.037) (0.150) (0.195) (0.094)
Autocovariate N Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N N
county FE N N N N N
Buffer 1.25 km 1.25 km 1.25 km 1.25 km 1.25 km
counties 279 279 279 279 279
Jews 37, 970 37, 970 37, 970 37, 970 37, 970
F-Statistic first stage 15.12 22.89
Model 13-14: entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
Model 15-17: entries are Probit regression coefficients.
county clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001.
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Table 6.6: Validity of distance to Delft as an instrument.
OLS
(18) (19) (20) (21)
Ref. Orthodox Chr. Ref. Orthodox % Jews Catholic in south
Distance to Delft (km)/1000 −3.743 4.028 0.030 0.408
(12.030) (12.082) (0.022) (0.815)
Constant −20.713∗∗∗ 20.993∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗
(0.697) (0.703) (0.003) (0.032)
Autocovariate N N N N
Controls N N N N
county FE N N N N
Buffer 1.25 km 1.25 km 1.25 km 1.25 km
counties 279 279 279 71
Jews 37, 970 37, 970 37, 970 2, 290
R2 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.030
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
county clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001.
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Table 6.7: Validity of distance to Delft as an instrument 2.
OLS
(22) (23) (24) (25)
% NSB % NSB Police % Voluntary Police % Spies
Distance to Delft (km)/1000 0.053 0.019 0.188 −0.001
(0.034) (0.019) (0.126) (0.001)
Constant 0.023∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.000∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.022) (0.000)
counties 640 640 640 640
R2 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.000
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001.
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Table 6.8: Validity of distance to Delft as an instrument 3.
OLS
(26) (27) (28) (29) (30)
% Trade % Industry % Unemploy % Agriculture Population
Distance to Delft (km)/1000 6.529 0.954 6.751 −5.276 −47321.700
(6.807) (10.085) (4.734) (14.950) (34708.3100)
Constant 6.807∗∗∗ 26.499∗∗∗ 9.498∗∗∗ 52.959∗∗∗ 13655.480∗∗
(0.702) (1.223) (0.572) (1.705) (4779.878)
counties 640 640 640 640 640
R2 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.005
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.




RELIGIOUSMINORITIES AND RESCUE IN TWENTE
7.1 Introduction
The previous chapter showed that geographical patterns of evasion are in line with the
minority hypothesis. Whereas Jewish proximity to Catholic churches increased evasion
rates in Protestant parts of the Netherlands, being close to Protestant churches had the
same effect in Catholic parts of the country.
While the analysis showed a statistical association between the presence of minority
enclaves and evasion at a fine grained level, it also deployed administrative data from
when the killings were unfolding preventing the retrospective biases introduced by ana-
lyzing commonly used post-war testimonies.
Relying on statistical evasion data alone however also comes at a cost, as it does not
tell us whether clandestine mobilization of minority communities drove the differential
survival of Jews. In this chapter therefore, I explicitly focus on religious rescue activities
to assess whether minorities were indeed better able to set up clandestine missions to pro-
tect threatened neighbors. Because a complete analysis of all rescue networks in the Low
Countries would pose serious challenges for data collection and measurement quality as
well as inflate unobservable omitted variable bias, I deploy a highly structured compar-
ison of rescue activities in one region, which overcomes aforementioned problems. The
narrower geographical scope of this study allows for more detailed data collection as
well as superior measurement and hence enables me to better assess the role played by
minority congregations in rescuing victims of mass persecution.
For this purpose, I zero in on the region of Twente, an area in the Netherlands encom-
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passing the villages of Almelo and Borne with which this dissertation began. Importantly,
Twente is an economically and socially integrated region located across the Catholic-
Protestant fault line that divided Western Europe. As a result, important economic and
social factors can be kept constant when comparing Protestant and Catholic groups in mi-
nority and majority contexts. The extraordinary availability of unused archival sources
presented by the Holocaust in Twente enables me to study clandestine collective action
in an extremely detailed fashion.
For the Twente region, I was able to retrieve two unique collections of post-war testi-
monies. The first collection consists of research done in light of a honors pension program
and contains information about people who either themselves have protected Jews or lost
family members who did so. The second body of documents is collected in light of post-
war trials against collaborators and provides information about the detection of Jews in
hiding. In combination with existing work on the mentality of non-rescuers (Demant
2015; Boom 2012; Hilbrink 1989) these sources provide an unusual opportunity to trace
the evolution of successful and unsuccessful clandestine rescue operations.
In the following section, I introduce the region of Twente and describe the develop-
ments that led to its religious split. I then describe the archival materials which allow
me interrogate the roots of clandestine collective action. The analysis is presented in sub-
sequent sections and proceeds in 8 steps: I first articulate the dilemma that clandestine
organizations posed for Gentiles sympathizing with Jews and suggest the role that mi-
nority communities could play to overcome this challenge. Following that, I give a birds’
eye view of all religious rescue operations in Twente, before describing some emblematic
cases of successful and unsuccessful mobilization in more detail. The discussion of these
cases is organized according to the three mechanisms that link minority isolation to clan-
destine collective action: 1) Assurance, 2) Selective survival 3) and organizers selectivity.
I then will use data from Twente to emphasize three important themes. The first the-
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matic section highlights how rescue operations inherited pre-war religious segregation
and points out how religious mixing undermined the minority advantage by reducing
isolation. Second, I use the qualitative data to show how, despite existing religious seg-
regation, Jews and Gentiles came in contact. Finally, I talk about the unanticipated but
important ability of minority groups to exploit cross-regional linkages they had devel-
oped before the war, enabling these groups to funnel Jews from one locality to the other.
7.2 Twente
During the war between Calvinist insurgents and the Catholic king of Spain detailed in
chapter 3, Twente lay in the middle of the battlefield and, as a result, ended up spanning
the major religious fault line that divided Western-Europe in general and the Netherlands
in particular. The establishment of Twente as a unified political entity dates back to 804
when the Netherlands became part of the Holy Roman Empire. With an eye on existing
tribal boundaries, Charles the Great turned the region into a separate shire which later
became part of the Episcopal principality of Utrecht. Under the rule of the Bishop the re-
gion turned completely Catholic and stayed this way after the Burgundian and Habsburg
emperors took over.
The local elite in Twente reluctantly joined the Dutch revolt against Spain in order to
maintain local privileges. In 1597 the whole of Twente became part of the Dutch republic
after an intense military battle. However, peace did not last long as in 1605 a new wave
of violence resulted in a split of the region that had been unified for more than 600 years.
Whereas the Northwest remained Dutch, the Southeast came under Spanish rule for a
little more then 20 years, after which general Casimir rejoined both parts within the Dutch
Republic (Klokhuis 1982).
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As both the reformation and counter-reformation were raging, this short-term political
split had a long-term impact on the religious composition of the Twente region. While the
North West became dominated by Protestants, the Southeast always remained a Catholic
stronghold. Deviant church communities were able to maintain themselves on both sides
of the divide. In the Catholic South, Protestants were able to penetrate with help from the
federal government. In the Protestant North, Catholic enclaves survived with help from
co-religionists living in nearby Germany (Kremer 1998). Under German influence, the
region also became a hotbed of minority Protestant movements that left the mainstream
church out of dissatisfaction with modernist tendencies throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth century (Klokhuis 1982).
The political geography of three centuries was still visible at the onset of the Holo-
caust. The map in figure 6.2 shows the distribution of Catholicism, Protestantism and
Orthodoxy in Twente in 1930.1 As one can see, Catholics were still dominant in the
Southeast, Protestants dominated the Northwest and minority enclaves of Protestants
and Catholics existed on either side of the religious fault line (the green and red churches).
The middle map reveals that both Catholic and Protestant parts of Twente were home to
numerous smaller deviant Protestant communities. The lower third of figure 6.3 shows
that in 1942, right before the deportations started, almost 3,000 Jews were living across
Twente. As Jews resided in both Catholic and Protestant parts of Twente it becomes pos-
sible to compare rescue in both Protestant and Catholic parts of the regio.2
A second factor that makes Twente so unique is that it was always a unified adminis-
trative territory, except for the 20 years of the counterreformation. Religious differences
notwithstanding, the region integrated economically and politically under Dutch rule.
Because it was relatively isolated from the rest of the country, the region independently
1Data on religious composition comes from the Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS 1931). Information
on churches is obtained from the Dutch inventory for Church buildings compiled by Sonneveld and main-
tained by the Free University in Amsterdam (IKGN 2011).
2Geocoded data on Jews is missing for the town of Groenlo.
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Figure 7.1: Twente, 1940.
developed a textile industry by relying on extensive cottage industry (Klokhuis 1982). In
1830, the Dutch government designated Twente to become the unified textile center of the
country, reinforcing unity even more(Willink 2010).
This level of economic integration guaranteed that, the major religious divergence
aside, the region’s economic and political homogeneity was sustained. This enables us to
keep other factors that could potentially explain minority mobilization constant. Figure
7.3 compares newly digitalized census data for different religious groups living in Protes-
tant and Catholic parts of Twente in 1947 (the year closest to World War Two for which
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(a) Catholic and Protestant minorities
(b) Minority Protestants
(c) Jews
Figure 7.2: Religious minorities in Twente, 1942.
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sub-group level data is available), and Jewish census data from early 1942 (before the
deportations started). As we can see Jews, Protestants or Catholics residing in the North-
west of Twente were indeed roughly comparable to their counterparts in the Southeast in


















Inhabitants (log) 8.978 8.905
% Jews 0.716 0.517
GDP per capita (log) 3.339 3.127
% Unemployment 13.406 8.575
% Trade 12.533 13.083
% Agriculture 42.867 47.833
% Industry 43.933 38.333
% <16 16.295 16.474
SIPO-SD per 1000 inhabitants 0.074 0.067
Nat. Soc. membership per capita 0.001 0.001
Catholics: % trade 17.566 15.221
Catholics: % agriculture 30.839 35.934
Catholics: % industry 33.295 35.977
Catholics: % <16 38.855 37.286
Protestants: % trade 12.934 10.523
Protestants: % agriculture 34.782 29.08
Protestants: % industry 36.155 35.238
Protestants: % <16 29.428 28.157
Jews: employed in trade (0-1) 0.125 0.131
Jews: employed in agriculture (0-1) 0.029 0.041
Jews: employed in industry (0-1) 0.069 0.06
Jews <16 (0-1) 0.155 0.141
Jews: mixed marriage (0-1) 0.025 0.031
Jews: Dutch (0-1) 0.732 0.763
% Trade 11.772 14.193
% Agriculture 25.066 32.675
% Industry 36.784 35.117
% Youth 34.55 33.51
Figure 7.3: Comparison Catholic and Protestant counties in Twente,
1942/1947.
7.3 Data
In addition to the quasi-experimental nature of this setting, another important reason to
study Twente is that a rich body of archival material is available that allows for a com-
parison between 1) clandestine collective action and non-mobilization and 2) successful
and failed clandestine networks so that we can assess overall differences in mobilization
capacity of minority and majority groups.
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Hilbrink provides a comprehensive list of all recognized resistance fighters in the re-
gion (Hilbrink 1989). Based on this list, it is possible to access a unique and under-utilized
collection of post-war testimonies which sheds light on successful resistance against
Genocide. The collection consists of research done by the Foundation 40/45 in light of
an honorary pension program. After the war, Dutch citizens could request an additional
state stipend if they could prove that they or deceased immediate family members had
extra expenses or suffered injury because of resistance activities. Sheltering Jews was one
of the activities that qualified as costly resistance. After someone had filed a request, the
Foundation 40/45 would start an investigation. Interviews with neighbors, reliable po-
licemen, mayors, surviving Jews and other members of the resistance were conducted to
assess the trustworthiness of the claimant (Cammaert 1994).
Testimonies from other resistance fighters proved particularly useful in reconstructing
the social structure of clandestine organization as almost all interviews started with a brief
description of how the testifier and the claimant had come into contact with each other.
The files are stored by the Social Insurance Bank and can be consulted in Winschoten.
In total, I consulted 207 files which provided information on fifty-three rescue networks
active in twenty-one of all twenty-six counties. In total eight of these twenty-one counties
were Catholic. Religious organization plays an important role in forty-two out of the fifty-
three identified networks. Because these files are based on testimonies of survivors, they
mostly provide information on successful networks.
To allow for a comparison between successful and unsuccessful mobilization, I com-
bine the files from the Social Insurance Bank with post-war trials of collaborators who
were active in Twente. Denouncing and arresting innocent Jews is, of course, uncon-
stitutional and was heavily persecuted after the war. They were also crimes that were
relatively easy to prove as the Nazis kept records of how they deployed Dutch collabo-
rators. As a result, trials often provide information on Jews that were arrested in hiding,
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enabling us to get information on failed resistance. The trial documents also provide
information on how the Nazis tried to detect associates of captured individuals, giving
some insight into how and why some networks failed. Trial documents are stored in the
National Archives in The Hague.
In order to compare successful mobilization with non-mobilization, I complement the
two bodies of testimonies with diaries and existing interviews of people who decided
not to save Jews (Demant 2015; Boom 2012; Hilbrink 1989). These accounts might give
insight in obstacles to mobilization. Obstacles that minority groups, according to the
central hypothesis of this dissertation, are better positioned to overcome.
Post-war testimonies are probably biassed by the testifier’s desire to justify his or their
own behavior. However, this bias is probably not different for minority and majority res-
cuers. As a result, the conclusions drawn from comparisons between the two should still
be valid. Moreover, scholars have demonstrated that Holocaust accounts are stable and
consistent over time, in particular when it concerns factual information about collabora-
tors and arrests (Greenspan 2001).
7.3.1 The Clandestine Collective Action Dilemma
How did Gentiles respond to the Jewish persecutions? If nascent resistance fighters were
indeed facing a clandestine collective action dilemma we would expect that a lot of peo-
ple willing to rescue refrained from doing so out of fear. Indeed, diaries seem to paint this
picture. Partly under influence of their religious leaders who protested the Nazis repeat-
edly, the overall attitude of Dutch christians was pro-Jewish and anti-German. Diaries of
Dutch gentiles reveal that anti-Jewish measures were met with widespread disgust and
indignation across the nation. “You cannot even call this bestiality because beasts would
never do something like this”, Hitzerus Mees, a well educated pensioner who was not
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particularly fond of Jews commented.“Draconian”, “Mean”, “inhumane”, “tyrannical”,
“clamant”, “terrible”, “humiliating” and a “disgrace” were other common terms Chris-
tian bystanders used to describe the treatment of the Jews by the Nazis. The Germans
themselves were referred to as “cowards, “bloodhounds”, “gangsters” and “monsters.”
(Boom 2012).
Feelings were not much different in Twente. Sjouke Wynia from Denekamp remem-
bered his father being furious when their Jewish neighbors had to leave their house (De-
mant 2015, p. 139). Willem Dingelheim, also from Denekamp wrote in his diary that
“everyone was heartbroken” because of the “undefinable suffering of the Jews”. Several
high school headmasters in the Twente area were seen crying when explaining to their
pupils that their Jewish classmates and teacher were no longer allowed to attend their
institution (Cornelissen 2006). The diary held by the head of the Jewish Council of En-
schede also confirms that the general population resented the deportations (Demant 2015,
p. 139).
Post-war interviews with both Jews and Gentiles in Twente indicate that sympathy
translated into small scale help for Jews before the round-ups started. When Jews were no
longer allowed to buy groceries in regular stores, a shop-owner in Haaksbergen provided
food to former Jewish customers for free under the counter. In Enschede, gentiles secretly
bought groceries for Jews living in their street (Demant 2015, p. 134). Other neighbors
helped to soften financial strain by lending money or providing employment (Geritz-
Koster 1999). One historian has even argued that in Enschede Jews and Gentiles grew
closer to each other than ever before during the early years of the war (Haan 2002).
On occasion, Gentiles even displayed public support for their persecuted neighbors.
In Almelo as well as Enschede, groups of Gentiles actively protested the introduction of
the Jewish star by wearing one themselves. This open form of resistance however was
short lived and ended when the police started arresting participants (Cornelissen 2006).
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These relatively low-risk activities notwithstanding, large scale clandestine help to
protect Jews from deportation was rare. Risk perceptions formed an important impedi-
ment to this form of resistance. After observing Jewish mothers asking Gentiles to save
their children, a bystander wrote in her diary: ”who has the courage to do that? It is not
allowed. You will undergo the same fate”. The clandestine nature of the operation was
deemed particularly challenging: “How on earth could you hide five grown ups, three
children.....” a woman wrote after hearing about the arrest of a Jewish family that had
gone into hiding to avoid deportation (Boom 2012, p. 244).
In Twente, Gentiles, although outraged by what happened to the Jews, also recognized
that protecting Jews was difficult and risky. When responding to the question whether he
ever considered sheltering Jews, Benno van Delden from Enschede said: “No never. [...]
the SS, the camps, firing squads, torture and all that misery. You had to be very strong to
shelter someone” (Demant 2015, p. 141).
Fear and uncertainty resulted in an overall feeling of helplessness. Earlier mentioned
Mees, for instance, characterized the first roundups as “systematic elimination against
which we could not do anything.” Trying to capture the overall mental state of by-
standers, a female witness to an early round-up wrote: “Everyone was deeply moved.
Outraged out of pure powerlessness” (Boom 2012).
The risks involved made it hard for people to imagine any form of organized solidarity
with Jews as revealed in the following statement by a non-rescuer: “I am willing to go to
jail for my convictions. It would have an enormous impact if everyone was willing to do
this, but this is not the case (.....) It is hard to know what to do.” (Boom 2012, p. 244).
Another diary reveals that this prospect of punishment created passivity among Dutch
citizens: ”We poor Christians could not do anything but follow Lukas 22:53. Follow from
afar that is our fate and cross. Let’s hope our sympathy can revitalize Jews” (Boom 2012).
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It is of course possible that gentiles were trying to find easy excuses to legitimate
their passive behavior. However, testimonies from Twente Jews seem to suggest that
the feelings of powerlessness were justifiable. During post-war interviews with social
scientist Demant in the early 2000s, several of them asked themselves what they would
they have done as Gentiles and concluded that passivity was a normal response in times
of hardship and threat (Demant 2015, p. 183).
After studying testimonies of successful protection networks, it is not hard to under-
stand where feelings of powerlessness among gentiles came from. Successful rescue or-
ganizations had to supply Jews with fake identifications papers, rationing cards, pro-
duce, clothes, information about upcoming roundups, medical care, funeral services,3
marriage counseling,4 psychological treatment,5 safe houses, ability to travel, communi-
cation lines,6 and, most importantly, numerous hiding places as few rescuers were able
to provide shelter for a long period of time. This was too much work for one person
or household alone and required the cooperation of reliable host families, couriers, food
providers, organizers and informants in the police system. In total ninety-seven percent
of 2,798 testimonies of Dutch rescuers commemorated by Yad Vashem mention help from
outside the family, highlighting the collective nature of rescue operations (Braun 2016).
Even though most Christians were outraged by anti-Jewish legislation, they recognized
that they could not simply engage in resistance because it was too dangerous. Yet, as
I will show in the next section, being embedded in a minority congregation increased
the impact an outraged citizen could have on evasion by reducing both the actual and
perceived danger.
3SVB-file 23, Docdirect, Winschoten.
4SVB-file 8, Docdirect, Winschoten.
5Yad Vashem file L. Gerritsen in Michman et al.
6Dagboek Douwes, NIOD 244 1065, Amsterdam.
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7.3.2 The Minority Advantage
The central hypothesis of this project is that minority groups are better able to overcome
the clandestine collective action dilemma outlined in the previous section. To assess this
systematically, I have coded all rescue groups active in Twente that could be found in
the files of the Stichting 40/45. I marked all groups that sheltered at least one Jew who
survived World War Two as successful and groups that mobilized but were not able to
successfully shelter a single Jew as unsuccessful. I code a network as religious if it was set
up by a religious leader such as a reverend, priest, chaplain, religious school teacher or
politician active in a religious party. Based on the denomination of the religious leaders
active in the organization, I determined the denominational color of the organization. If
the minority hypothesis holds, we would expect Protestant networks to be most success-
ful in the Catholic Southeast, Catholic networks to be most successful in the Protestant
Northwest and Orthodox Protestant groups to be successful throughout Twente.
Successful networks are depicted in figure 6.4 and are largely in line with the minority
hypothesis. All but two of the eight Protestant rescue organizations were active in areas
dominated by Catholics. When we look at Catholic networks we see a similar picture with
only two of the fifteen successful movements operating in Catholic territory. Orthodox
Protestant protection of Jews emerged in both Catholic and mainstream Protestant areas.
This is in line with our theory as the Orthodox formed minority communities everywhere.
Figure 6.4c displays the three unsuccessful networks that could be found in the files.
As we can see, all of these networks are connected to majority congregations. This spatial
pattern suggests that, in line with our central hypothesis,minority networks were better
able at producing and sustaining successful rescue operations while attempts of major-
ity groups were more likely to fail. In the next subsection, I will describe some of the
processes that led to the emergence of this pattern.
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(a) Roman Catholic and Protestant networks
(b) Orthodox Protestant networks
(c) Failed networks
Figure 7.4: Rescue networks in Twente.
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7.3.3 Assurance
Why were religious minorities better at producing clandestine collective action? In a post-
war interview, Catholic chaplain Visser, who was active in the predominantly Protestant
town of Wierden, explicitly talks about importance of minority isolation which assured
him that mobilization was possible. Acting out of sympathy for those in need, he knew
he could always rely on specific local Catholic farmers for help in providing food and
shelter. They in turn blindly trusted their Catholic front man and were suspicious of
everyone outside of their pillar. Catholic farmers in the area even went to the Chaplain
and local Catholic headmaster for medical advice because they refused to listen to the
local doctor who happened to be Protestant.7
Exploiting the commitment of his followers, Visser purposively created an isolated
organization to reduce exposure. He built his organization around people he could trust
and ignored contacts outside of his own congregation: “I always wanted to stay indepen-
dent. Nobody outside my parish knew what I was doing. [....] My own people knew but
they kept quiet (Hilbrink 1989).”
In Protestant Enschede, chaplain Van Der Brink tells a similar story of how minor-
ity isolation enabled clandestine mobilization by assuring both secrecy and commitment.
He started his resistance early. Already before the war his church had successfully sum-
moned Catholics to leave the Dutch Nazi party. When the deportations started he con-
vinced Catholic police officers to refuse cooperation. Inspired by his brother, who pro-
vided him with illegal newspapers, fake identity papers and food vouchers, he set up an
underground network with the help of parish members Junninck and Hesselink and po-
lice patrolman Ebbers. He was able to find several shelters for Jews among members of his
7It is striking that religious substance in and of itself was not the driving force of group commitment.
One Catholic from Wierden remarks that their chaplains: “do not talk that much about religion. Real
Catholics do not really do that (Hilbrink 1989).’
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community after temporarily hiding them in presbyteries. Catholic boy scouts were used
as couriers, while funding for his organization was obtained from businessmen who were
part of his parish.8 When round-ups were coming up a local police officer would post a
warning note on the doors of Catholic church (Bekkenkamp 2000).
All contacts ran via the presbyteries to maintain the exclusive Catholic character of
the operation (Bornebroek 1985). Similar to what we saw in Wierden, the chaplain of
Enschede never forayed outside his parish in order to reduce exposure. “Within your
own parish you knew who to approach for help. Those people will not let you down.”9
A similar movement, driven by minority assurance, emerged in Catholic Hengelo, in-
dicating that this process was not unique to minority Catholics. While raised an atheist,
Schipper converted to Protestantism to marry his wife. Like most converts, he was ex-
tremely committed to his church and played a leading role in local Orthodox community
life. He was a council member of the Protestant political party (AR), sent his kids to an
Protestant school, joined the Orthodox men’s association and served as a deacon. Be-
cause of his central position within the church, Schipper realized people could be trusted
and mobilization was possible. The importance of the church as a guaranteed safe space
is illustrated by this statement of his daughter: “If you would go to church on Sunday
you would see numerous Orthodox families together with their Jewish children.”10 Or-
thodox Protestants were not the only resistance organizers in this Catholic stronghold
that demonstrate the importance of assurance. Mainstream Protestant Sikko Vis created
a rescue network out of the Association for Christian Education, which he chaired. Peo-
ple on the board of this organization were all extremely influential in their churches and,
according to Vis, could exploit commitment among followers to provide shelter.11
8Interview kapelaan Van Der Brink, NIOD, Amsterdam.
9Interview kapelaan Van Der Brink, NIOD, Amsterdam.
10Archive Flim NIOD 471 13 B, Amsterdam.
11Archive Flim NIOD 771 12D, Amsterdam. Yad Vashem file S. Vis in Michman et al.
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The parish of Jacob Koers provides an other example of Protestant minority mobiliza-
tion driven by assurance. After being betrayed at an earlier hideout, Jacob Zion begged
one of his close friend Somsen for a hiding place. Somsen was a council member of
the Protestant church in Catholic Eybergen and contacted his minister, Jacob Koers. The
reverend immediately offered the church attic to Jacob and two of his brothers, subse-
quently convincing members of his own community to provide permanent shelter. The
Zion brothers were able to stay there until liberation in May 1945. Throughout the war
years, numerous other Jews found refuge in Koers’ enclave. The reverend knew he could
blindly trust his immediate followers and simply picked names from his membership
card tray when Somsen brought Jews in need. The strength of the community was signi-
fied by the fact that Koers is able to openly communicate about the rescue activities dur-
ing services; two well informed parish members guarded the church to keep unknown
outsiders out.12
Minority mobilization did not always stop at county borders. According to himself,
Grunningman from Haaksbergen, a prudent leader of the Roman Catholic boy-scout as-
sociation in Twente, did not rely heavily on coordination: “I did not think it was good
to just gather people and set up a resistance organizations. For me it should be based on
intuition.” However, his more “intuitive” approach in combination with his interregional
boy-scout network, led him, in the end, to embed most of his operation in a minority
congregation. After failing to find good helpers in the predominantly Catholic towns of
Hengelo, Haaksbergen and Oldenzaal and refusing to work with mainstream Protestant
leaders, he finally was successful in placing Jews with a local pastor and Catholic game-
keeper in dominantly Protestant Neede.13
Grunningman’s story illustrates how some religious leaders with interregional ties
12Yad Vashem file J. Koers in Michman et al. Yad Vashem file H. ter Brake in Michman et al. Yad Vashem file B.
Mateman in Michman et al. Yad Vashem file D. Somsen in Michman et al. Archive NIOD 251a-117, Amsterdam.
13Interview Grunningman. Archive NIOD 251a-117, Amsterdam.
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purposively picked pockets of reliable contacts from a wider range of communities while
shunning religious leader of different denominations. He however did not pick them
because they were minority communities, but because these congregations seemed more
likely to provide the required networks of trust and commitment. In other words, because
they assured the organizer that mobilization was possible. This is an important insight
because the spatial statistical analysis presented early in this dissertation, which relies
heavily on geographic proximity, is not picking up these types of processes and there-
fore underestimates the relationship between minority mobilization and evasion. The
comparison across the religious fault line put forward in this chapter, on the other hand,
might overestimate the emergence of minority networks because of interregional selec-
tion. The ability of majority leaders to find minorities of the same congregation in nearby
areas is probably much higher in regions with a diverse religious landscape.
7.3.4 Selective Survival
The previous section introduced us to chaplain Van der Brink who exploited minority
commitment in Protestant Enschede. If we compare the successful minority operations of
Van Der Brink with rescue attempts by majority protestants in the same city, it becomes
clear that maintaining a cloak of secrecy was hard if you were not embedded in a com-
mitted and isolated minority community. Via a good friend working at the police, L., a
mainstream Protestant in Enschede, received four Jewish refugees in his home. Soon after
their arrival however they were forced to leave. An anonymous note signed by “a good
neighbor” was delivered to the house: “Get rid of your guests as soon as possible. People
are looking at you.”14 Apparently, L. was not able to keep sensitive information out of the
hands of uncommitted outsiders.
14L..
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Compared to their counterparts in minority enclaves, majority leaders were less suc-
cessful in creating and sustaining clandestine organizations. Their attempts to set up
coordinated resistance along lines of trust often got disrupted because of early denuncia-
tions by uncommitted parish members. As a result their organizations were less likely to
survive (Aldrich 1999). This reinforced the minority advantage in clandestine collective
action.
To drive this point home, it is instructive to compare the trajectory of Enschede rev-
erends Leendert Overduin and Nanne Zwiep. Until 1926 their careers followed a similar
path. Both men received their religious education at Leiden University and aimed to
become ministers in the mainstream Dutch Reformed church. But whereas Zwiep had
led Dutch reformed congregations in northern parts of the country before coming to En-
schede, Overduin had decided to switch to the minuscule and more Orthodox “Reformed
church in Restored Dependency” that was founded in 1926 after an intense scriptural de-
bate about whether men were able to hear the snake in the Garden of Eden talk.
Their intellectual differences notwithstanding, the two men came together with other
religious leaders in September of 1941 to file a complaint against early deportations of
Jews with the local authorities. On multiple occasions Zwiep and Overduin held anti-
Nazi sermons in which they denounced anti-Jewish legislation and tried to convince
people to resist (Bekkenkamp 2000). Despite their similar actions, their faiths diverged
dramatically on the 20th of April 1941. Whereas Zwiep was arrested and died in Dachau,
Overduin became the organizer of one of the most successful rescue networks in the coun-
try.
What explains this difference? Overduin’s congregation consisted of less than fifty
souls, all of whom he knew personally. His sermons were only heard by loyal people
he could trust. Zwiep on the other hand lectured in the main church of Enschede and
sometimes drew crowds of around a 1000 people, some of whom had never seen each
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other. Numerous times Zwiep was cautioned and asked to tone it down: “Reverend
watch out, they are watching you! Your enemies do not sleep. They will be in the church
this very morning” (De Wolf 1947). His sacristan told him he had seen the organist, whose
son was a Nazi, take notes while Zwiep was preaching (Bekkenkamp 2000). Zwiep’s
biographer De Wolf was probably right when he observed that “the church has an holy
call but in order to fulfill it she needs to be able to rely on the love and strength of its
members” (De Wolf 1947).
While an undedicated member of his congregation denounced Zwiep, Overduin was
able to exploit the dense networks of his community to save over 700 Jews. His organiza-
tion could grow rapidly as his followers “always said yes” and he knew exactly who to
trust. Much like himself, his followers were often driven by “the desire to help those in
danger” and the commandment to love thy neighbor.15 Dressed up as a baker or chimney
sweeper, he travelled between different members of his organization hiding secret docu-
ments in his umbrella (Weustink 1985). The core of this organization consisted of twenty
operatives, most of whom were recruited from the tiny “Reformed church in Restored
Dependency.”16
From within his parish he was able to recruit helpers with diverse skill sets. One of his
main helpers was the head of the council of aldermen of his church. He was employed in
a wood factory and could therefore provide both the resources and skills to build secret
hideouts and storage rooms in homes.17 Other members of his parish were painters who
helped to camouflage shelters,18, typographers who delivered paperwork19 and a graphic
specialist who forged documents.20
15Yad Vashem file A. Ten Tije in Michman et al. SVB-file 55, Docdirect, Winschoten.
16SVB-file 23, Docdirect, Winschoten.
17SVB-file 23, Docdirect, Winschoten.
18Yad Vashem file J. Hofstra in Michman et al.
19SVB-file 51, Docdirect, Winschoten.
20SVB-file 23, Docdirect, Winschoten.
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Contrary to Overduin and in a similar vein as mainstream Protestant Zwiep, Dutch
majority Reverends, Van Gelder from Steenwijk, Van Staaij from Wierden, Le Roy from
Almelo and De Geus from Almelo, were all arrested early on while mobilizing their con-
gregations because their activities became exposed by disloyal adherents (Hovingh 2015).
This last case, De Geus, is particularly revealing as it illustrates the dangers a religious
leader faced when moving from a minority to majority community, revealing that the se-
lective survival mechanism was more important than individual organizing skills. Before
coming to Almelo, De Geus was at the helm of a small Dutch reformed congregation in
the Catholic town of Beuningen, near Nijmegen. Within this enclave he forcefully and
freely preached against the Nazis without any repercusions from the Nazis. Despite nu-
merous warnings from within his congregation, he continued his anti-Nazi tirades when
he was transferred to Protestant Almelo in 1940. “If Church and Christ no longer tell the
truth no one will” (Touw 1946, p. 620) was his response when his closest followers tried to
caution him. In line with the fears of congregation members, De Geus was apprehended
by the SD when they found out he had distributed a pro-Jewish texts among his followers
in January 1942 (Touw 1946).
This story of De Geus also demonstrates the further reverberations that selective sur-
vival could have for patterns of religious resistance. Right before his arrest, reverend De
Geus was approached by a small group of Protestant rescuers who required assistance
with sheltering Jews. As soon as they learned about De Geus’s fate, the rescuers had to
shift gears and approached an Orthodox minister to set up a clandestine operation. This
minister was able to create an efficient underground movement by exploiting the loyalty
of his followers. He was able to mobilize several parish members including a baker,21
textile manufacturer22 and police officer.23 All of these men lived around the church and
21SVB-file, 28, Docdirect, Winschoten.
22SVB-file 20, Docdirect, Winschoten.
23SVB-file 17, Docdirect, Winschoten.
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were able to provide food and clothes as well as implement an efficient warning system.
The story of Pastor Stokman from Oldenzaal reveals that selective survival also op-
erated in the Catholic South East. Before the German invasion, Stokman worked with
Catholic mayor Bloemen to help Jewish refugees from Germany. He called upon his fol-
lowers to open their houses for those fleeing anti-Semitic legislation and convinced both
the local Franciscan monestary and Parish house to set up emergency kitchens. Numer-
ous followers answered his requests. A Roman Catholic cinema owner even made one of
his theater rooms available as a shelter.
Of course, Stokman had to abandon his open help to Jewish refugees when the Ger-
mans took over the country. Instead, he shifted his focus to a more covert operation. He
tried to mobilize people he knew from the Catholic labor union to help Jews and dis-
tribute anti-Nazi pamphlets. Unfortunately, he failed miserably as his activities became
known to the Nazis within weeks. One of his followers had leaked information. Already
in 1940, two years before the major deportations started, he had to flee Oldenzaal. His
partner, mayor Bloemen, was imprisoned. Despite the revealed preference for resistance
no Catholic rescue network filled the void left by Stokmans’ departure (Weustink 1985).
Creating a clandestine organization in Oldenzaal, however did not turn out to be im-
possible as a small pocket of Orthodox Protestants, activated by clergymen, deacons,
school teachers and prominent politicians, did engage in the clandestine rescue of Jews.
Within this Orthodox enclave, further recruitment took place along denominational lines
as it provided a basis for trust. Church choirs, parish meetings, religious soccer teams, and
councils of alderman formed the infrastructure for the illegal organization. The church
always played a central role as money for the movements was collected during Sunday
services and meetings were held in church buildings and rectories.24 Hence, in Oldenzaal
both majority and minority christians tried to mobilize, but only the latter survived the
24SVB-file 33, Docdirect, Winschoten.
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challenges of clandestine collective action.
7.3.5 Organizer’s Selectivity
Close inspection of rescue operations in Zwolle suggest that a minority shell also made it
easier for religious leaders to recognize and recruit committed members. The Roukema
family was part of a tightly knit Orthodox minority enclave of “Vrijgemaakten”, within
which there “were no social boundaries.” Although they were not particularly interested
in politics, they listened to the sermons of the militant reverend Klaas Schilder who called
upon true believers to step up against anti-Jewish policies during the early years of the
war. The oldest son Gijs was motivated by Schilder’s words: “he encouraged us to stop
talking and resist forcefully. Out of the emergency shelter, into your uniform.”
The leadership of the “Vrijgemaakten” church was soon made aware of Gijs’s atti-
tudes towards the Germans. A local pastor happened to be in the Roukema residence
when Gijs openly expresses how excited he was about the foresight of resistance. Not
much later another reverend visits the family. He heard about Gijs’s defiance towards the
Germans and knew the family because Roukema senior used to be his teacher. The pastor
approaches Gijs to become his assistant in an illegal rescue organization, an organization
that becomes responsible for helping hundreds of Jews.
A couple of blocks from where the Roukemas lived, Spanhaak also got inspired by
one of his religious foremen: Horreeus de Haas. In debates with National Socialist leader
Anton Mussert, De Haas attacked the anti-Semitic foundations of the Dutch Nazi party.
When he lost his job, Spanhaak was committed to do something about German policies.
However, as a mainstream Protestant, he was unaware of the activities deployed in the
nearby minority enclave of the Vrijgemaakten church until much later. Though willing to
participate, he always remained “an outsider” to the better organized clandestine resis-
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tance networks of the small Orthodox community a few blocks away and, as a result, is
never able to fully engage in organized resistance (Hilbrink 1998).
As the comparison between Roukema and Spanhaak illustrates being a member of
a minority congregation conditioned the impact a motivated rescuer could have on the
fate of Jews as one was dependent on leadership and organization to make a difference.
Compared to their majority counterparts, minority leaders had the advantage of organiz-
ers selectivity, i.e. they were more likely to recognize committed recruits and incorporate
them in rescue operations (Marwell and Oliver 1993).
Intelligence created by church networks also played a role among mainstream Protes-
tants in Catholic Groenlo where reverend Haspels placed Jews with those members of
the Protestant youth organization, whom he knew would fulfill their Christian duty of
neighboring love. Men who served on the board of the Protestant church brought Jews
to their temporary hideouts. At least eighty Jews were able to find shelter in this deviant
community of around 500 individuals (Touw 1946).
The reverse also happened. Sometimes minority leaders could exploit their local in-
telligence to determine who was not suited for clandestine work. In Goor, for instance,
church chaplains refused to incorporate one of their followers into their rescue operations.
As it turns out this was a wise idea. The devoted Catholic was somewhat delusional as
he thought he could single-handedly win the war by encircling city hall.25
Not being embedded in a community of dedicated fellows not only hampered se-
crecy, it also made it hard to to solve complex problems such as finding enough financial
resources. The nervous diary entry of Jewish Theresa Wertheim, who decided to go un-
derground in Enschede but was not helped by a minority congregation, is emblematic:
“When does the misery finally stop? Two or three months at most and our money will be
25SVB-file 40, Docdirect, Winschoten.
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gone. [...] We are starting to get worried. Soon we will run out of money. Then what will
happen?”26
Minorities were able to find financial resources because leaders had enough intelli-
gence to selectively recruit actors with a wide range of skill sets who were willing to
support their cause. When discussing the rescue activities of Catholic chaplain Van Der
Brink we already saw that minority leaders were able to mobilize funds from rich and
committed parish members to overcome the problems that Theresa Wertheim was facing.
Sometimes, however, the coordination of different skill sets was so strong that it sim-
ply solved financial problems by turning a rescue operation into little autarchic firms for
which Jewish fugitives provided labor. In Nijverdal, an Orthodox reverend brought to-
gether an owner of a fabric store, a baker and a group of farmers, some of whom already
knew each other from the Orthodox school, church or singing association.27 The baker
provided food for Jews, who in turn made bags out of straw provided by the farmers.
The straw bags were then sold by the shop keeper who used the money to pay for food.
As a result ninety Jews could be helped without any outside money.28
This reveals that minority networks in which close social relationships abound not
only embed rescue organizers in hubs of commitment but also create an inventory of dif-
ferent skills and resources available within the confines of trusted enclaves. The network
closure of minorities, in this way, cut across individuals with different skill sets, allowing
for coordinated solutions to complex problems while minimizing risks of defection (Burt
2009).
26Diary Theresa Wertheim, www.joodscheraadenschede.nl.
27Archive Flim NIOD 471 13 D, Amsterdam.
28SVB-file 8, Docdirect, Winschoten.
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7.3.6 Segregation and Mixing
One striking feature of both Catholic and Protestant rescue operations was that they
tended to be completely segregated by religion. Despite cooperation among religious
leaders at the national level, local clandestine networks simply reproduced the pillarized
structure of Dutch society.
As pre-war religious networks were completely separated at a local level, recruitment
of helpers was in some cases almost automatically contained within one congregation.
A baker’s son from Nijverdal who mobilized rescuers explains this general pattern quite
straightforwardly: “We were Orthodox, hence so were our friends and customers. So
these were the people where you brought [Jewish] children” [....] This way I placed ten
Jews.”29
Mutual distrust and ignorance between different religious groups reinforced network
segregation. Protestants either did not know or refused to accept that Catholics were
effective organizers of rescue operations. Despite the fact that earlier mentioned Catholic
chaplain Van Der Brink from Enschede was able to run a rescue operation that sheltered
almost 500 individuals, some Protestants still considered him a sloppy and indiscrete
daredevil who lacked organizational skills. The leader of a Protestant group in Hengelo,
even claimed that Catholics in general were nothing more than passive bystanders who
were either cowards or pro-German.30
No one was as extreme as Orthodox leader Johannes ter Horst, who repeatedly ex-
pressed his contempt for people from different backgrounds. He went as far as to say he
would shoot members of another denomination if he would run into them during a secret
operation (Hilbrink 1989, p. 78).
29Interview Flim, Archive Flim NIOD 471 13C.
30SVB-file 22, Docdirect, Winschoten. Archive NIOD 251a 61.
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Stereotypes also permeated Catholic society. Members of Catholic networks in Twente
used the pejorative term “reverend’s clique” to allude to the passiveness and insolence of
the Orthodox. Mutual disrespect was equally widespread. On the rare occasion that
actors from different denominations did come together, Catholics got annoyed by the fact
that Protestants always had to start every communication with prayer (Hilbrink 1989).
Inherited mistrust could even trump proven dedication to the illegal cause. In Catholic
Borne, a member of the majority church volunteered to join a Protestant resistance orga-
nization after he had helped one of its leaders escape a German security official. Despite
the risks the boy had taken to save the life of one of its core members, the organization
refused his further services because he was considered “too lose” within the Protestant
community. Ironically, his reputation was partly created by his mother, who spread nasty
things about him because she wanted to sabotage his relationship with a Protestant girl,
he had recently started dating. As a good Catholic, she could not approve of this relation-
ship.31
Actors aiming to bridge religious divides were seen as intruders by other resistance
fighters (Bornebroek 1985). In Almelo, a social democrat decided to join an Orthodox
group in 1943. Despite the fact that he had already proven to be a dedicated resistance
worker on his own, it did not work out at all. Other Orthodox Protestants found it diffi-
cult to cooperate with him and looked at the outsider with contempt. At more than one
occasion they tried to get rid of him early on by providing misinformation about future
meetings and activities. A year after he joins the organization he got arrested.32
As came up in the stories of chaplains Van Der Brink and Visser, religious leaders often
actively guarded the boundaries of their group. In a similar vein, Leendert Overduin,
reverend of the tiny “Reformed Church in Restored Dependency” in Enschede, also made
31SVB-file 52, Docdirect, Winschoten.
32SVB-file 41, Docdirect, Winschoten.
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sure his networks did not interfere with the activities of other groups beyond what was
strictly necessary. Overduin was infuriated when he found out that one of the families
in his network had recently started to house an illegal worker, who was on a mission to
kill a local collaborator on behalf a different resistance network. He did everything in his
power to prevent the murder from happening and had the resistance member removed
from the household (Weustink 1985).
Repeatedly Overduin had arguments with secular rescuer Tusveld about who should
take care of specific Jews. Overduin did not trust Tusveld and both men refused to co-
operate with each other despite the fact that they were sheltering members of the same
family (Bekkenkamp 2000).33 Overduin’s closest accomplice, commented that “you got
reprimanded”34 by Overduin if you engaged in other resistance activities and networks.35
In one extreme case, arguments over segregation even created a rupture within one
organization. In Catholic Oldenzaal, a Protestant rescue mission led by political party
leaders Van Der V. and P. operated at the margins because it could not recruit widely. Van
Der V. tried to circumvent this problem by coopting a few Catholic helpers from outside
his trusted circle in the organization. P. was outraged when he found out about this and
immediately decided to split off from the already minuscule organization. After the war,
it was discovered the two Catholic recruits were actually traitors.36
Several other cases reveal that religious minority leaders had good reason to be con-
cerned about religious mixing, as it often undermined their clandestine mobilization ad-
vantage by increasing exposure. When information left the confines of the minority en-
33SVB-file, 28, Docdirect, Winschoten. SVB-file 13, Docdirect, Winschoten.
34SVB-file 14, Docdirect, Winschoten.
35The fact that Overduin tried to keep his organization isolated from outside influences is also revealed
by the post-war story of Gonny Mensink. She was an important Catholic member of the resistance working
at city hall who, by accident, took Overduin for a traitor. Mensink had never heard of Overduin resis-
tance work because she mostly interacted with members of the Roman Catholic community of Enschede
(Bekkenkamp 2000).
36SVB-file 50, Docdirect, Winschoten. SVB-file 33, Docdirect, Winschoten.
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clave, coordination problems emerged and denunciation became more likely. The story
of Catholic boy scout leader Van H. and his friend, Jan Buiter, is insightful. While the
network emerged within the confines of a Catholic minority community, it suddenly ex-
panded outwards. This turned out to have dramatic consequences for the movement.
During his time as an economics student at the University of Amsterdam, Van H. met
Buiter, with whom he organized protests against the Dutch Nazi Party before the German
invasion. Early 1943, the SIPO raided universities and professional colleges in Holland
to retaliate for an attack on a German general. Van H. decided to go back to Twente and
invited secular Buiter to join him.
Upon his arrival Buiter, immediately started to contact people to engage in illegal
activities, such as sheltering Jews. As a newcomer to the region, he initially was forced
to rely on the networks of his friend Van H.. Luckily, this network was quite extensive
and diverse because of Van H.’s central position in the Catholic Boy scout association.
Though the Nazis integrated boy-scout associations with the Nazi Youth movement in
April of 1942, Van H. rejected this forced merger and kept meeting illegally, fronting as a
small religious congregation.37
For Van H., secrecy was of the utmost importance. He even refused to tell his own
brother the exact details of his activities. After a while however Buiter became less care-
ful and started to recruit outside of his friend’s safe network feeling that the Catholic
enclave was too small for his ambitions. The resulting inclusion of people from differ-
ent backgrounds caused internal conflict about what strategy to pursue and, eventually,
became Buiter’s downfall, at least according to Van H.:
“In the beginning he [Buiter] relied heavily on my contacts to build up a resistance
network. Soon, however he seemed to know more people than I did. He even forged a
37SVB-file 47, Docdirect, Winschoten. SVB-file 38, Docdirect, Winschoten.
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link between our group and the LO [Protestant]. Soon after, the network was betrayed
and infiltrated by a V-Man [Nazi-spy ].”38 Together with Orthodox Protestant organiz-
ers Breteler and Van Heek, several members of the movement, including Buiter, were
arrested. Before the arrest several people had already warned Buiter that the movement
was becoming too visible (Hilbrink 1989).
After this period of German repression and backlash, Van H. moved back to a more
segregated setup, which in his own view was safer: “we decided to go fully underground
again. Shield the organization from the outside world to make it harder to penetrate by
outsiders. Create a more camouflaged and fragmented organization.”39
The story of Buiter and Van H. is emblematic of numerous cases where religious
boundary crossing resulted in operational failure of whole rescue missions. Mixing how-
ever could also affect the success rate within the same rescue operation. In Catholic Borne,
an anonymous Protestant minister encouraged at least two families within his parish
to shelter Jews.40 Whereas the first worked in isolation and was able to keep Jews un-
derground despite several searches,41 the latter failed to do so. The head of the second
household was arrested during a meeting with socialist and Catholic resistance workers.
The meeting was set up to resolve disagreements about the distribution of food coupons
between different factions within the network.42 All but one of the attendees was arrested
(Hilbrink 1989).
All these examples reveal how selective survival amplifies the overall segregation
of clandestine organizations. Expansion of recruitment outside the confines of existing
groups was appealing to some as it could enlarge an organizations’ impact and scope.
Unfortunately, networks that scaled outwards often created internal differences in ideol-
38SVB-file 47, Docdirect, Winschoten.
39SVB-file 47, Docdirect, Winschoten.
40SVB-file 51, Docdirect, Winschoten.
41SVB-file 30, Docdirect, Winschoten.
42SVB-file 51, Docdirect, Winschoten.
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ogy, strategy or style. This triggered innate strife and in turn increased the demand for
coordination, and as such reduced the likelihood that a rescue organization could keep
intelligence out of the hands of their much stronger opponent.
There seems to be one common exception to this pattern. Sometimes specific resources
were so rare that groups of different denominational backgrounds had to rely on the same
individual to keep their operation going. As a result, these overlapping actors formed
narrow bridges between isolated pockets of resistance. Employees of the local census
bureaus illustrate this exception. Before conducting a raid, Nazis requested residential
information of Jews and shelters at the census desk. Civil servants working at this desk,
were therefore in a unique position to predict were the next attack on underground net-
works would take place and warn those involved ahead of time. Not only did operatives
at the census bureau have crucial access to information, they also played an important role
in the distribution of food coupons. Combined with their knowledge about underground
activities, they were able to provide different networks with produce without interfer-
ing with their leadership. As a result, they bridged Protestant, Orthodox and Catholic
networks in Delden, Enschede and Oldenzaal (Hilbrink 1989).43 A very similar pattern
emerged in Borne (Hilbrink 1989), Wierden44 and Almelo. One resistance coordinator in
Almelo notes the inefficiency of this setup: “We were constantly trying to draw attention
from the same people”(Hilbrink 1989).
We can see parallels when looking at other underground movements. Networks of
selectivly recruited Jewish fighters in Auschwitz for instance often deployed the same
messengers and smugglers to stay in contact with external helpers as outside links were
extremely rare (Kogon 2006). Contrary to what happened in the infamous extermination
camp however, overlapping individuals did not play a big role in the merging of differ-
ent groups in the Netherlands. Finding addresses often remained the responsibility of
43SVB-file 21, Docdirect, Winschoten.
44SVB-file 11, Docdirect, Winschoten. SVB-file 17, Docdirect, Winschoten.
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key figures within religious communities who relied on coreligionists. This is probably
because bridge builders themselves recognized the importance of segregation and homo-
geneity for secrecy.45
7.3.7 How do Jews Enter Minority Networks?
Given these high levels of religious segregation, one wonders how Jews and nascent
Christian rescuers came into contact. Based on post-war testimonies it is possible to iden-
tify three common pathways, of which the third was the most important in this case.
First, religious leaders sometimes made the first step and contacted Jews in their
neighborhood to offer their help or motivated their parish members to do so (Weustink
1985).46 This is what Leendert Overduin did. Shocked by the early round-up of Jews in
September 1941, he started convincing Jews to go underground.47 The first Jews he helped
lived in his street and were brought in by his parish member, Arend Holl, who lived
nearby (Bekkenkamp 2000). The chaplain of Glanerbrug, Enschede also took the first step
in forging a linkage between Jews and parish members (Weustink 1985). Catholic Grun-
ningman told Jews in his neighborhood: “If you want to leave, just tell me.”48 Reverend
Dijkhuis from Borne asked Jewish refugees she housed before war to come and live with
her in her Mennonite retreat after the German invasion.49
Second, Jews sometimes themselves took the initiative and asked local clergy for help.
This often happened on a collective basis via Jewish councils or rabbis. As early as
September 1941, the local Jewish council of Enschede contacted local clergy to find ad-
45SVB-file 21, Docdirect, Winschoten.
46Yad Vashem file B. Oskam, in Michman et al. Interview Grunningman. Archive NIOD 251a-117, Amsterdam;
Yad Vashem file H. Dijkhuis in Michman et al.
47Yad Vashem file B. Oskam, in Michman et al.
48Interview Grunningman. Archive NIOD 251a-117, Amsterdam.
49Yad Vashem file H. Dijkhuis in Michman et al.
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dresses for twenty-one Jews (Bekkenkamp 2000).
The third and most frequent bridge between Christian communities and Jews was
formed through a process of scale shift of spatially clustered personal ties (McAdam,
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Initially, Jews were often helped by neighbors (Bekkenkamp
2000),50 colleagues,51 family physicians,52 neighborhood patrolmen,53 business relation-
ships,54 former customers or nearby friends (Rossum 2011).55
After a while, these localized early helpers realized that, despite their best intentions,
they could not manage to keep Jews sheltered for prolonged periods of time without
outside help. The extent to which one could find help within local communities then
determined whether one could continue activities. Looking for help within your own
faith-based community was a self-evident next step because people found it hard to be-
lieve that someone in their own church would let them down. In general, religious lead-
ers were the default contacts for their parishioners in times of need. People who had
problems housing Jews were simply recommended by their friends “to go to the pastor”
(Hilbrink 1998, p. 134).
Throughout the country, individual rescuers were forced to consult religious leaders
or religious resistance groups when confronted with Jewish demands for more moving
space,56 additional requests for protection (Noltus 1983), with food shortages,57 increased
risk of exposure,58 imminent house searches,59 financial problems,60 health issues,61 mil-
50SVB-file 34, Docdirect, Winschoten.
51Yad Vashem file J. Hofstra in Michman et al. Yad Vashem file M. Coelingh in Michman et al.
52Yad Vashem file T. Velsing, in Michman et al.
53L..
54SVB-file 9, Docdirect, Winschoten. SVB-file 36, Docdirect, Winschoten. Yad Vashem file F. Pakker in Michman
et al.
55Yad Vashem file G. Olink in Michman et al. Yad Vashem file D. Somsen in Michman et al.
56Jan Hovingh (2015). Predikanten in de frontlinie. Barneveld: Vuurbaak.
57Yad Vashem file A. Ten Tije in Michman et al.
58SVB-file 55, Docdirect, Winschoten.
59SVB-file 34, Docdirect, Winschoten.
60SVB-file 42, Docdirect, Winschoten.
61Yad Vashem file L. Gerritsen in Michman et al.
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itary destruction,62 and leaked information.63 In some cases unorganized helpers also
asked their religious leaders for advice, spiritual guidance64 or even approval before they
would take in a Jew65. As a result, isolated attempts often coalesced into religious rescue
networks once collective action problems came to the forefront.
When talking about coordination, rescuers themselves often observed that religious
leadership was crucial.66 Several testimonies reveal that church leaders collaborated with
nascent rescuers to expand their networks (Hovingh 2015)67 by either asking parish mem-
bers to help on behalf of a third party or writing endorsements for rescue organizers to
facilitate recruitment (Hovingh 2015). In addition, rescuers utilized numerous churches,
chaplaincies, religious party offices, christian schools and presbyteries as temporary safe
houses from which Jews were moved to other hiding addresses(Weustink 1985).68 Often
religious leaders were the only ones who knew where Jews were hidden (Hovingh 2015).
Regardless of which pathway was taken, localized friendships, acquaintances, neigh-
bors and other face-to-face contacts were crucial in bringing Jews in contact with rescue
networks (Varese and Yaish 2000). Hence, in most cases, contact clustered in space. A
coding of 2,798 postwar testimonies also suggests that eighty-nine percent of all Jews who
found shelter mentioned local social contacts in one way or the other. Sixty-three percent
of 11,421 Jews for which information is available found shelter in the region where they
were living legally in the first year of the war. Needless to say, a much larger percentage
made use of local networks to illegally migrate within and between regions (Braun 2016).
62Yad Vashem file N. Talsma in Michman et al.
63Yad Vashem A. Hijmans in Michman et al.
64Yad Vashem file Scheffer in Michman et al.
65Yad Vashem file J. Musch in Michman et al.
66SVB-file 10, Docdirect, Winschoten.
67SVB-file 14, Docdirect, Winschoten.
68Yad Vashem file K. Meima in Michman et al.
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7.3.8 Interregional Ties
Apart from confirming the importance of isolation and commitment, the case studies also
reveal a third mechanism that links minority status to successful rescue: the ability to
set up interregional ties to move Jews from one locality to the other. Although reliance
on help elsewhere entailed risks, it also facilitated clandestinity. Sometimes Jews were
both well known and unpopular in their neighborhoods. In these cases, it would be easy
for Nazis to detect Jews if they stayed near their original home. This made relocation
important for retaining secrecy.69
Due to a lack of critical mass within their own locality, minority groups were often
forced to cooperate with like-minded groups across local borders to keep their religious
activities running. During the war, such ties with co-relgionists in different localities
could now be exploited to funnel Jews from one county to the other. For instance, when
the deportations intensified, Overduin’s small parish in Enschede reached the limits of
its carrying capacity. To expand his network, he exploited his contacts with protestant
leaders in other parts of the country. He placed Jews with religious leaders in the east (Ni-
jmegen, Harderwijk), west (Hilversum), south (Limburg) and even the far North (Hov-
ingh 2015).70 Instead of only leading his parish, he now became a middle-man located
between different religious minority leaders who were at the helm of their own rescue
congregations. For safety reasons, however, he never interfered in local relationships
between these minority leaders and their followers and only communicated with reli-
gious leaders.71 The same is true for Catholics, as the previously mentioned boy scout
networks of Buiter and Grunningman often forged links between localities. In a simi-
lar vein, Catholic chaplain Van Der Brink from Enschede placed Jews with congregants
69Yad Vashem file G. Haveman in Michman et al.
70Yad Vashem file C. Moulijn in Michman et al.
71SVB-file 51, Docdirect, Winschoten.
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living on farms villages 20 kilometers outside of the city.72
This role of inter-regional networks however was most pronounced among Ortho-
dox Protestants. Although most Orthodox rescue operation emerged in local isolation,
ties between reverends did facilitate some inter-regional cooperation on an ad-hoc basis.
When baker’s son Flim contacted Orthodox Protestant reverend Hamming in Nijverdal
to place eighty Jews, the latter realized that it would be impossible to do so in his small
parish. Hamming wrote a letter of introduction to his colleagues Vogelaar and Teeuwen
in the neighboring towns of Lemele and Heerde, explaining the situation. Together the
three parishes were able to find the required addresses to keep the group of Jews hidden
throughout the war.73
The enhanced ability of minority groups to set up strong interregional networks, dove-
tails nicely with the (rather famous) argument that small religious groups formed a cru-
cial role in the creation of long-distance capitalism (Greif 2006; Weber 1985). According to
Greif Jewish traders in the eleventh century formed the backbone of pre-modern trade re-
lations between different regions within the Muslim Mediterranean. Because Jews formed
isolated pockets throughout the region they were able to constitute a inter-regional coali-
tion within which partners could credibly communicate expected obligations of implicit
trade contracts from one place to the other. As a result, traders could enforce agreements
by tarnishing community reputations in case of negligence.
About ninety years earlier, Weber made a related but distinct observation about
Protestants sects in the United States. He was surprised by the fact that business men who
were trying to establish themselves in a new locality were always asked about their reli-
gious background. He later found out that religious denomination acted as an important
marker of trust and credibility. According to the German sociologist, members of small
72Interview kapelaan Van Der Brink, NIOD, Amsterdam.
73Yad Vashem file R. Hamming in Michman et al.
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congregations were more likely to find trade partners who trusted them as “Whereever
he goes the member finds a small congregation of fellow believers which receives him as a
brother upon recommendation from his previous congregation [...] an advantage shared
by all diaspora religions, such as Judaism (Weber 1978).”
The parallel with rescue networks is clear. In both cases members of minority com-
munities could find reliable partners in different regions to which one could either funnel
highly valued goods or people. The fact that minorities were so successful in staging
resistance against the Nazi-Holocaust because they formed interregional networks con-
necting dense tight-knit pockets of committed members also resonates with the litera-
ture on violent mobilization. When writing about powerful insurgencies in South-East
Asia Staniland argues that violence against states can be sustained longest when it is em-
bedded in localized hubs of commitment which are connected by strong supra-local ties
between communities (Staniland 2014).
7.4 Conclusion
In support of the minority thesis, the narrowly confined comparison of rescue opera-
tions in Catholic and Protestant Twente reveals that a) religious minority leaders were
able to exploit the mobilizing capacity of committed members to overcome the clandes-
tine collective action dilemma; b) majority leaders that tried to do this were more likely
to get denounced early on; c) religious mixing undermined the minority advantage by
undercutting isolation; d) as a result of this, insulated pockets of Protestants were more
successful in protecting Jews in areas dominated by Catholics while the same was true
for Catholic enclaves in Protestant regions
In addition to providing support for the minority hypothesis, the case study also helps
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us link deeply structural factors to actual outcomes by suggesting three feedback mecha-
nisms that translate the (somewhat) abstract minority advantage into actual higher levels
of clandestine mobilization. Group commitment assures members that mobilization is
possible (Elster 1979), helps leaders to recruit the right operatives (Marwell and Oliver
1993) and improves the selective survival of groups by reducing infiltration from out-
siders (Aldrich 1999). Whereas the first two hinge on the recognition of opportunities by
forward looking actors, the latter, selective survival, is more evolutionary in logic.
Interestingly, the structured comparison also highlights an unanticipated advantage
that minorities had when setting up rescue operations. Dovetailing with existing work
that centers around the important role that small religious groups play in creating and
sustaining long-distance economic collaboration (Weber 1985; Greif 2006), post-war testi-
monies show that minority congregations were better at fostering interregional ties that
helped Jews escape to other parts of the country.
This chapter enables me to assess the minority hypothesis with high quality data while
keeping a large number of potential confounding variables constant. The downside of a
narrowly confined comparison is that it limits the external validity of the study. How
do we know whether the findings are not unique to the small geographical region under
study? The case studies give some reason to believe that this is indeed the case. When
talking about the Roman Catholic network set up by Grunningman, we saw that a mi-
nority rescue operation emerged because he had more success in creating clandestine
organizations in minority areas than in majority areas. This process of course only oper-
ates in regions with a diverse religious landscape where organizers can move back and
forth between majority and minority congregations of the same religious color. Therefore,
the apparent minority effect we observe in Twente could be unique to border regions or
regions that are religiously diverse. To see whether this is the case or not, I conduct
shadow case studies of rescue networks in two homogeneously Protestant and two ho-
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mogeneously Catholic provinces as well as a quantitative analysis of rescuers throughout
the Netherlands in the next chapter. If the minority pattern is also visible in these analysis,
we can be more certain that we are capturing a general process.





























RELIGIOUSMINORITIES AND RESCUE BEYOND TWENTE
8.1 Introduction
The previous chapter presented evidence that minority mobilization was indeed driving
the differential evasion of Jews in the Netherlands. However, the analysis was based on
a small scale comparison in an area of limited geographical scope. To make sure that the
specific dynamics of the Twente region are not driving the findings, this chapter presents
shadow case studies for two completely Protestant provinces in the North and two com-
pletely Catholic provinces in the South in addition to a statistical analysis of Christian
rescue throughout the Netherlands.
I focus on four religiously homogenous regions of the country to establish that the
minority hypothesis does not only hold for areas close to the religious faultline. Data for
the four shadow case studies are again obtained from the earlier discussed Foundation
40/45. Based on a name list of 1013 religious rescues compiled by Yad Vashem (J. Mich-
man, Flim, et al. 2004), I was able to track down dossiers of 500 rescuers who requested
a additional stipend from the state and were living outside of Twente. These files are
complemented with existing literature to fill contextual gaps.
The lists provided by Yad Vashem are also utilized for the statistical analysis. Yad
Vashem files provide information on the locations where religious rescuers were active
during the war and whether they got arrested or not. This information is deployed to
statistically analyze whether minority groups were indeed more likely to mobilize and
less likely to get get arrested once they did. Although the data for the shadow cases is
less refined and less complete than that presented in the previous chapter, it does indicate
that the lessons drawn from the Twente case travel beyond its borders.
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The chapter is built up as follows: in the next four sections I discuss findings for Zuid-
Limburg, Noord-Brabant, Friesland and Groningen respectively. I will then describe the
results of the statistical analysis. The conclusion summarizes the finding of this and the
previous chapter.
8.2 Catholic Zuid-Limburg
To begin, I look to the Catholic province of Zuid-Limburg. located near the border with
Belgium. One of the main forces underlying the rescue activities in the provincial capital
Maastricht was Van A., a member of a tiny Protestant parish in this Catholic bulwark.
As a tax officer, he had substantial contact with local Jewish business men, who he be-
gan helping when the deportations started. Together with his fellow parish members,
including an alderman who owned a grocery store and could provide food, a local police
officer who warned for upcoming raids and a photographer who forged identity papers.
So again we see how minority enclaves encompassed and mobilized a wide range of dif-
ferent skill set.
Religious bonds of trust within his minority enclave enabled Van A. to funnel Jews
to several small Protestant communities throughout the Southern part of the province,
which were connected because they all attended the same central church in the city.1 Here
we see how an interregional network emerged because a pre-war lack of critical mass
forced minority groups to form a congregation with co-religionists outside their home
town.
This was not the only rescue operation the Protestants in Maastricht produced. Cour-
rech Staal was an alderman of the Dutch reformed community. One late evening in 1942
1SVB-file 6, Docdirect, Winschoten. SVB-file 24, Docdirect, Winschoten. SVB-file 53, Docdirect, Winschoten.
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he rang the bell at the home of Jewish Salmang family who lived right across the street.
After a brief chat, Staal proposed to shelter the two Salmang children, Eva and Otto.
An offer that in Eva Salmang’s words,“saved my live”.2 Largely thanks to these two op-
erations over forty-nine percent of all Jews living in the vicinity of Protestant churches
survived the war in and around Maastricht, the largest number in the whole province
(see figure 8.1).
Figure 8.1: Protestant churches in Maastricht.
As in Twente, the contrast with Catholic majority rescue operations in Maastricht is
stark. Inspired by the pro-Semitic protests of the Episcopate, a local trader and almoner
who knew each other from the Catholic youth movement started providing Jews with
illegal paperwork. Their efforts were short-lived as both men got arrested early 1943. A
2Yad Vashem file C. Staal in Michman et al.
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post-war testimony from the owner of the nearby grocery store reveals why: “He told
everyone in my store that he was anti-German and that he possessed illegal military co-
ordinates on a map. He trusted everyone. This became his downfall.”3 In much the same
way, a Catholic chaplain in the Amby neighborhood of Maastricht who sheltered Jews
was betrayed by one of his own parish members.4
The seemingly higher risks involved in majority rescue often inhibited mobilization
altogether. With few exceptions (see discussion in the next chapter), Catholic clergy were
extremely reluctant to help in the Southern city of Roermond, about thirty kilometers to
the north of Maastricht, as they considered resistance “reckless” and feared infiltration.
Even the extremely well organized labor unions could not be exploited to set up clan-
destine operations.5 Tragically, the chaplains that did stick out their neck were forced to
flee the country6 or ended up in internment camps.7 It bears mentioning that I have not
discovered any evidence of Protestant networks in this area either.8
Protestants did however play a key role in initiating pro-Jewish resistance in neigh-
boring Heerlen. The main organizer here was reverend Gerard Pontier. He approached
the Jewish Silber family who were living nearby and said “if you ever need help, come to
us” (Flim 1997). After encouraging Jews living in his neighborhood to go underground,
he organized his isolated parish into a tightly knit community that insulated Jews from
outside infiltration (Rens 2013). Because of this religious deviance, Catholic neighbors
accused Pontier’s followers of being Nazis and shied away from contact. This enhanced
their already existing isolation and prevented people from finding out about their clan-
destine operations.9 The overall process is probably best symbolized by how Jewish chil-
3SVB-file 12, Docdirect, Winschoten.
4SVB-file 54, Docdirect, Winschoten.
5Archive NIOD, 251a 119.
6Archive NIOD, 251a 119.
7SVB-file 46, Docdirect, Winschoten.
8There is some evidence that a Protestant safe house was located in Roermond, but I have not been able
to find any information about any rescue network associated with it (Cammaert 1994).
9SVB-file 7, Docdirect, Winschoten. Yad Vashem file H. Bockma in Michman et al. Archive Flim NIOD 471 13
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dren were transported from one safe house to the other within Heerlen; because some of
these children had “Semitic looks,” they could not simply walk openly in public. Instead,
a group of Protestant children gathered, formed a hedge and played a game of leap-frog,
limiting exposure of facial characteristics by forming a human caterpillar.10 Quite liter-
ally, Protestants in Heerlen placed a protective shell around Jews. As a result, fifty-three
percent of all Jews living in and around Pontier’s parish survived the war (figure 8.2).
Figure 8.2: Protestant church Pontier in Heerlen.
The importance of Protestant isolation for sustaining secrecy becomes apparent when
we compare Pontiers’s network with Catholic rescue missions that also emerged in and
around Heerlen. The Catholic Hustinx family, for instance, started sheltering Louis Mos-
sel in August 1943. They treated him like a member of their family. However, they were
B, Amsterdam.
10SVB-file 39, Docdirect, Winschoten.
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not able to keep his stay a secret. In the fall of the same year, Louis had to leave the
Hunstinxs because neighbors who were members of the local Nazi party threatened to
betray them. Discouraged by the situation, Louis left for a new shelter.11 The outcome
could have been worse as other Catholic families in Heerlen sheltering Jews were actually
exposed and arrested due to personally motived denunciations,12 German intelligence
work,13 community gossiping,14 infiltration15 or betrayal from nearby collaborators.16 A
local chaplain in Heerlen was even arrested after delivering an anti-German sermon.17
Although Pontier’s operations initially focussed on local Jews, he became involved in
a large interregional network as the war went on. Sometime in 1942, he was approached
by two Protestants from Amsterdam who were carrying a recommendation letter from
his admired big city colleague, Orthodox reverend Sikkel (Hovingh 2015). The two men
had, without much success, used the same letter to try to find shelter in the Protestant
provinces Groningen and Holland.18 Everywhere they went they got the same message:
“We sympathize with the Jews but we have no room to place them”.19 Pontier was able to
step up and provided the two Amsterdammers with a list of reliable Protestant families
that they could contact (Flim 1997). After Heerlen the two Protestants went on to Catholic
Venlo,20 Sittard,21 Geleen,22 Treebeek,23 Hengelo and Rossum24 to set up new rescue “dis-
tricts” with the help of Protestant clerics or congregants who Pontier knew from before
the war.25
11Yad Vashem file G. Hustinx in Michman et al.
12SVB-file 5, Docdirect, Winschoten.
13SVB-file 19, Docdirect, Winschoten.
14SVB-file 29, Docdirect, Winschoten.
15SVB-file 2, Docdirect, Winschoten.
16SVB-file 4, Docdirect, Winschoten.
17SVB-file 35, Docdirect, Winschoten.
18SVB-file 49, Docdirect, Winschoten.
19SVB-file 14, Docdirect, Winschoten.
20SVB-file 25, Docdirect, Winschoten. SVB-file 32, Docdirect, Winschoten.
21SVB-file 39, Docdirect, Winschoten.
22Yad Vashem file J. Tabak, in Michman et al.
23Yad Vashem file D. Spoelstra in Michman et al.
24Archive Flim NIOD 471 13 B, Amsterdam.
25Archive Flim NIOD 471 13 B, Amsterdam.
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Similar to what we saw in Twente, Pontiers’s network operated independent from
Catholic resistance groups. Time and time again, Protestant resistance operatives in
Heerlen stated that they were uable to testify about the illegal activities Catholic coun-
terparts deployed as they alway met separately. Catholics, seen as talking differently
and dressing weird, who went to bars and believed that Maria was a saint, could not be
trusted.26 When asked to name Protestant rescuers, however, the same people provided
pages of notes.27
In part, mutual unawareness can be explained by the fact that, in times of uncertainty,
people are more hesitant to trust strangers and only recruit along lines of trust.28 It seems
equally important that rescue coordinators in Heerlen, much like Leendert Overduin in
Twente, aggressively kept their operation separate from resistance movements surround-
ing them.29 When one of Pontiers contact men found out that their helpers had forged a
link with a Catholic organization helping pilots, he scolded the operative and destroyed
the tie immediately.30 It is quite plausible that this move benefitted the operation as the
Catholic pilot organization was infiltrated in the summer of 43, bringing down several
clandestine missions in the region, including one in Maastricht that focussed on protect-
ing Jews (Cammaert 1994).
The most compelling evidence that minority isolation played a crucial role in sustain-
ing protection reveals itself in the summer of 1944, when waves of repression, initiated
by the SIPO-SD and bounty hunters, dismantled numerous Catholic majority rescue net-
works in Venray, Oirlo, Broekhuizervorst and Castenray. With few exception, Protestant
operations remain intact. This development did not go unnoticed by interregional res-
cue workers, who start to worry about the safety of Catholic networks in the South and
26SVB-file 29, Docdirect, Winschoten. Archive Flim NIOD 471 13 B, Amsterdam.
27Yad Vashem file H. Bockma in Michman et al.
28SVB-file 43, Docdirect, Winschoten.
29Only reluctantly were some Catholics allowed in the operation. Here strong inter-religious friendship
ties formed the bridge (Cammaert 1994)




Figure 8.3: Rescue networks in Limburg.
instead attempted to focus more on their Protestant counterparts (Cammaert 1994).
A bird’s eye view of the whole province in figure 8.3 confirms the importance of mi-
nority rescue. Although, less than 4 percent of the population of Limburg was Catholic,
thirty-three out of all fifty-one networks emerged within the confines of a Protestant con-
gregation.
Interestingly, Catholics from Limburg were able to mobilize if they were moved to
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a Protestant environment. The Holocaust put an enormous administrative pressure on
the bureaucracy of the Amsterdam. Because of this increased workload, the city had to
hire civil servants from other parts of the country. Two of these new workers came from
Limburg. While rescue in their home towns were largely a Protestant phenomenon, the
new recruits were able to exploit their newly acquired minority position to set up a illegal
warning system for jews. As for the functioning of this warning system, one of them later
said: “In a hostile environment where you could not know who was good or bad, trust
was crucial. A little too much babbling could be fatal. We, however, were both from Lim-
burg and knew each other’s culture. Because of this we were able to develop a meticulous
approach. It was important that we stayed independent of our other colleagues.”31
8.3 Catholic Noord-Brabant
The minority advantage seemed even more pronounced in the Catholic province of
North-Brabant. Provincial resistance organizer Piet de Goede declared after the war that
during his reign Catholics were too late in developing a resistance mentality and hardly
ever sheltered: “I could never count on my Catholic friends if people needed to go under-
ground. And then I went to Onno and we placed people in no time among Protestants.
Protestants also provided funding [....] We tried to get money from Catholic clerics but
failed”.32 As a result Protestant reverends had to be frontrunners in setting up rescue op-
erations in numerous Brabant counties. This can be seen in figure 8.4, which reveals that
twenty-eight out of thirty-eight rescue networks (seventy-four percent) are embedded in
Protestant minority enclaves. A striking proportion, given that only nine percent of the
population was Protestant.
31SVB-file 1, Docdirect, Winschoten.
32Although De Goede might have been biassed because of his own religious background some Catholics




Figure 8.4: Rescue networks in Brabant.
Minority rescue in Vught demonstrates the importance of interregional ties. Because of
the limited number of Protestants in Brabant, Dutch Reformed minister Van Wijhe served
as a reverend in three localities: Boxtel, Esch and Vught. This enabled him to funnel Jews
from one place to the other in times of need (Flim 1997). When Jews hidden in his vacation
home were detected by collaborating police forces,33 he and several Jews were able to
escape and go underground elsewhere(Hovingh 2015). One of his operatives, curate Van
33Archive Flim NIOD 471 13 D, Amsterdam.
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Der Veen, was arrested. However, he was so dedicated to his leader and community that
refused to give anyone in (Hovingh 2015). Hence, Van Der Veer’s commitment literally
prevented the expected sub-optimal outcome in this prisoner’s dilemma and, as a result,
forty percent of all Jews living around the Protestant church in Vught evaded deportation
(see figure 8.5).
Figure 8.5: Protestant Church Van Wijhe in Vught.
The case of Oss, located twenty kilometer to the east of Vught, again demonstrates
the importance of religious segregation. In this medium-sized industry city, Jan Faber
helped Jews find shelter. Faber was a mainstream Protestant who relied heavily on the
networks of his father, a reverend with good contacts in local Christian communities in
and around Oss. In collaboration with reverend Veldman, he is able to find shelter for
several Jews. Underlining the importance of segregation, postwar testimonies reveal that
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the Catholic community is clueless of his underground activities. Van Hoeckel, a local
chaplain who was considered an expert witness on resistance,was unaware of the work
Faber did for local Jews. A former colleague who belonged to the Catholic church states
that “We had know idea whether we could trust this man, so we decided to ignore him.”34
In line with the minority argument, this separation proved beneficial for Faber as the
resistance networks initiated by Catholic clerics and labor unions were uprooted near the
end of the war.35
According to Protestants in Brabant, segregation was largely due to the fact Catholics
did not want a act like a unified group and protect Jews as everything in their view had
to be “Brabants and Catholic, Brabant Nostra.” Others say that Protestants were simply
not willing to include Catholics in their pro-Jewish rescue networks.36 Regardless of who
was at fault, it is indeed striking that even near the end of the war, when most rescue
organizations were integrated into unified movements, this split between Protestants and
Catholics persisted, with a separate Protestant wing focussing on helping Jews and a
Catholic wing focussing on help to Catholics(Riessen, Aerde, and Algra 1951).
8.4 Protestant Friesland
That a minority position bolstered Catholics in Protestant parts of the country as well is
nicely illustrated by rescue operations set up by chaplain Gerard Janssen in the Friesian
town of Sneek. In addition to twenty-five local Jews, Janssen also saved the lives of large
number of Jews from Western cities who arrived with the help of studentnetworks (J.
Michman, Beem, and D. Michman 1999). Via a police officer, the chaplain was contacted
by a local rabbi who needed help to keep his community out of the hands of the Nazis.
34SVB-file 10, Docdirect, Winschoten.
35Purification police file 3, National Archives, Den Haag. Purification police file 6, National Archives, Den Haag.
36Archive NIOD, 251a 119.
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Janssen understood the social relations within his parish through and through and had
no problem identifying reliable addresses to house Jews. He was assured that resistance
was possible. In addition, he made it possible for Jews to stay in the local Roman Catholic
Hospital and join the the Roman Catholic school (Bazuin 2008). Statements of a Protestant
vicar in predominantly Protestant Sneek underline the impact Janssen had. In her post-
war testimony, the vicar who herself had a hard time mobilizing her followers (Bazuin
2008), could not hide how amazed she was that her Roman Catholic counterpart was
able to shelter significantly more Jews despite the fact that the Catholic community was
three times smaller than hers.(Flim 1997) Janssen himself was aware of the fact that the
small size of his community made for its greater strength. Writing about one of his most
dedicated helpers, he observed after the war: “I already knew them for a long time as
members of my parish. Sneek’s community was so small. This way it was easy to find
out that they were good patriots.”37 In other words, in creating clandestine operations,
he could rely on organizers selectivity. As a result of Janssen’s network, fifty-five percent
of the Jews living around his church were able to evade, making it the safest place in the
whole Province (see figure 8.6).
Much like what we saw with Pontier in Heerlen, chaplain Janssen also became in-
volved in an interregional network that tried to whisk Jews out of Amsterdam. Its telling
that the same students Janssen worked with had also, without much success, tried to in-
volve chaplains in the Catholic provinces Limburg and Brabant. Here they instead had to
rely on Protestant helpers.38 Even when the same networks with identical missions and
operatives set up rescue organizations, their success hinges on whether the groups they
approach form isolated minority communities.
Janssen was not the only minority leader in Sneek who rescued Jews. Baptist rev-
erend Willem Mesdag led a congregation of 530 people. Before the war he coordinated
37SVB-file 37, Docdirect, Winschoten.
38Archive Flim NIOD 471 11 B, Amsterdam.
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Figure 8.6: Catholic church Janssen in Sneek.
a religiously inspired group that provided humanitarian assistance to Jewish refugees.
In collaboration with a local resistance movement, he contacted Jews living around his
church and encouraged them to go underground (Bazuin 2008).39 Although Mesdag was
extremely popular among his followers and was assured that most of them would blindly
obey him, he was also aware that members of the baptist consistory were probably not
willing to take any risks. Consequently, he mobilized his followers without informing
any of the elders (Hovingh 2015). Hence, he deployed organizers selectivity and knew
who not to approach to turn his rescue operation into a success.
His house became a hub for regional rescue activities and Jews were even sheltered
inside the baptist church (Flim 1997). Mesdag’s networks also extended outside Sneek.
39There is also some evidence that a local Rabbi was among his friends.
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The experienced reverend acted as a mentor for all of his junior colleagues in the region
and throughout the war he could use his contacts with young Baptist ministers to place
Jews all over the province of Friesland (Hovingh 2015; Bazuin 2008). In the provincial
capital of Leeuwarden, he involved his colleague Van der Wissel, the pastor of 1450 bap-
tists, who mobilized several followers(Wijbenga 1995).40 In a similar vein, his Catholic
counterpart, chaplain Janssen, brought Jews to Catholic minority enclaves in Bolsward,
Blauwhuis and Oosterwierum, about 30 minute bike rides from Sneek (Flim 1997). In the
latter community Jews even served as acolytes to make sure they would not be exposed
to German soldiers attending mass (Bazuin 2008).
When discussing rescue operations inside Sneek, the Orthodox Protestant community
cannot be left unmentioned. When the local police commander received a telegram on
March ninth of 1943 announcing that all Jews will be put on transport at 9:30 that same
evening, he immediately informed Orthodox Protestant resistance group Lever. After
getting the news, two of its members start offering their help to Jews they meet in the
streets. At 8pm, thirty minutes before the actual deportations start, leaders of the same
group began house visits to neighboring Jews to warn them of their upcoming fate and
provided them with underground addresses (Bazuin 2008).
When a large number of Jews had to leave their shelter in the aftermath of a railroad
strike in on the seventeenth of September 1944, it was again the Lever group that stepped
up and funnelled Jews to new addresses. The Frisian rescuer Turksma who converted
from the more liberal Dutch Reformed to the Orthodox church right before the war, might
provides us with one reason why his new community was so powerful. Although initially
skeptical about its dogmatic views, he was drawn into the Orthodox church because that
its followers were so committed to the group, they were like “real friends” to each other
(Wijbenga 1995).
40Among them the famous resistance worker Krijn van der Helm.
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While group commitment led Orthodox Protestants, Catholics and Baptists to form the
backbone of clandestine protection, the impact of the dominant Dutch Reformed clerics
on rescue in Sneek was relatively limited. Mainstream Protestants in Sneek responded to
the Holocaust in three ways. First, reverend Schut who became mayor of Sneek in 1941
with the Dutch National Socialist Party simply endorsed the persecution of Jews because
in his view: “God created the world but the Jews had to ruin it.” Second, as mentioned
above, some reverends tried to mobilize but could not find the similar support among
their followers. A third group of mainstream Protestant reverends did actually mobilize
against the Nazis but were denounced by their followers (Hovingh 2015).41
As figure 8.7 demonstrates, the town of Sneek was indicative of rescue patterns
throughout the whole province of Friesland. Of the fifty-nine religious active rescue or-
ganizations, eighty percent was embedded within minority congregations.42
8.5 Protestant Groningen
Rescue stories from the Northern Province of Groningen further confirm that the minority
advantage was often conditional on maintaining segregation. This is can be illustrated by
the demise of a nascent network that emerged in the tight-knit Catholic parish of the city
of Groningen (the Capital of the province Groningen is a city bearing the same name).
One of its members was Scholte, the cashier of the local food distribution office. Via his
work, Scholte had access to food coupons. With the help of Jagt and Naber, who he both
knew from the Catholic Sint-Christophel association for small business men, he was able
to exploit this position to provide shelter for Jews.
41Mesdag also got arrested during the last day of the war. However, not because of pro-Jewish mobiliza-
tion but because he was found with illegal pamphlets.




Figure 8.7: Rescue networks in Friesland.
While Jagt managed a restaurant almost exclusively frequented by fellow Catholics,
which served as safe meeting place, Naber provided the organization with iron and tools
via the hardware store he owned. Although the majority of the Catholic resistance fight-
ers in Groningen shunned secular and Protestant resistance movements, Scholte, after
working in Catholic isolation, established ties with Group De Groot, a communist under-
ground organization. Despite repeated calls by fellow Catholics to end cross-pillar collab-
oration, Scholte refused to give up these contacts, wanting to provide food to whomever
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needed help regardless of religious background.
In the end, it was these ties outside of their own community that lead to the disruption
of their resistance work. January 1945, the leader of the De Groot Group, Boekhoven, is
arrested and his whole personal administration, containing information on Scholte and
his men, fell in the hands of the SD. Scholte was detained ten days after Boekhoven’s
arrest (Hamans and Mesters 2008).
A very similar story reveals itself when one looks at Orthodox Protestants rescuers ac-
tive in the village of Nieuw Vennep. A deputy minister of the Orthodox Protestant church
in this region forged linkages between local traders and farmers which were crucial for
setting up a sheltering infrastructure as the latter often had the space and resources to
keep Jews underground for a prolonged period of time. In the village itself, two pockets
of protection emerged separated by a series of houses owned by members of the National
Socialist Party who, at any cost, had to be prevented from finding out (Braun 2016). A
little bit outside the village lived Hannes Bogaard who saved approximately on hundred
Jews and was known as “the bush monkey” because he always “hung in there.” The
whole Orthodox Protestant community seemed to know what the bush monkey was up
to; among the Orthodox Protestants, who harbored mixed feelings about his rescue activ-
ities, his farm was known as “the concentration camp” because it housed so many Jews.
The church for him, however, always felt as a safe haven: “I trust all Orthodox people”,
he often said (W. Bank 1985). Less romantic testimonies reveal that Orthodox Protes-
tant believers in the village were uncomfortable with what he was doing, but could not
bring themselves to denounce someone they considered one of their own (W. Bank 1985).
While Hannes often turned to fellow church members to collect money or to place Jews
when his own house became too crowded, the Orthodox Protestant grocery and bakery
provided Bogaard with food for “his guests.” Equally important were the warnings he
got from a local police officer when the Germans were actively looking for Jews in the
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area. Hannes was arrested by the Nazis only a few days after he mistook members of the
Dutch Reformed (non-Orthodox) church for co-religionists and told them about his activ-
ities (Ommeren and Scherphuis 1985). Once again, we see that leaving denominational
confines was fatal.
Figure 8.8: Christian Reformed Church Van Smeden in Groningen.
Despite such infiltrations due to religious mixing, minorities in Groningen still had an
advantage in setting up clandestine operations, in Groningen city, at least three Orthodox
Protestant congregations set up rescue missions (Hovingh 2015). Reverend Van Smeden,
leader of the Christian reformed congregation in the northern part of the city, went as
far as to shelter Jews inside the main church building before moving them to committed
members of his parish (Capellen and Oolders-Jurjens 2008). In figure 8.8 below we see




Figure 8.9: Rescue networks in Groningen city.
evade deportation. This is considerably higher than the city average of eightteen and the
provincial average of twenty-two percent. If we look at the province as a whole in figure
8.9 we see that a majority of all rescue operations (fourteen out of twenty-two networks)
was driven by small minority parishes.
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8.6 Quantitative Analysis
These shadow cases suggest that the lessons learned from Twente travel to both homo-
geneously Protestant and Catholic provinces. The analysis however focusses on whole
networks. This could potentially introduce a minority bias, as minority groups because of
their interregional ties, produce more scattered networks that, due to missing network in-
formation, are mistakingly coded as smaller and separate rescue operations. To test more
systematically whether minority congregations indeed involved more people throughout
the whole country, I also quantified the number of rescuers in the already mentioned files
from Yad Vashem (J. Michman, Flim, et al. 2004).
As a first cut at the data, I divided the Netherlands into counties where Protestantism
was strongest and counties where Catholicism was strongest. I then counted the number
of Dutch Reformed rescuers in the latter half as well as the number of Catholic rescuers
in the former and added the number of rescuers belonging to Orthodox Protestant de-
nominations. This sum is then divided by the total number of rescuers. The results are
presented in the figure below. According to this coding scheme, thirty-two percent of
the population would be a member of a minority. Overall, post war testimonies seem to
confirm that minority groups were more likely to rescue Jews. Of all the rescuers com-
memorated by Yad Vashem (J. Michman, Flim, et al. 2004), sixty-two percent belonged
to a minority church. Yad Vashem data is far from perfect however as it only records
altruistic rescuers of Jews that survived the war. To make sure the analysis is not driven
by the unique nature of the source, I conducted a similar analysis using survey data col-
lected among Jewish survivors (Evers-Emden and Flim 1996). Each of these survivors
was asked whether they were helped by Catholics or Protestants. The data is housed by
the Dutch institute of war documentation (NIOD). A similar picture emerges: of all the
two hundred rescuers, 61 percent adhered to a minority religion. As we can see, the per-
centage of minority rescuers are very close in both datasets giving us some confidence
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that measurement is valid.








Figure 8.10: Minority rescue according to post-war Testimonies.
It is of course possible that geographical differences in tolerance towards Jews might
be driving this result as more tolerant regions attracted more Jews and other religious
minorities increasing the opportunities for minority rescue. Therefore, I also analyze the
Yad Vashem data in a multivariate framework keeping geographical factors and group
size constant.43 I matched Yad Vashem recognized rescuers to all Catholic, Mainstream
Protestant and Orthodox Protestant communities that existed in the Netherlands in 1930
(CBS 1931). This results in a database of 2,883 religious communities nested in 1,027
counties for which we know how many rescue took place according to Yad Vashem. If
the minority hypothesis holds, we would expect Catholic communities to be more likely
to produce rescuers in Protestant parts of the country, Protestant communities to pro-
duce more rescuers in Catholic parts of the country and Orthodox communities to be
more likely to rescue everywhere. To capture this minority effect, I interact whether a
community is Catholic with the percentage of Catholic Christians in a county. The logic
behind this is that Catholics should be more likely to rescue in areas where relatively
43I preferred to use the Yad Vashem files over the survey data as the former has a broader coverage
providing more opportunities to keep geographical factors constant
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few Catholics live but less likely to rescue in areas where Catholicism is widespread (and
Protestantism is not) because they are no longer a minority. Results of the analyses with
county clustered standard errors are presented in the first three models of Table 8.1.
[Table 8.1 about here.]
Model one looks at the percentage of rescuers for each religious community while
model two looks at whether at least one rescuer was active in a community. In line with
the minority hypothesis the effect of Catholicism on rescue is conditional on the overall
strength of Catholicism in the region regardless of what outcome variable is chosen. Since
interaction effect are somewhat hard to interpret, the model is visualized in figure 8.11.
As we can see in figure 8.11b Catholics are more than fifty percent more likely to produce
networks of assistance to Jews in Protestant areas, while the same is true for Catholics in
Protestant areas. Also in line with the minority hypothesis, figure 8.12 reveals that Or-
thodox groups who were the smallest congregation everywhere are about twelve percent
more likely to stage rescue operations. The third model shows that the results are robust
to the inclusion of county level fixed effect suggesting that the minority effects are not
driven by local level omitted variable bias.
In the case study of Twente we saw that enclave networks were also less likely to be
exposed and uprooted, resulting in selective survival of minority networks. Based on Yad
Vashem files it is possible to retrieve whether rescuers were arrested or not, which can be
used as a proxy for exposure. The results of a logistic regression analysis are presented in
table 8.2. Again, the effect of Catholicism on getting arrested is conditional on the overall
religious environment. As we can see in figure 8.11d, Catholics engaged in rescue oper-
ations in Protestant parts of the Netherlands were more than twenty percent less likely
to get arrested than their protestant counterparts. This effect however flips around in ar-
eas dominated by Catholics where mainstream protestant clerics were almost 10 percent
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(f) M6: Arrest Cleric (Y/N)
Figure 8.11: Effect of Catholic community with 90 percent confidence in-
tervals conditional on Catholic strength in region.
less likely to get arrested. Figure 8.12 reveals that Orthodox Protestant clerics are about
eight percent less likely to get arrested overall. The effects become more pronounced
when county level fixed effects are included, suggesting that the minority arguments is
not likely to be confounded by local geographical factors.
[Table 8.2 about here.]
Yad Vashem files are based on testimonies of Jewish survivors and are therefore likely
to miss large numbers of exposed networks. This truncates the sample and could poten-
tially bias the results. Retrieving religious information from all arrested rescuers in the
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country is probably impossible. Therefore I also decided to focus on a important subset of
rescuers for which denominational information is easy to obtain: clerics. The case study
above revealed that clerics played a prominent role in almost all rescue operations. It is
therefore reasonable to assume that arrests of clerics provide some insight into the overall
exposure rate of religious groups. I have constructed a database of 405 clerics from 200
counties who engaged in rescue operations throughout the county by combining informa-
tion on successful attempts culled from the already used Yad Vashem files (Braun 2016)
with unsuccessful attempts obtained from religious commemoration books and German
arrests record which list profession and reason for arrest (Hovingh 2015; Hamans and
Mesters 2008).44 This allows me to compare arrests rates between majority and majority
clerics. Figure 8.11f visualizes the results. Much in line with what we saw for rescuers
culled from Yad Vashem files only, Roman Catholic clerics active in Protestant areas were
more than sixty percent less likely to get apprehended by security forces, while Protes-
tants were twenty-six percent less likely to be exposed in Catholic areas. Orthodox protes-
tants were seventeen percent less likely to be arrested throughout the country. Focussing
on clerics reduces the number of observations and, as a result, variation within counties.
This makes it impossible to include fine-grained county level fixed effects. Nevertheless,
taken together these analyses provide compelling support for the minority hypotheses in
suggesting that while in the Protestant parts of Netherlands Catholics were more likely to
produce successful rescue operations that were less likely to be exposed, the same is true
for Protestant communities in Catholic parts of the country.
44Archive NIOD 250b.
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Figure 8.12: The effect of Orthodox Protestantism on occurrence of res-
cue activities (M2) and arrests (M4-M6) with 90 percent confi-
dence intervals.
8.7 Conclusion
When the deportations started Jews were encouraged by or relied on local contacts to
go underground. Despite overall sympathy with Jews, people willing and able to help
were rare given the high risks involved in initiating clandestine rescue activities. Sustain-
ing clandestine missions appeared even harder as it entailed solving complex problems
that were too much work for one individual or household alone, at the same time the
required cooperation automatically increased exposure. As a result, the lives of Jews and
their helpers sooner or later became dependent on whether local communities could se-
cretly coordinate collective rescue attempts. The ability to do so was shaped by group
commitment.
The case studies presented in this chapter reveal that this high premium on commit-
ment restricted recruitment of rescuers because it was easier to generate group commit-
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ment between similar actors who had already engaged in frequent interaction before the
war. Recruitment into illicit collective action therefore often proceeded via existing ties
of trust, typically resting on kinship ties or other strong bonds. As a result, clandes-
tine collective rescue during the Holocaust often inherited group-structures that had been
formed in uneventful times. The pillarized structure of Dutch group relationships, there-
fore, created the confines within which clandestine mobilization emerged.
Compared to dominant groups, minority enclaves within this pillarized system had a
natural advantage in producing and sustaining clandestine networks because they were
anchored in isolated hubs of commitment which provided relatively safe places for illicit
mobilization. This in turn created an opportunity to overcome the dual challenge of high-
risk collective action and secrecy. In addition, minority enclaves were more likely to have
formed ties with minority communities elsewhere before the war, allowing them to build
critical mass for their activities. These ties could be exploited in war time to illegally
funnel Jews from one place to the other.
As a result, Jews were more likely to survive when their individual networks over-
lapped with those of isolated minority groups. Neighborhood ties with enclave members
were more likely to coalesce into sustainable assistance because the deviant position of
enclaves: 1) increased the number of potential recruits with specific skill sets that could
be trusted because members were more committed to group and leadership; 2) assured
organizers and followers alike that rescue operations were feasible; 3) improved the abil-
ity of organizers to recognize and select skilled recruits; 4) decreased the spread of infor-
mation to uncommitted outsiders which 5) enhanced the overall survival rate of minority




Table 8.1: Religious communities and rescue of Jews, 1940-1945.
OLS Logit OLS
(1) (2) (3)
% Rescue Rescue (Y/N) % Rescue
Catholic Community 0.011∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.128) (0.008)
Catholic Strength 0.023∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.181)
Catholic Community*Catholic Strength −0.028∗∗ −1.162∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗
(0.010) (0.320) (0.022)
Orthodox Community 0.013∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.035) (0.003)
Constant 0.004∗ 0.230∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.045) (0.000)
County FE N N Y
Size control Y Y Y
Observations 2883 2883 2883
Counties 1027 1027 1027
Log-Likelihood 4191.963 −1972.327 4544.075
Models 1 and 3: Entries are regression coefficients.
Models 2: Entries are logistic regression coefficients.
County clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001.
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Catholic Community −1.782∗∗ −0.304∗∗ −4.179∗∗
(0.658) (0.127) (1.742)
Catholic Strength −1.228∗ −0.909
(0.569) (0.581)
Catholic Community*Catholic Strength 2.703∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗ 5.699∗∗
(0.856) (0.174) (2.002)
Orthodox Community −0.748∗∗ −0.086∗ −0.873∗
(0.308) (0.052) (0.431)
Constant −1.246∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗ −0.463∗
(0.339) (0.126) (0.202)
County FE N Y N
Size control Y Y Y
Observations 985 985 405
Counties 205 205 200
Log-Likelihood −345.211 −54.763 −240.162
Models 1 and 3: Entries are logistic regression coefficients.
Models 2: Entries are regression coefficients.




RELIGIOUSMINORITIES AND EMPATHY, 1940-1945
The previous two chapters showed that pre-war levels of commitment carried over
into the war time period, turning religious minorities into isolated hubs of commitment
that produced clandestine protection networks for Jewish neighbors. In this chapter I
investigate whether the same is true for pre-war levels of empathy. Systematically in-
vestigating the role that empathy plays in motivating those who help victims of mass
persecution is easier said than done. Most research on the motivations underlying re-
sistance against the Holocaust has relied heavily on post-war testimonies of the rescuers
involved. If one is interested in studying the independent role that empathy played in the
rescue process this is not a particularly useful source of information as rescuers will ret-
rospectively almost always identify with those who they helped (S. Oliner and P. Oliner
1992). Hence, post-war testimonies by rescuers will be biassed towards finding evidence
in favor of the empathy mechanism.
To overcome this problem, I deploy two alternative empirical strategies that do not
suffer from this bias. The first compares the attention that minority and majority clandes-
tine resistance newspapers paid to the Jewish plight during the Nazi occupation. Clan-
destine periodicals provide insight in the extent to which different groups identified with
Jews when the Shoah was unfolding and as such circumvents the retrospective bias de-
scribed above. The comparison reveals that minority empathy was reflected in how Chris-
tian resistance workers perceived the Jewish problem on the ground. Whereas Protestant
clandestine newspapers paid more attention to the Shoah in Catholic parts of the Nether-
lands, the reverse was true in Protestant areas.
The second empirical strategy compares resistance networks for Jews with resistance
organizations for fellow Christians. The logic behind this comparison is straightforward.
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For all rescue missions, regardless of whether they are aimed at Jews or co-religionists,
clandestinity was required. Rescue networks for Jews could additionally be enhanced
by pluralist norms, but this is not the case for rescue operation targeting fellow Gentiles
who are part of the same religious denomination. Hence, if empathy with victims of
mass persecution affected minority mobilization independently of clandestine capacity,
one would expect that the religious minority advantage in mobilization was more pro-
nounced for Jewish rescue than for the rescue of co-religionists. Indeed, the comparison
shows that this is the case, making it clear that on top of clandestine capacity, minority
empathy did indeed play an additional role in creating resistance against Genocide.
The remainder of this chapter is divided in three sections. The next section presents
the comparison of minority and majority resistance newspapers. A comparison between
the rescue of Gentiles and the rescue of Jews in Twente and Limburg, follows in order
to see whether minority pluralism induced empathy played a mobilizing role on top of
enhanced clandestine capacity. The third section utilizes a quantitative analysis to look
whether the lessons learned from these case studies can be applied more broadly to the
Netherlands as a whole.
9.1 Resistance Newspapers
To assess whether pre-war differences in empathy with Jews translated into resistance
mobilization on the ground during the occupation, I conduct a content analysis of Dutch
resistance newspapers. Immediately after the German invasion, small groups of individ-
uals started to produce clandestine periodicals in order to escape Nazi censorship. By
secretly writing and distributing these magazines and newspapers, resistance workers
hoped to boast morale, counterbalance German propaganda, provide information about
military developments and eventually instigate revolt (Winkel and Vries 1989).
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Over a 1,000 different outlets produced millions of copies of about 50,000 different
issues. Small embryonic networks, rooted in local religious or political associations,
emerged to illegally write, print and disseminate all these newspapers amongst their
neighbors. To a large extent, clandestine periodicals became the mouthpiece of the con-
gregations and communities in which they were embedded, informing their immediate
surroundings about specific frustrations with the Nazi regime (Dewulf 2010).
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Institute of War Documentation, in collaboration with
the Royal Dutch library, has systematically collected and digitalized copies of all resis-
tance newspapers that survived the war.1
For each of these newspapers, I coded whether the newspaper was published by
a Catholic, Protestant or secular resistance group and in which part of the country it
was distributed.2 Unfortunately, is was not possible to distinguish between mainstream
Protestant and Orthodox Protestant resistance organizations. I was therefore forced to
treat all Protestant newspapers as part of the mainstream church. This could result in an
over-estimation of Protestant attention for Jews as Orthodox organizations, that formed
minorities everywhere, will be marked as majority Protestants. However, this bias makes
finding a difference between minority and majority newspapers less likely, even if it actu-
ally exists. As the bias is stacked against finding support for the minority hypothesis, we
can be more confident the empathy mechanism holds if we indeed find that minorities
are more likely to pay attention to Jewish plight.
After establishing the religious denomination of a resistance newspaper, I deployed
an automatic content analysis to identify whether it reported on Jewish persecutions. I
deployed the same search string as used in the previous chapter to analyze pre-war dis-
1Already in 1943 did Posthumus start collecting illegal newspapers. After the war his work was contin-
ued by the previously mentioned Dutch Institute of War Documentation (NIOD), a research consortium he
himself helped founding. Through a radio campaign Dutch citizens were encouraged to submit copies of
their newspapers to the NIOD. These newspapers can be accesses at http://www.delpher.nl/nl/kranten.
2This was done based on Winkel and de Vries (Winkel and Vries 1989).
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course: Joden* OR Joodsch* OR Jood* OR Israel*. In order to guarantee whether attention
to Jewish issues during World War Two by resistance newspapers indeed reflected em-
pathy, I coded all articles manually and marked all pro-Semitic statements. For instance,
an Protestant minority newspaper wrote reprinted the following verse, titled the Plural-
ist Alphabet, numerous times: “Now it is the Jews whose lives they burn but tomorrow
another group will take their turn” (Boom 2012).
Matching pro-Semitic claims with newspapers of different religions enables me to ex-
amine the differences in empathy between religious minority and majority newspapers.
This resulted in a data base of 1,076 Dutch resistance newspapers. Whether newspapers
paid attention to the fate of Jews or not gives a strong indication of their overall empa-
thy. Figure 9.1 presents the percentage of resistance newspapers which covered Jewish
persecutions per religious group. In line with the minority hypothesis, Catholic minor-
ity newspapers were more likely than their majority counterparts to pay attention to the
misery of the Jews.3 While seventy-eight percent of all Catholic minority newspapers re-
ported on Jewish persecutions, the same was true for less than sixty percent of Catholic
majority newspapers. The story flips when we look at Protestant resistance newspapers.
While eighty-eight percent of all Protestant resistance newspapers payed attention to Jew-
ish persecutions in Catholic areas, only seventy-two percent did so in parts of the country
where they formed a majority.4
Comparing Protestant and Catholics resistance newspapers also provides support for
the capacity mechanism. Producing and distributing illegal newspapers involves a solu-
tion to the clandestine collective action dilemma, which minorities are better equipped to
do. We see this when looking at the production of clandestine newspapers by majority
and minority groups. While only, twenty-six percent of the Dutch population belonged to
3Interestingly, in line with this pattern, the Catholic bishop of the completely Catholic province Noord-
Brabant was also the most reluctant to protest anti-Semitic legislation (Stokman 1945).
4Unpaired T-tests of these differences suggest that these differences are significant with P-values<.0001.
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a minority congregations, thirty-four percent (90+285/1076) of all resistance newspapers





































Figure 9.1: Percentage of resistance Newspapers reporting on Jewish
Plight by Religion, 1940-1945.
In sum, the analysis of resistance newspapers reveals that minority congregations
were more likely to produce clandestine newspapers which in turn payed more atten-
tion to Jewish plight. It was this convergence of clandestine capacity and empathy that
turned religious minorities into likely hotbeds of resistance against the Holocaust. We
have seen in the previous two chapters that the clandestine capacity of minorities played
an important role in the production of rescue networks for threatened neighbors. The
question now becomes whether empathy independently affected mobilization against the
Holocaust? The next section explores this issue by comparing rescue networks for Jewish
outsiders with rescue networks for fellow Gentiles.
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9.2 Religious Minorities and Help to Co-Religionists
An alternative way to assess whether empathy and pluralistic norms played a role in ac-
tivating minority rescue operation is to compare rescue operations for excluded outsiders
with resistance operations that represented the interests of in group members. Both types
of rescue organizations heavily rely on clandestinity to survive. However, only the former
type of rescue mission would profit from norms of pluralism and empathy as protecting
members of ones own ethnic group does not require these values.
If, on top of clandestine capacity, empathy for marginalized groups was driving
minority mobilization, we would expect religious minority congregations to be more
strongly overrepresented among rescue operations for Jews than among rescue opera-
tions for Gentiles. If clandestine capacity alone was driving the minority advantage, we
would not expect to see a difference in minority overrepresentation between the two types
of resistance.
As was mentioned in chapter 3, deportations were extended to include Gentiles in
late 1943, though students and the unemployed were persecuted throughout the war. I
have culled the post-war testimonies for Twente described above to retrieve information
on faith-based resistance organizations that protected co-religionists. They are mapped
in figure 9.2b and 9.3b. For readers convenience I have also reprinted religious rescue
networks for Jews in 9.2a and 9.3a. It is immediately clear that rescue operations for
Gentiles were more widespread than rescue operations for Jews.
When comparing the religious representation on these maps, it becomes clear that al-
though religious minority groups are overrepresented, they played a less prominent role
for resistance groups that sheltered Gentiles. In Twenty slightly more than 50 percent,
21 out of 41, of all resistance groups for Gentiles were embedded in minority congrega-
tions, while more than 90 percent of all missions rescuing Jews emerged out of minority
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enclaves. It is important to highlight that fourteen networks saved both Jews and Gen-
tiles, resulting in a total of only 6 minority operations that were set up for Gentiles only.
Often, rescue networks for Gentiles build on clandestine operations that had emerged in
response to the Holocaust. Taken together, this suggests that on top of the clandestine
capacity of deviant congregations, minority empathy with marginalized outsiders func-
tioned as an additional mechanism linking minority status to rescue operations for Jews.
We can conduct a similar comparison for the earlier analyzed Province of Limburg.
Cammaert (Cammaert 1994), has utilized the same files of the Stichting 40/45 to provide
a comprehensive overview of resistance networks for Gentiles for this Southern part of
the country. The networks that Cammaert finds are depicted in figure 6.19c. To facilitate
comparison, I have remapped protection networks for Jews in figure 9.4a and 9.4b. Again,
we see that rescue for fellow Christians was more prevalent than rescue for Jews. More
importantly, the minority contrast is even more striking than what we saw for Twente.
Only one of of all the eighty networks for Gentiles active in Limburg was rooted in a
minority congregation. Recall that thirty-three out of all fifty-one networks helping Jews
emerged within the confines of a religiously deviant congregation.
9.3 Quantitative Analysis
What about other parts of the Netherlands? Commemoration books of two resistance
organizations the Fighting Squad (KP) and the National Organization (LO) enable me to
investigate this. The LO was a national organization providing shelter for Gentiles who
tried to escape the Arbeiteinsatz, the KP its armed wing that engaged in violent attacks on
distribution centers in order to obtain food coupons for sheltered co-ethnics.
Both the LO and the KP saw it as their primary task to protect fellow Christians who
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(a) Protestant and Catholic networks rescuing Jews.
(b) Protestant and Catholic networks rescuing Gentiles.
Figure 9.2: Protestant and Catholic networks in Twente.
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(a) Orthodox Protestant networks rescuing Jews.
(b) Orthodox Protestant networks networks rescuing Gentiles.
Figure 9.3: Orthodox Protestant networks in Twente.
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(a) Minnority networks rescuing Jews.
(b) Majority networks rescuing Jews.
(c) Networks not rescuing Jews.
Figure 9.4: Resistance networks in Limburg.
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were targeted by the Arbeitzeinsatz. As a result, networks protecting Jews operated in-
dependently from both organizations (Riessen, Aerde, and Algra 1951). Although it is
impossible to assess this for each individual member independently, it seems safe to as-
sume that most of them only engaged in resistance activities benefitting co-religionists
and refrained from helping Jews.
Based on commemoration books, I have retrieved information on the religious back-
ground and area of operation of 1609 resistance members active in the LO and KP during
the war (Riessen, Aerde, and Algra 1951; Hilbrink 2015).
[Table 9.1 about here.]
In a similar vein as I did for rescuers of Jews commemorated by Yad Vashem in chap-
ter 8, I match the information on individual resistance workers to all Catholic, Main-
stream Protestant and Orthodox Protestant communities that existed in the Netherlands
in 1940 (CBS 1931). This results in a database of 2886 religious communities nested in
1027 counties for which we know how many LO and KP members were active according
to commemoration lists. To assess whether minorities were more likely to engage in re-
sistance, I interact whether a community is Catholic with the percentage of Catholics in
a county. Results of the analyses with county clustered standard errors and fixed effects
are presented in the table 9.1 and visualized in 9.5 and 9.6.
Contrary to what we saw for the rescue of Jews, there seems to be no strong minor-
ity effect. Although, Orthodox Protestants were more likely to be active in the LO, there
seems to be no difference between majority and minority Catholics or mainstream Protes-
tants. This confirms what we saw for Twente and Limburg: although a minority position
bolstered rescue operations for Jews, this was less the case for rescue operations for co-
religionists. Again this suggests that, on top of network insulation, empathy with other
deviants activated minority mobilization against the Holocaust.
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(f) County FE: Survival KP-members
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(h) County FE: Members KP/1000 in-
hab (Based on membership lists)
Figure 9.5: Effect of Catholic community on membership resistance orga-
nization conditional on Catholic strength in region. Point es-
timated are represented as points with 90 percent confidence
intervals.
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Effect of Orthodox Protestantism
















DV: KP-members membershiplists (FE)
Figure 9.6: Effect of Orthodox protestant community on membership re-
sistance organization with 90 percent confidence intervals.
The commemoration books only provide information on resistance workers that per-
ished during the war. In chapter 8 we saw that religious minorities are not only better
able at mobilizing clandestine networks, they are also less likely get uprooted because of
group isolation. It is therefore possible that the absence of a minority effect in the previ-
ous analysis is driven by the fact that we only look at relatively unsuccessful resistance
members who did not survive the war.
To circumvent this problem, I have also analyzed KP membership in the province of
North-Holland (figure 9.7) for which complete membership lists were reconstructed after
the war. The lists provide information on 108 additional resistance workers who fought
for Gentiles and survived the war.
Noord-Holland is a religiously mixed province. A largely Protestant North and South
are separated by strip of Catholicism that runs from Western Haarlem to the eastern
Wieringermeer (See figure 9.7). This Catholic enclave was created by the Bishop of Haar-
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Figure 9.7: Religion Noord Holland, 1930.
lem in 1609, when he openly distanced himself from his natural ally the Spanish king
during the Dutch revolt. In return for his loyalty the Dutch insurgents granted him cer-
tain religious privileges. As a result, he was able to sustain a Catholic chapter in his
region, which subsequently provided an important source for spreading Roman Catholi-
cism (Rogier 1964).
The resulting religious variation in combination with completer membership lists al-
lows us to investigate whether results based on commemoration books are biassed to-
wards not finding a minority effect. To test this, I regress whether members’ survival
230
depends on whether he or she belonged to a minority community. Results are presented
in table 9.2 and visualized at the bottom of figures 9.5 and 9.6. The analysis reveals that
Orthodox Protestants and mainstream Protestants in Catholic areas were indeed more
likely to survive the war. However, the same cannot be said for Catholics in Protestant ar-
eas, defying the overall minority argument. This seems to confirm that general resistance
networks did not benefit as much from the minority advantage as did rescue networks
for Jews. Instead something unique to Protestant minorities seems to be driving these
relationships. It also indicates that an analysis of perished members allone does not com-
pletely bias our results towards not finding a minority effect. In line with this insight, we
indeed find no minority effect on KP-membership when analyzing community level mo-
bilization in Noord-Holland with complete membership data (see figure 9.5g and 9.5h).
[Table 9.2 about here.]
All in all, the comparison between Jewish rescue networks and resistance networks
for Gentiles reveals that the minority advantage was more prominent for the former than
the latter. Hence, minority congregations were more strongly overrepresented among
Jewish rescue networks than among resistance groups that helped Gentiles. Since both
types of networks were so strongly dependent on clandestinity to survive, this suggests
that mobilization against the Holocaust was relatively stronger among minority enclaves
because they were both more able and more willing to protect victims of purification
campaigns.
9.4 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that on top of enhancing clandestine capacity, minority status also
increased minority mobilization against Genocide by increasing attachment to pluralism
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and empathy. Local minorities had to rely on values of tolerance and open-mindedness
in order the function normally. As a result local minority communities were more pro-
semitic than their majority counterparts before the war, payed more attention to the chal-
lenges that Jews were facing during the war and activated more rescue networks aimed at
alleviating those challenges. The fact that minority enclaves were more important for the
rescue of Jews than for the rescue of Gentiles, both of which required secretive networks,
further suggests that pluralist norms played an important role on top of the clandestine




Table 9.1: Religious communities and membership of rescue organizations
for Gentiles, 1940-1945 (based on commemoration books).
OLS OLS OLS OLS
(7) (8) (9) (10)
Members KP/1000 inhab Members LO/1000 inhab Members KP/1000 inhab Members LO/1000 inhab
Protestant minority community 0.037∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.013 0.583∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.054) (0.019) (0.073)
Catholic community 0.008 −0.068∗ 0.013 0.099
(0.024) (0.036) (0.056) (0.061)
Catholic strength 0.027 −0.041
(0.070) (0.095)
Catholic community*Catholic strength −0.078 0.073 −0.082 −0.376∗∗
(0.072) (0.103) (0.159) (0.157)
Constant 0.064∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.083∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.031) (0.008) (0.014)
county FE N N Y Y
Observations 2886 2886 2886 2886
Counties 1027 1027 1027 1027
Log-Likelihood −441.993 −4228.096 531.410 −4097.807
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
County clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001.
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Table 9.2: Religious communities and membership of KP organizations in
Noord Holland, 1940-1945 (based on Post-War Registrations).
Logit OLS OLS OLS
(11) (12) (13) (14)
Survived Survived Members KP/1000 inhab Members KP/1000 inhab
Protestant minority community 0.592∗∗ 0.123∗∗ −0.013 −0.017
(0.212) (0.037) (0.041) (0.047)
Catholic community −0.695 0.092 0.033 −0.116
(0.965) (0.144) (0.098) (0.210)
Catholic strength 2.059 0.064
(2.690) (0.277)
Catholic community*Catholic strength 0.431 −1.028 −0.079 0.269
(4.447) (0.652) (0.208) (0.451)
Constant −0.848 −0.106∗∗ 0.078 0.000
(0.592) (0.034) (0.112) (0.001)
County FE N Y N Y
Observations 111 111 353 353
Counties 21 21 353 353
Log-Likelihood −70.693 −72.521 −111.928 −24.739
M11: Entries are logistic regression coefficients.
M12-14: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.









Although the overall patterns presented in the last chapters largely confirm the minority
hypothesis, we also observed that minority protection was not the only force underlying
clandestine resistance against the Holocaust. What other types of networks played a role?
Where did majority networks come from? I address these questions in this chapter.
In the first section, I will return to Twente and analyze the roots of the four majority
rescue operations active in this area. These four case studies suggest that two factors
could compensate for a lack of minority commitment: activation by interregional en-
trepreneurs and local isolation. In the same section, I also trace whether these factors
can account for the emergence of majority rescue in the two homogeneously Protestant
and Catholic provinces analyzed in section 8.2 to 8.5. In short, the data suggest that ma-
jority groups were able to sustain clandestine collective action if they were rooted in small
insulated enclaves and/or were part of interregional networks, or, in other words, if their
social structure resembled that of minority groups.
In the following two sections, I explore off-the-line cases in Twente, i.e. cases with low
evasion rates where proximity to minority churches was high and vice versa. Qualitative
evidence from these cases suggests that evasion in religious majority regions was high if
other types of minority communities, such as radical socialists and communists, stepped
in and produced rescue organizations. Conversely, evasion in the vicinity of religious
minority enclaves was low when police collaboration with the Nazi’s was high due to
mistrust among officers. These findings highlight that the minority argument can poten-
tially be extended to non-religious groups but is conditional on support from inside local
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police forces.
Section three tries to integrate the insights obtained from studying off-the-line and
majority cases into a quantitative analysis. Based on the geo-coded data presented in
chapter 6, a spatial regression analysis of Jewish evasion indicates that geographical iso-
lation, interregional ties and the strength of left-wing minorities were indeed significantly,
albeit weakly, correlated with evasion. No association between evasion and collaboration
within the police apparatus could be established, though this is most likely due to the
crude nature of the deployed measures.
10.2 Majority Rescue in Twente and Beyond
Looking to figure 10.1, we see that in total four rescue operations in Twente go against
what the minority hypothesis would predict: two Protestant networks in Nijverdal lo-
cated near the Western border of Twente, and two Catholic organizations in the eastern
towns of Haaksbergen and Weerselo rescued Jews.
Going in reverse order, a Catholic chaplain was able to set up a rescue operation with a
local police patrol who was a dedicated member of his parish, in predominantly Catholic
Weerselo (Hilbrink 1989). How was this majority congregation able to mobilize its mem-
bers while preventing exposure? The key to its success seems to be that the chaplain was
able to place Jews with Catholic farmers who lived far removed from the main roads of
town in houses that could only be reached through dirt tracks.1 It is plausible that this
geographic isolation compensated for the lack of social isolation and prevented denunci-
ation.
The fact that staying away from pavement was crucial for Jewish survival in Weerselo
1SVB-file 3, Docdirect, Winschoten.
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Figure 10.1: Majority rescue networks in Twente.
is illustrated by the fate of the Zilversmids, a Jewish family that did not survive the war.
At the beginning of the war, they were able to find shelter with the Junnick family, but this
address was compromised when strangers had seen members of the Zilversmid family
cross a thoroughfare near the end of the war. A member of the Dutch Nazi party got
hold of this information and ratted them out, after which the whole family was shot in a
nearby bunker (Weustink 1985).2
2The absence of geographical isolation also forced majority rescuers to forbear rescue. In Almelo, main-
stream Protestants refused to hide people because their house was located too close to the road. Although
this could have been a cheap excuse, it bears mentioning that a nearby fellow Protestant who temporarily
housed a Jewish family did indeed get arrested (Cornelissen 2006).
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Armed with a gun in her purse Aleida Smits, a devout Catholic, brought Jewish
friends and neighbors to safe places in Haaksbergen (Geritz-Koster 1999). She received
help from her Pastor Elbersen who “was willing to hide Jews underneath the alter if
necessary”, a head of police who ”knew better where Jews were sheltered than anyone
else,”3, and a Catholic doctor who was able to let Jews stay in the local Hospital. A strong
sense of community spirit present in the town might explain the ability of this major-
ity group to protect their persecuted neighbors. Haaksbergen was a small church village
with few cars. As a result, most people walked to their work, fostering the feeling that, re-
ligious fault lines notwithstanding, everyone knew each other personally (Geritz-Koster
1999). Jews, Protestants and Catholics alike were all considered part of the same locality.
However, despite the cohesiveness of the village, the network of which Smits was the
anchor point was not completely immune to betrayal. On two occasions, the Jewish boy
Kurt Falkenstein was betrayed by neighbors and had to be taken to a new shelter.4
While local level isolation and cohesion compensated for the lack of minority commit-
ment and empathy in Weerselo and Haaksbergen, the majority organization of Protes-
tants in Nijverdal was nudged towards resistance by outside forces. Ankie Stork was a
member of an organization of students who secretly moved Jews from the university city
of Utrecht to other parts of the country (Flim 1997). In 1943, Ankie was asked by her
co-workers to look for shelter addresses in Nijverdal, where she grew up. Stork decided
to call pastor Berkhoff in the neighboring town of Lemele, who had revealed himself as
anti-German in several student magazines before the war broke out. She was aware of his
sympathies because he had often preached in the Dutch Reformed church she attended.
Stork motivated Berkhoff to shelter Jews. Via Berkhoff, Stork was able to get a list of five
Protestant families who were willing to help. It is important to emphasize that not all the
addresses provided by Berkhoff were equally safe; the twelve Jews housed by the Groten
3Purification police file 2, National Archive, Den Haag.
4Purification police file 5, National Archive, Den Haag.
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family were soon arrested by local bounty hunters.5
Overtime, Berkhoff’s network slowly expanded as the five original families started
recruiting among their close friends (Flim 1997). It is telling that these majority rescuers
did not blindly trust their fellow church members and were afraid to bring sheltered
Jews to church, something that was common practice among minority churches as we
have seen above.6 Rescuers realized that their Jewish guests had to be kept away from
some fellow churchgoers, who were believed to be members of the Dutch Nazi party.
Another indication that levels of trust were lower than in minority congregations was
that Reverend Berkhoff himself was arrested after parish members leaked information
about him reading an anti-German texts from the pulpit.7 Instead of relying on church
commitment, these rescuers were motivated and helped to overcome initial collective
action problems by Stork, who provided them with produce and illegal paper work in
the early stages of the operation. It was only later that the “Lemeler Convent”, the name
the protestant rescuers had adopted, became largely self-sufficient.
Berkhoff collaborated with his colleague, reverend Hijmans. Hijmans had personal
reasons to help persecuted Israelites as he himself was of Jewish descent. Despite his
leading position in the community, sheltering Jews in this Protestant town proved to be
quite difficult. Out of fear for betrayal by fellow parish members, a Jewish couple shel-
tered by two of his followers had to be constantly hidden from the outside world.8 Other
houses were raided9 and one of his key organizers got arrested10 It is therefore not surpris-
ing that Hijmans decided to use his interregional networks to place other Jews in Catholic
Hengelo, where his mainstream Protestants formed a minority, so that Jews could be en-
5Yad Vashem file A. Knappert in Michman et al.
6Archive Flim NIOD 471 11 B, Amsterdam.
7Yad Vashem file, A. Stork in Michman et al.
8Yad Vashem file Scheffer in Michman et al.
9Yad Vashem file A. Knappert in Michman et al.
10Yad Vashem file, A. Stork in Michman et al.
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capsulated by a small group of committed helpers.11
Taken together, these four exceptional cases reveal that majority groups a) were moti-
vated to help victims of mass persecution b) able to sustain clandestine resistance against
Genocide when they operated in cohesive or isolated environment that compensated for
lower levels of secrecy and identification12, or c) received help and motivation from inter-
regional resistance entrepreneurs.
To asses whether these factors travel beyond the borders of Twente, I also investigated
whether these factors were present among majority rescue missions in the provinces of
Friesland, Groningen, Limburg and Brabant that were discussed as shadow cases in sec-
tion 8.2 to 8.5. I marked all majority networks which operated in villages outside of
county seat as well as where help came from resistance organizers who were themselves
based elsewhere.
The four figures below present the outcomes of this analysis. When we look at the pre-
dominantly Catholic provinces in the south, we see that twenty-three out of twenty-eight
majority networks were either rooted in a geographically isolated enclave or embedded
in interregional networks, while the same is true for fifteen out of the seventeen majority
operations active in the Northern provinces.
10.3 Proximity and Survival
To which extent does the striking pattern of minority mobilization in Twente we saw in
the previous chapters get reflected in a relationship between the presence of minority con-
11Yad Vashem A. Hijmans in Michman et al.
12That geographical isolation is a precondition for resistance is a well-established insight from resource
mobilization theory (Tilly 1978) and can be traced back to Marx’s ideas on how concentration in factories








Figure 10.3: Majority networks in Northern provinces.
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gregations and evasion? In the figures below, evasion rate is plotted against the average
proximity of Jews to minority congregations for all counties in Twente for which registra-
tion lists were available. Figures 11.4a and 11.4b show the relationship between evasion
and proximity to Catholic churches for Protestant and Catholic counties respectively. As
is revealed, proximity to Catholic churches did indeed increase evasion of Jews in West-
ern Twente and had the opposite effect in Eastern Twente. Figure 11.5a reveals that there
is a positive, albeit weak, relationship between proximity to Orthodox communities and
the chance that a Jew was able to avoid deportation. The weakness of the relationship
is somewhat surprising given the strong presence of Orthodox rescue operations in the
region. However, the absence of a strong association can be explained by one outlier: the
town of Rijssen. As I elaborate, we will find out that this town is a somewhat unique case
where developments in the local police apparatus hampered the ability of clandestine or-
ganizations to remain covert. When removing the Rijssen case the correlation between
Orthodox Protestant church proximity and evasion increases to r=.3.
Figure 9b combines the three previous figures and plots the overall proximity to all mi-
nority churches (RK/NH minority plus orthodox churches) against the average survival
rate. Again, we see a positive slope. Three cases have a standardized residual larger than
one-and-a-half and do not seem to fit the regression line. First, this is the case for Weerselo
(marked in orange, top right), where, as was discussed above, a majority network was ac-
tive that was able to produce a rescue organization because of its geographical isolation
and small community size. The other three outliers, marked in blue, are Neede, Rijssen
and Vriezenveen.
Measurement error could explain why Neede is an off-the-line case (high-center). In
this town, near the South-Eastern border of Twente, a rescue network emerged around
the Liberal-Protestant minister Assendorp.13 Although officially part of the mainstream
13Yad Vashem file J. Assendorp in Michman et al.
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Figure 10.4: Evasion and proximity to Catholic Churches in Twente (coun-
ties Jews>10).
Protestant church, this denomination has its own church buildings and organizations
(Van Eijnatten and Lieburg 2005). When coding minority churches, however, I was not
able to take this information into consideration as both groups were lumped together.
Proximity to minority churches overestimates evasion for Rijssen (bottom right). Post-
war testimonies leave room for two interpretations of why this might be the case. The first
interpretation, drawing on testimonies from people within the police commissioner’s im-
mediate social circle, is that that the Nazis were particularly successful in creating dis-
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(a) Orthodox Protestant Proximity.




































(b) Overall Minority Proximity.
Figure 10.5: Evasion and proximity to Minority Churches in Twente (coun-
ties Jews>10).
cord between rank and file members of the local police forces. As a result, no collective
attempts to sabotage round-ups were undertaken and several Jews got arrested in hiding.
In the early years of the occupation, two police troops that had operated independently
before the war were merged together and put under the helm of a newly appointed com-
missioner. The troops did not know what to think of their new leader as he did not openly
discuss his attitudes towards the Nazi regime. Consequently, police officers obeyed Nazi
orders as they were not sure whether their boss would support their dissent. For his part,
the commissioner often tried to warn Jews in hiding and lamented his employees for not
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taking more risks.14
The second interpretation, which relies more heavily on testimonies of lower ranked
officers, is that the newly appointed commissioner was an opportunistic coward who
leaned towards the Nazis in order to advance his career while actively helping advance
the Genocide. Some suggest he offered help to the SIPO-SD arresting Jews and heard
him legitimize obedience towards the Nazis by comparing the police to a “piano that has
to make music regardless of who pushes the keys.” Two testifiers independently say he
recommended officers to volunteer for prison camp in case they were not willing to work
with the German authorities.15
It is remarkable that Haaksbergen and Nijverdal do fit the regression line despite the
fact that these villages were home to important majority church operations. For Nijverdal
this is probably the case because, in addition of the Lemeler Convent, four minority
groups were active here as well: the Catholic network of Tijhuis, the Orthodox network of
baker Flim, the Orthodox network of reverend Meines and a Baptist network. For Haaks-
bergen, the picture is less clear. Although a Protestant minority network was active here
as well it is hard to believe that this organization had more carrying capacity than the
network created by Aleida Smits.16
In Vriezenveen the evasion rate is much higher than one would expect given the over-
all proximity of Jews to minority churches. Archival documents about Vriezenveen reveal
several Jews were saved by a communist organization. The role that this secular group
played in Vriezenveen brings us to the mobilization of non-religious groups.
14Purification police file 1, National Archives, Den Haag.
15Purification police file 1, National Archives, Den Haag.
16Yad Vashem file A. Dijkhuis in Michman et al.
248
10.4 Non-Religious Groups
Although forty-nine out of the fifty-eight rescue networks could be classified as religious,
secular networks also deserve attention. In the figure below, we see that with the excep-
tion of a network run by a noble man who housed Jews on his estate and another network
for which the actual organizational base could not be identified, secular groups protecting
Jews in Twente all had a radical left profile.
Figure 10.6: Secular resistance networks in Twente.
As in most of Western Europe, communists in the Netherlands were political out-
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casts, resembling small religious sects in combining committed membership with a hi-
erarchal structure (L. A. Coser 1974). Much like members of minority congregations,
several prominent communist resistance workers active in Twente were expelled from
mainstream organizations and had to pay the costs for their revolutionary ideals.
Across the board, communist organizations had less of an impact on resistance than
religious communities because most of their formal infrastructure was taken out by the
Nazis. Large numbers of prominent party members were arrested in June of 1941. Given
that secular left-wing movements included many Jews among their members, intact or-
ganizations would have probably been willing to stage a concerted insurgency against
the Holocaust (Blom and Cahen 2002).
Communist organizations in Almelo, Hengelo, Enschede and Vriezenveen seemed to
be less affected by this wave of repression because they mainly recruited among unknown
rank and file members (Hilbrink 1989). After Hilter launched operation Barbarossa, they
started organizing themselves in small cells, ressembling the segregated structure of re-
ligious minority groups. At the initiative of Wobben a group of neighbors started print-
ing and distributing illegal communist newspaper De Waarheid in Almelo. The five men
were“sworn friends” and longtime acquaintances from banned Communist youth orga-
nizations. This helped them establish report: “We knew them from way before the war.
We were lefties and anti-national socialist, we knew this from each other.”17
Not long after they set up an illegal printing station, they engaged in more risky ac-
tivities, secretly helping Jewish and Gentile members of their movement evade depor-
tation. They even established an illegal electricity connection with a local brewery to
provide their organization with energy resources. One of the men sheltered Jews in his
own house. Local networks in his left wing neighborhood enabled him to do this. When
one of the Jews commits suicide and needs to be buried, all of his neighbors were aware
17SVB-file 48, Docdirect, Winschoten.
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of the situation: “Everyone in the street knew about the Jews” but the “the whole street
could be trusted.”18
Printing also helped radical socialists recruit. Hein Vrind, led the legal office of the
NVV labor union. He published several protests against anti-Jewish legislation in the il-
legal newspaper De Vonk. Through his work he created a distribution network of laborers
who deliver De Vonk in their neighborhoods. Via this network Vrind, together with his
colleague Te Riet, recruited between six or eight radical socialists who engaged in rescue
operations for Jewish socialists. In total forty Jews were provided for. Much like its Chris-
tian and Communist counterparts, the De Vonk-group remained a purely socialist group
insulated from outside influences (Cornelissen 2006).
Another left-wing network formed around an employee of the provincial employment
office: Henk Hoften. He was inspired by a series of lectures given by radical socialist
Scheps at meetings of the socialist youth movement AJC, in which Henk, together with
his brother Herman played a leading role. On at least twenty occasions Scheps lamented
the passive attitude of the Social Democratic party leadership during the war: “what is
the use of the SDAP-party if it loses its soul, Germany might have won a military battle
but it will lose the cultural-historical war.” This strengthened Hoften in his conviction
that one should refuse to cooperate with the German occupier (Hilbrink 1989).
Together with several other members of the AJC, he starts distributing illegal leftwing
magazines. Similar to what was the case for De Vonk, this network formed a strong
base for an illegal shelter organization. An alternative source of recruits was provided
by youngsters, who refused to work for the German compulsory labor programs and
rely on the socialist youth association for financial support.19 Via his work, Hoften had
contacts with census offices and agencies for food distribution, guaranteeing a steady
18SVB-file 45, Docdirect, Winschoten.
19SVB-file 18, Docdirect, Winschoten.
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supply of illegal documents and food coupons. Like what we saw for religious minority
operations, mutual distrust between socialist and religious organizations often prevented
the formation of a unified rescue organization in Almelo. According to Hoften Orthodox
Protestants were not careful enough as they organized too much meetings and even left
an extensive paper trail of their operations.20
This section has given an overview of all secular rescue organizations active in Twente.
Strikingly, almost all of these groups formed political minorities. When looking at how
these networks operated some remarkable similarities with religious minorities emerged.
Like their religious counterparts, political minorities formed isolated hubs of commit-
ment, operating independently of other resistance organizations. They were often moti-
vated to provide protection because Jewish members of their own movements were under
threat.
10.5 Back to Quantitative Data
The in-depth analysis of Twente uncovered some cases of religious majority networks,
secular operations and other off-the-line cases that contradict the minority hypothesis.
Further investigation of these cases helped me identify four additional factors that po-
tentially affect evasion: 1) activation of resistance facilitated by geographical rather than
social isolation; 2) interregional entrepreneurs who prompt religious leaders in the coun-
try side to undertake rescue activities. Often these entrepreneurs were former residents
or recent immigrants who were able to take care of initial collective action problems and
funneled Jews to and from other localities; 3) the capacity of marginalized (secular) politi-
cal factions to set up clandestine networks for their Jewish members and 4) negatively the
ability of the Nazis to exploit the police apparatus either due to internal discord between
20SVB-file 18, Docdirect, Winschoten.
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officers and superiors or the presence of opportunistic commissioners.
In this section I again exploit the geocoded database presented in chapter 6 to asses
whether these factors affected evasion rates for Dutch Jews more generally. I construct six
additional quantitative measures to do so.
Based on historical land use data, I recovered the overall size of residential areas to
capture geographical isolation. The historical land use data is collected by Alterra at the
Univeristy of Wageningen and provides information on how land has historically been
used for raster cells of 25 by 25 meters (H. Kramer, Dorland, and Gijsbertse 2010). One
of the coded categories is residential development. This category is exploited to create
patches of connected residential cells that are used to proxy for the overall size of living
communities.
In the figure below, the stepwise process through which this is done is illustrated for
the Twente localities Weerselo, where a majority rescue network emerged and Oldenzaal
where this was not the case. We see that the residential area of Weerselo, in the top left
corner, is very small compared the city of Oldenzaal. The geocoded data on Jews allows
me to merge this data with Jewish evasion rates. Unfortunately no land use data is avail-
able for the war period. Instead, I take the average score of the last land use survey before
(1900) and after the war (1960). As this measure is skewed, I use logged valued.
To operationalize links with interregional networks, I construct two measures. The
first measure is the number of sheltered Jews per capita that lived in a different county
before the war broke out. Information is obtained from lists created by the Jewish coordi-
nation commission (JCC) after the war which are digitalized by Flim (J. Michman, Flim,
et al. 2004). The JCC was a government funded agency which aimed to restore Jewish
family relationships by mapping where different relatives had gone underground dur-




Figure 10.7: Example land use data: Weerselo and Oldenzaal, 1960.
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provides information on 10,807 sheltered Jews (around 33 percent of the total number).
This is largely due to the fact that Jews during the war had become reluctant to provide
address information to government bureaucracies.
Second, I use migration to and from the county in the five years preceding the war to
capture potential interregional linkages.21 The logic behind this operationalization is that
recent immigrants and emigrants often played an important role in forging linkages with
other communities. Data is obtained from Beekink et al. (Beekink et al. 2003).
To measure the presence of left wing minorities, I utilize the percentage of radical left
voters in the 1937 election, the last election before the war broke out. Data are obtained
from the Central Bureau for statistics (CBS 1939). Finally I exploit unique German admin-
istrative records to create two measures that tap the overall level of collaboration within
the Dutch police forces. During the war, the Nazis monitored the reliability of Dutch po-
lice operatives and created lists of anti-Nazi officers. Based on these lists, they identified
police men who needed to be replaced. I use the number of anti-Nazi police officers per
1000 inhabitants in a county as a first proxy for (non-)collaboration. Secondly, I use the
number of officers actually fired by the Nazis per 1000 inhabitants. Both these measures
are created out of lists stored in the Dutch National Archives.22
[Table 10.1 about here.]
In the analysis, I reproduce model 4 presented in chapter 6 and add the six measures
described above. The results of the analysis are visualized in figure 10.8. Increasing the
size of a residential area with one standard deviation reduces the likelihood of evasion
by 1 percent. This suggests that evasion is indeed slightly more frequent in small living
communities, where everyone, Gentiles as well as Jews, knows each other. As counties
21Alternative time frames are used. Results are consistent with the ones presented below.
22Purification police 2.2.1 51, National archives, Den Haag. Purification police 2.2.1 66, National archives, Den
Haag.
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contain multiple villages, it is possible to include county level fixed effects. When taking
into account county level omitted variable bias the effect of community size becomes a
bit stronger, a one standard deviation increase results in a 1.5 percent increase in evasion.
The analysis provides mixed support for the importance of interregional ties. There
seems to be no relationship between evasion and the placement of Jews from outside the
county. This could of course be due to the fact that the data on sheltered Jews is far from
complete. The level of migration to and from a county before the war, however, does have
a significant and positive effect on the chance that a Jew survived the war. A one standard
deviation increase in migration results in a 1.5 percent higher evasion rate. This indicates
that Jews were somewhat more likely to be sheltered in places where people had more
contacts outside the local community.
Increasing the percentage of votes for radical left parties in a county with one stan-
dard deviation increases the level of evasion with almost five percent. This supports the
notion that, that in addition to religious minorities, marginalized political factions were
motivated and able to overcome the clandestine collective action dilemma.
Neither of the two measures that tap police (non-)collaboration with the Nazis seem
to have a substantial impact on evasion. This could be caused by the fact that the mea-
surement is too crude to capture the underlying processes. In Rijssen we saw that mutual
distrust between rank and file and leadership prevented coordinated resistance against
the Nazis. It is likely that Nazis intelligence was not able to pick up on these subtle pro-
cesses. Moreover, successful police molls working for the resistance probably never got
detected and, consequently, did not end up in the Nazi-administration.
All in all, the quantitative analysis confirms that interregional ties, small tight-knit
residential communities and non-religious minorities also played an important role in
producing clandestine collective action against the Holocaust. In short, this shows that
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Figure 10.8: The change in predicted probability of evasion as variable is
increased one standard deviation with 90 percent confidence
intervals.
rescue was more likely to take place in areas where non-empathy related motives were









Community size (logged) −0.056∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.004)
Jews from outside county per 1000 inhabitants 0.077
(0.063)
% Migration (previous 5 years) 0.053∗∗
(0.020)
% Votes radical left 0.257∗∗∗
(0.070)
Fired police officers per 1000 inhabitants 64.602
(61.336)
Anti-German Police per 1000 inhabitants 9.300
(18.110)




Catholic proximity*Catholic strength −2.062∗∗∗ −1.110∗∗∗
(0.574) (0.289)
Orthodox proximity 0.883∗ 0.233∗∗
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Number of Jews/1000 −0.018∗∗∗ −0.002∗
(0.003) (0.001)
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M1: Entries are logistic regression coefficients.
M2: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.




CHRISTIAN RESCUE IN BELGIUM
11.1 Introduction
In this chapter I explore Christian rescue operations in largely Catholic Belgium. In sup-
port of the minority hypothesis, I turn to similar geocoded evasion data, post-war surveys
and secondary literature to show that Protestant enclaves in Belgium were more likely to
protect Jews. Their minority status imbued networks with a willingness to protect victims
of mass-persecution and facilitated clandestine collective action by producing isolated
hubs of commitment.
The chapter then moves on to explain Catholic rescue missions. According to the
minority hypothesis, we would expect to see relatively few Catholic rescue organizations
in Belgium as Catholics formed the majority everywhere. Yet, Catholic protection of Jews
was not uncommon. How can this pattern, which at first sight contradicts the central
arguments of this dissertation, be explained? Catholic rescue in Belgium took two forms.
First, Catholic rescue was more likely to emerge in religious institutions such as con-
vents, monasteries or health colonies which provided an alternative form of isolation
making any minority position redundant(Teitelbaum-Hirsch 2006; Vromen 2010).
Second, Catholics mobilized against Genocide when their local leaders had idiosyn-
cratic motives to shelter Jews and, at the same time, could exploit isolated hubs of reli-
gious commitment created by secularization. In predominantly secular towns, Catholics
formed a social minority vis a vis a non-religious majority, creating network structures
comparable to those of Protestants. Similar to communists cells and tight-knit major-
ity congregations in Twente, Catholics in secular parts of Belgium were able to combine
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motives unrelated to pluralism with social isolation, to produce clandestine rescue oper-
ations for threatened neighbors.
The empirical analysis establishing these patterns proceeds in four steps. After de-
scribing the positions of Protestant and Catholics elites towards pluralism and Jews, I
provide illustrative examples of Protestant rescue operations. I then explore more sys-
tematically whether Protestant communities were indeed more likely to engage in the
protection of Jews than their Catholic counterparts by making use of a post-war survey
conducted among both Protestant and Catholic clerics. The fourth section introduces a
geocoded database of Jewish evasion, similar to the one used in chapter 5 for the Nether-
lands, to assess whether Jews living in the vicinity of Protestant enclaves were indeed
more likely to evade. Finally, I use case studies, post-war surveys, individual level eva-
sion data and information on religious institutions to investigate the relationship between
secularization and Catholic rescue operations.
11.2 Protestants, Catholics and Jews Before the War
Anecdotal evidence indicates that throughout the nineteenth and twenty century Belgian
Protestantism was immune to anti-Semitism (Phillip 1970). At the turn of the century,
James Hocart, a priest of a Protestant church in Brussels, organized five seminars address-
ing the relationship between Protestants and Jews which rejected Christian anti-Jewish
sentiments, such as beliefs in God-killing or ideas expressed by notorious French anti-
Semite Drumont. During these meetings, Hocart linked his defense of Jews to the general
importance of tolerance, brotherhood and pluralism: “Beware, sons of free thinking; you
deny your origins and principles when you refuse the Jews the title of brothers, simply by
difference in belief (....) What would you say yourselves if the same happened to you in
Catholic countries? Would you not then call upon your freedom of conscience?” (Hocart
261
1899). Like what we saw in the Netherlands, Protestant minorities empathized with Jews
because they themselves were dependent on pluralism for survival.
Hocart was not alone in his condemnation of anti-Semitism. Throughout the nine-
teenth century, Protestant newspapers rejected the blood libel and expressed strong sup-
port for Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish captain in the French army who was unfairly sentenced
to life in prison for treason (Saerens 2007b).
The pluralist defense of Jews came to the surface right before the outbreak World War
Two. Despite, or perhaps because of, their own marginal status, Protestant churches
in Belgium repeatedly and openly supported Jews throughout the 1930s and distanced
themselves from anti-Semitism. Numerous Protestant communities expressed their sym-
pathy with Jews in letters to the central Jewish church and public gatherings. In 1938, pas-
tor Schyns, the vice-president of the synod for the union of Protestant churches, directly
condemned anti-Jewish legislation in Nazi Germany during a protest meeting. Although
Catholic party members also attended the same meeting, the church never send a repre-
sentative. In that same year, Schyns went on to become the chairman of a Brussels based
aid committee for refugees which provided help to Jews fleeing Germany. At around the
same time, a similar committee was founded in the Flemish port city Antwerp by Gerriet
Vanderriet of the local Belgian Evangelical mission church (Saerens 2007b).
The contrast with Catholic discourse is revealing. A strong Catholic response against
anti-Semitism never emerged in Belgium. Neither political nor clerical elites took a stance
against the slow and steady increase of anti-Jewish sentiments,which, as a result, kept on
developing freely throughout the first half of the twentieth century.
Cardinal Van Roey, the primate of the Belgian Catholic church, never spoke out on
behalf of the Jews because in his view others had never done the same thing for Catholics
when they were discriminated against in Russia, Mexico and Spain. More fundamen-
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tally, he feared that an active fight against anti-Semitism would bring Catholics into con-
tact with Jewish communists and freemasons. Instead, he preferred to convert all Jews
through prayer (Saerens 1998).
In line with this attitude, the Cardinal forbade the World Alliance for Combatting
Anti-Semitism from giving a series of lectures in Antwerp and Brussels and dismantled
the Catholic Office for Israel, an association that had been established a few years earlier
to create atonement between Jews and Catholics (Saerens 1986).
Much like their co-religionists in the Southern parts of the Netherlands, Catholics pun-
dits in Belgium emphasized differences between Jews and Christians when talking about
religious persecutions, preventing them from staging a forceful protest against Nazi or
Soviet policies. Instead of unequivocally rejecting Nazi violence against Jews, editorials
in the Catholic newspaper Gazet van Antwerpen repeatedly attacked socialists, liberals and
others for expressing outrage about anti-Jewish legislation while not standing up for Ro-
man Catholics undergoing a similar fate. In response to a denunciation of Nazi violence
by socialist member of parliament Destree the paper wrote:“the Jews are important to
him but he does not care about Catholics. In the view of socialists Catholics stand outside
the law. Everywhere were socialists rule Catholics get persecuted.”1
As the last sentence reveals, these critiques often included an implicit reference to a
secret coalition between secular political movements and Jews, invoking a political threat
frame. Freemasons, socialists and liberals in this view only protested anti-Semitic legisla-
tion because they let the “Jewish part of their heart” speak too much2 for “opportunistic
reasons.”3 Sometimes this notion took insane forms. For instance, even after religious
persecutions of both Catholics and Jews in the Soviet Union were well under way, the
Gazet could not recognize the shared fate of both groups and kept referring to Russia’s
1Dagblad Gazet van Antwerpen 9/9/1935.
2Dagblad Gazet van Antwerpen 7/3/1937.
3Dagblad Gazet van Antwerpen 4/10/1933.
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political elites as a “large heap of Jews” who were threatening Catholicism.4
At times, economic forms of anti-Semitism were blended in as well. The most bizarre
example comes from an editorial in the Gazet van Antwerpen in which the author claimed
that the Nazis sent Jewish refugees to Belgium so that they could destroy the economy
from within.5 Columnist Wannes incorporated a religious threat frame in his comments:
“liberals and socialists refused to denounce religious persecutions of Catholics elsewhere
but do pretend to be defenders of the Jews who tortured the lord and crucified him.”6
When the Gazet did finally reject anti-Jewish persecutions, they did so conditionally
and not without highlighting the economic and cultural threats Jews posed: “even though
Jews rule the press and other elements of our cultural plus financial world, even though
it is fair to speak of cheaters, usurers and blood suckers, this does not justify the cruelties
perpetrated against them.”7
Hence, when we compare Protestant and Catholic responses to anti-Semitism in Bel-
gium, we see a striking difference. Protestant minority elites, on the one hand, empha-
sized similarity between Jews and Christians and highlighted the importance of plural-
ism. This in turn created empathy and motivated protests against anti-Jewish legislation.
Catholic elites in Belgium on the other hand refused to recognize that Jews and Catholics
were both facing persecution and stressed the unfair treatment Catholics received rela-
tive to their Jewish counterparts. This prevented the emergence of a coherent narrative of
empathy and formed an anchor point for other forms of anti-Semitism to latch on to.
4Dagblad Gazet van Antwerpen 10/6/1939.
5Dagblad Gazet van Antwerpen 27/9/1934.
6Dagblad Gazet van Antwerpen 8/2/1934.
7Dagblad Gazet van Antwerpen 14/11/38.
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11.3 Protestant Rescue
During the German occupation, both Protestant pastors Schyns and Vanderriet intro-
duced in the previous section, were able to translate their pro-Semitic dispositions into
clandestine collective action in Brussels and Antwerp respectively. In Brussels, numer-
ous Jews were allowed to convert to Protestantism during the early years of the war (H.
Hellemans 2007).8 When the deportations started, Schyns exploited the willingness of his
“entire” parish to help Jews and found shelter for numerous persecuted neighbors among
parish members.9
A special role in Protestant networks in Brussels was played by the Visser family who
ran a Methodist orphanage. In total, thirty Jews were sheltered with the Vissers. The
entire methodist congregation was in on the operation and whenever Germans threatened
to enter the orphanage, all Jews were lifted over the garden fences and temporarily taken
in by neighbors.10 Due in part to the fact that a large number of small Protestant enclaves
were located in Brussels around 63 percent of all Jews living in the Belgian capital was
able to go underground.
Relative to Brussels, Jews in the city of Antwerp had an extremely small chance of
evasion. In total, sixty-five percent of the roughly 14,000 Jews living in the city were de-
ported to extermination camps in Eastern-Europe. Given this high deportation rate, it is
not surprising that overall help for Jews in Antwerp was extremely rare. The Protestant
community, under the helm of earlier mentioned pastor Vanderriet, formed a positive
exception to this rule. When the war broke out Vanderriet, was able to continue the ac-
tivities of his aid committee in a secretive fashion and used it to shelter numerous Jews.11
8Much like Schyns, Vandenbroeck from the Evangelical mission church uses parish members in his
Brussels congregation to shelter Jews (H. Hellemans 2007).
9Schyns in de l’enquete Paul Bouffier sur les Eglises protestantes de Belgique (CEGESOMA AA 1205).
10Visser in de l’enquete Paul Bouffier sur les Eglises protestantes de Belgique (CEGESOMA AA 1205).
11Vanderriet in de l’enquete Paul Bouffier sur les Eglises protestantes de Belgique (CEGESOMA AA 1205).
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Thus, although overall evasion in Antwerp was extremely low, fifty-seven percent of all
Jews living around Vanderriet’s community escaped deportation (see figure 11.1).
Figure 11.1: Jewish evasion in Antwerp.
The contrast with Catholics in Antwerp is stark. Given the presence of numerous
Catholic churches in districts populated by Jews, many clergy must have witnessed the
brutal round ups of Jews. Nevertheless, no organized Catholic rescue mission emerged
in the city. Developments in the Saint Joseph parish, located in the middle of the Jew-
ish district near Antwerp’s central train station, reveal that the ability of cells rooted in
majority congregations to stay underground might be the cause of this glaring absence.
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Initially, the deputy pastors of the Saint Joseph congregation were open to resistance. Ed-
ward Salman for instance recruited contacts within the military hospital of Antwerp to
obtain information that could be useful for resistance cells. Soon after establishing this
connection, however, Salman was arrested because of involvement in resistance opera-
tions. A few months later his immediate colleague, deputy pastor Cassiers met a similar
fate (Saerens 2000).
Much like what we saw in Twente, minority enclaves were also able to exploit interre-
gional ties with similar enclaves elsewhere in the region to funnel Jews from one locality
to the other. Several Jews from Brussels and Antwerp were sheltered in rural Protestant
enclaves in Hainaut, Belgium’s most Southern province. Figure 11.2 demonstrates that
these communities also helped local Jews escape deportation, as 65 percent of all Jews
living around Protestant communities in this area were able to find shelter.
These anecdotes indicate that Protestants networks were imbued with pluralist val-
ues because they formed local religious minorities. Moreover, Protestant enclaves were
able to transform their tolerance into clandestine collective action during the war because
they could activate local and interregional network ties, much like what we saw in the
Netherlands. In the next section, I will explore more systematically whether Protestant
communities were indeed more likely to provide assistance to Jews compared to their
Catholic counterparts based on post-war survey data collected by the Belgian institute of
war documentation (SOMA).
11.4 Post-war Survey
In the 1970s, SOMA conducted a survey among both Protestant and Catholic commu-
nities in Belgium. This survey provided information on developments during the war
267
Figure 11.2: Jewish evasion in Hainaut.
in different congregations. The survey provides information on 32 Protestant12 and 808
Catholic clerics.13
The survey asked whether someone in the congregation had provided help to Jews
during the war. The answers to this question are summarized in figure 11.3. The differ-
ence between Protestant and Catholic answers is striking. As we can see, less than thirty
percent of all Catholic clerics reported to have saved Jews while seventy percent of all
12De l’enquete Paul Bouffier sur les Eglises protestantes de Belgique (CEGESOMA AA 1205).
13I include information on monks, priests, chaplains and religious teachers but excluded information on
students and priests who were not in Belgium during the war (Fonds Enquete Kerk\Eglise (AA 1448-1449))
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Protestant respondents answered the question positively. It is of course possible that we
are comparing Protestant and Catholic clerics active in completely different areas with
completely different opportunities to rescue Jews. To account for these opportunities I
will further limit the comparison to Protestant and Catholic clerics living in the same
locality.
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Figure 11.3: Percentage of clerics that self-report to have helped Jews.
The analysis takes a binary dependent (help to Jews versus no help) and independent
variable (Protestant versus Catholic. Traditionally, scholars would analyze this data in
a regression framework with country fixed effects to keep local context constant. This
is not the ideal solution for this type of data for two reasons. First, rescue activities are
rare and a statistical model could result in perfect separation when including fixed effects
and religious denomination. Second, given the small number of cases it is likely that
the outcomes of the analysis will be driven by the parametric assumptions made in the
model.
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Instead, I rely on matching. This strategy consists of pairing each Protestant cleric with
a Catholic cleric in the same locality to keep local factors constant. This eliminates large
contextual differences and guarantees that I am comparing relatively similar clerics who
only differ in denomination. I rely on exact matching, both with and without replacement.
A simple difference-in-means test is used to estimate the average treatment effect.
[Table 11.1 about here.]
Table 11.2 reports the average treatment effect. Protestant weres fifty percent more
likely to protect Jews than their Catholic counterparts. It is, of course, possible that these
effects are driven by an unobserved confounding variable. Therefore I calculate Rosen-
baum bounds to determine how sensitive these results are to potential omitted variable
bias. These bounds show to which extent results still hold if we vary the correlation
between being a Protestant cleric and an unobserved confounder. Table 11.2 and 11.3
present the Rosenbaum bounds for matching with and without replacement respectively.
The first column presents the gammas; typical studies using observational data maintain
statistical significance between a gamma of one and two. A gamma of one indicates that
matched clerics who rescued have the same change of being in the treatment group or
not while a gamma of 2 indicates that matched clerics who rescued are twice as likely to
receive the treatment.
[Table 11.2 about here.]
The Rosenbaum bounds in table 11.3 and 11.4 show that even if the odds of a cleric
who saved Jews being a Protestants were between 2.7 and 3 times higher because of the
effect of an unobserved cofounder, the inference regarding the effect still holds at the .05
confidence level.
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[Table 11.3 about here.]
The SOMA-survey also asks questions about other types of resistance activities and
whether there was support within the congregation for New Order movements, which
advocated for supporting the Nazi occupiers in order to create a unified and pure state.
Comparing resistance and New Order support among Catholic and Protestant congrega-
tions could potentially shed light on the mechanisms underlying the minority hypothesis.
If it is indeed clandestine capacity that is driving the minority advantage we would also
expect to find a positive relationship between minority status and other secretive resis-
tance activities. If the minority advantage is driven by a disposition to protect pluralism
we would expect minorities to be less likely to encapsulate supporters of New Order
movements, which idealized a racially pure state.
Table 11.3 reveals that in line with a capacity mechanism Protestant were also more
likely to engage in other resistance activities that required clandestine collective action.
Compared to Catholics, Protestants were thirty percent more involved in resistance net-
works. This result is more sensitive to omitted variable bias, however as can be seen in
table 11.5 and 11.6. The results no longer hold at the .05 confidence level when the odds
of a resisting cleric being a Protestant are between 1.3 and 1.6 times higher because of the
effect of an unobserved cofounder.
There seems to be no relationship between support for the New Order in a congrega-
tion and minority status. To some extent, this sheds doubt on the importance of pluralist
values for minority rescue. However, it remains likely that clerics after the war might not
have been fully open about collaborationist tendencies in their parishes truncating the
overall level of variation on the dependent variable. In addition, the fact that the minor-
ity advantage is stronger for Jewish rescue than for other resistance activities suggest that
pluralist values on top of clandestine capacity did actually factor into the decision to step
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up against the purification campaigns initiated by the Nazis.
[Table 11.4 about here.]
[Table 11.5 about here.]
Needless to say, the data presented in this section suffers from several biases as church
leaders have incentives to misrepresent their help to Jews in order to make their commu-
nities look better than they actually were. It is not entirely implausible that minority com-
munities have a stronger motivation to do so as they alway try to prove themselves vis
a vis dominant groups (Durkheim 1897). In the next section, I therefore turn administra-
tive data compiled by the Nazis to assess whether Jews living in the vicinity of Protestant
churches were more likely to evade deportation.
11.5 Jewish Evasion and Protestant Proximity
Following the same strategy deployed for the Netherlands in chapter 5, I construct a geo-
coded database of Jewish evasion based on German registrations and deportation lists
to determine whether Jews living close to Protestant churches were more likely to evade
deportation. Much like in the Netherlands, the German occupying regime conducted a
registration of all Jews in collaboration with local authorities. The first registration was
conducted in October 1940 and only focussed on Jews older than fifteen years (Delplancq
2003). The census provided information on 42,500 Jews. Post-war calculations suggest
that around 2,000 Jews, less than five percent, evaded registration (Van Doorslaer, De-
bruyne, et al. 2004).
Substantial Jewish migration from Antwerp to Brussels likely motivated the German
regime to update the 1940 registration. In the summer of 1941, municipality governments
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were again ordered to conduct a census of all Jews in the country. An example registration
is depicted in figure 11.4. The updated lists recorded the names, date of birth, nationality,
profession and address of 42,392 Jews older than fifteen years old. Similar to what we
saw for the the Netherlands, the SIPO-SD coordinated the second registration (Saerens
2006b).
Figure 11.4: Jewish registration list.
In December 1941 a third registration took place. This time information was collected
in light of the establishment of the Association des Juifs en Belgique (AJB) , a German front or-
ganization whose goal was to stimulate and coordinate Jewish “migration” to the East. As
part of this registration, information was collected for 31,472 Jews in Belgium regardless
of age (Saerens 2006b). As we can see in figure 11.5 this third registration also provided
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information on names, professions and street addresses.
Figure 11.5: AJB-registration
I combine the updated 1941 registration with the lists compiled by the Association des
Juifs en Belgique (AJB) for two reasons. First, there is considerable debate among historians
over which lists were more reliable and used more frequently by the Nazis (Meinen 2009).
Saerens, on the one hand, argues that the AJB-lists were more reliable because they were
most recent (Saerens 2000). Schram (Schram 2004), on the other hand, suggests the Nazis
relied more heavily on the first registrations because it included information on more
Jews. Instead of taking sides in this debates I combine aforementioned strengths of both
registrations. Second, the two registrations complement each other in terms of coverage.
As said the first two registrations only included information on Jews older that fifteen,
while the AJB-lists had no age restriction. For the AJB-lists, however, registrations for
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certain streets in Antwerp have gone missing.14 Hence, whereas the AJB-list provide
information on Jews younger than 15, the second registration includes information on all
streets.
After digitalizing all registrations I paired them together to delete doublers and up-
date information on Jews that was available in one registration but not in the other.15
This resulted in database of 51,570 Jews. This is remarkably close to the 52,000 Jews the
Germans believed to be in the country in 1940 (M. Steinberg 2004).16
Figure 11.6: Deportation list
For the Dutch case, I collected data on people who died and survived in camps to ob-
tain information on the evasion of deportation. In Belgium, however, all deportation lists
14In particular the two folders with street names starting with a M-P and W-Z in Antwerpen have disap-
peared. These streets, however, are included in the earlier registrations (Saerens 2006b).
15I use the same matching procedure described and tested in chapter 5. I use information from the more
recent AJB-lists if a Jew showed up in both registrations
16The first two registrations can be found at the Jewish Museum of Belgium, while the AJB-lists are
stocked at the Belgian Center for the Study of War and Society: CEGESOMA archive Pierre Beeckmans
(AA1314 nr. 300-500). I would like to thank Laurence Schram and Dorien Styven from memorial museum
Kazerne Dossin, Mechelen for providing me with digitalized spreadsheets of these registrations. National-
ity, street addresses and legal status were coded manually from scanned files also provided by the Kazerne
Dossin Museum.
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are complete and intact, making the construction of an evasion database more straight-
forward.(M. Steinberg and Schram 2008)17 Below one sees a copy of one of these lists.
Deploying the matching strategy introduced and vetted in chapter 5, I match the Jewish
registrations to the deportation list based on first and last name and date of birth. Street
addresses provided by the registrations were then used to geocode the location of all Jews
(Braun 2011).
Information on churches is obtained from the Catholic yearbook 1950, the year closest
to World War Two for which this information is available. Surprisingly, Catholic year-
books included detailed street information of Protestant houses of worship but not of
their own church buildings.18 Street addresses were utilized to obtain fine grained coor-
dinates of Protestant church buildings. As in chapter 5, I draw circular buffers around
each Jew varying in size between 1.25 and 2 kilometers. Within each buffer, I then count
the number of Protestant churches to construct a measure of the overlap between Jewish
and Protestant networks. The counts are logged to address the skewness of the mea-
sure. A variogram suggests that spatial autocorrelation is present among observations
3.5 kilometer apart. I therefore included an autocovariate that measures the percentage
of Jews that evaded deportation with in a 3.5 kilometer radius. Mirroring the analysis
in chapter 5, I control for distance to the county center, nearest SIPO-SD office and dum-
mies that mark whether a Jew converted to Christianity, had Belgian nationality or was
married to a gentile. In the main analysis, I regress whether a Jew evaded deportation
against the logged number of Protestant churches within a specific radius while control-
ling for spatial autocorrelation and the set of controls specified above. All standard errors
are clustered at the county level to make sure that interdependence of Jews living in the
same county is not introducing a downward bias in standard errors. Results of a logistic
regression analysis are presented in table 11.6 and visualized in figure 11.7.
17Lists are available at the newly opened Holocaust Museum Kazerne Dossin. I would like to thank
Laurence Schram and Dorien Styven for providing me with digital versions of these lists
18Katholiek jaarboek voor Belgie (1950). Brussel.
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[Table 11.6 about here.]
Regardless of which buffer is used, increasing the logged number of Protestant
churches by one standard deviation results in around a 1.5 percent higher chance of eva-
sion. The positive correlation between Protestant proximity and evasion indicates that
Jews were more likely to survive the war if their networks overlapped with those of reli-
gious minorities. The overall effect however is relatively small. This makes sense given
the fact that Protestants in Catholic Belgium constituted such a small group and only had
a limited capacity to take in Jews.
Δ in Evasion (%)
FE: 2 km buffer
FE: 1.75 km buffer
FE: 1.5 km buffer










FE: 1.25 km buffer
FE: 1.5 km buffer
FE: 1.75 km buffer
FE: 2 km buffer
Figure 11.7: The change in predicted probability of evasion with 90 per-
cent confidence intervals if the number of Protestant churches
increases with one standard deviation.
To make sure that the relationship between Protestant proximity and evasion is not
driven by county level omitted variable bias I also reran the models with county level
fixed effects. These models are estimated using OLS to allow for the inclusion of a large
number of dummy variables. The result are presented in table 11.7 and the lower half of
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figure 11.7. As we can see, the overall results remain remarkable similar after we include
fixed effects. The effect only disappears when using a 1.75 kilometer buffer. All in all, this
suggests that the correlation between Protestant proximity and evasion is robust to local
level omitted variable bias.
[Table 11.7 about here.]
11.6 Secularization, Catholic Isolation and Rescue in Belgium
The previous section established that in line with the minority hypothesis Protestants
were more likely to protect Jews than Catholics. This of course does not imply that
Catholic communities did not rescue at all. As a matter of fact, there is a common un-
derstanding in Belgian public discourse that the Catholic church played a crucial role in
resistance against the Nazis in general and the Holocaust in particular (Lagrou 1997).
How was it possible that Catholic church communities despite the absence of a minor-
ity advantage were able to set up clandestine networks to protect threatened neighbors?
In this section, I will show that Catholics formed religious but not social majorities ev-
erywhere due to the strong secularizing forces present in Belgian society. Exactly in these
more secular regions, where Catholic church communities were relatively isolated, re-
ligious elites, driven by idiosyncratic motives, were at times able to produce secretive
mobilization against Genocide.
As we saw in the introduction and chapter 3, the reformation had fundamentally dif-
ferent outcomes in the Netherlands and Belgium. Whereas it created a strong cleavage
between Catholics and Protestants in the former, it had no such effect in the latter. In Bel-
gium, the Protestant uprising failed to destroy the dominance of the the Roman Catholic
church. This did not mean that the Catholic church went uncontested. On the contrary, as
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in other homogeneously Roman Catholic countries, Belgian nation builders produced a
deep division between a unified group of Christians who defended their religious rights
and secularist who tried to minimize the role of religion in the political and public realm
(Urwin 1970; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).
Contrary to the Netherlands, where early waves of secularization sparked by the
French revolution only touched small pockets of freemason and humanist lodges, anti-
clerical attitudes in Belgium became a driving force behind a broader liberal movement
which possessed an enormous mobilizing potential (Lesthaeghe and Lopez-Gay 2013).
This early trend was amplified by the fact that Belgium was the second country to indus-
trialize after England in the nineteenth century (Landes 2003).
During the following century, strong liberal and later socialist parties started forming
anchors of secularism throughout the country. However, not all regions within Belgium
were affected by secularism in the same way. Figure 11.8 displays local level mass atten-
dance in 195019 and voting for the Catholic party in the parliamentary election of 1925.20
When we take a close look at the local strength of Catholicism it appears that secu-
larism was more prevalent in urban and industrial centers located in the center of the
country. Still, others have observed that a very strong relationship between urbaniza-
tion and secularization does not exist (De Smaele 2009; Lesthaeghe and Lopez-Gay 2013).
This makes it possible to assess the effect of secularization and Catholic strength indepen-
dently of industrialization and urbanization (Lesthaeghe and Lopez-Gay 2013).
19Because Protestantism was so rare in Belgium, it is safe to see secularization and Catholic strength as
each other’s flip side. Mass attendance data for each county is based on Collard (Collard 1952). Digital files
are provided by LOKSTAT at Ghent University. I would like to thank Sven Vrielinck for all his help with
obtaining the data.
20I make use of voting data from 1925 because it was the last election before the Flemish movements
splintered the Catholic voting bloc. Since I am interested in all Catholics regardless of party preference and
nationalist sentiment, I prefer this measure over measures from later elections. The statistical data analysis
below was are also executed with later election data. Results are consistent with the ones presented below.
Data are obtained from http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/nl/main.html. Data was only available at the
kanton level. A geographical unit that on average includes ten counties.
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(a) Mass Attendance, 1950.
(b) Votes for Catholic Party, 1925.
Figure 11.8: Local strength of Catholicism.
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Historically, secularization was particularly strong in the Liege region (Lesthaeghe
1991) an original hotbed of free thinkers (Witte and Craeybeckx 1983). Strikingly, Liege
was also home to the most famous Catholic rescue organization in Belgium led by mon-
seigneur Kerkhofs, the local bishop. Before the German occupation, Kerkhofs was part of
an organization that aimed to convert Jews to Catholicism. His pre-war activities shaped
the ways in which he perceived the German occupation. In particular, he conceived of
anti-Jewish legislation as an opportunity created by God to prostelytize.21 This motivated
him to call upon his followers to open their doors to persecuted Jews. He himself took
in a Jew and personally encouraged local clergy and Catholic institutions to do the same.
Like Arch-Bishop Van Roey he never openly rejected in the deportations from the pul-
pit. However, on October 1942, close after the deportations started, he used a sermon to
subtly motivate people to help the children of those most in need (Saerens 1998).
His message of conversion through protection resonated with his immediate followers.
In Banneux a pilgrimage site right outside Liege, several Jews from Kerkhofs’ network
were sheltered. The charismatic chaplain of this small parish, Jamin, was rather hostile
toward Jews, who he considered cowards and Christ killers. The chance to “cure” Semitic
souls however made Jamin take in Jews. According to Jamin, protecting Jews:“was of
vital importance for the Christian apostolate. For the children, a stay in Banneux must
leave a indelible impression, a memory that they will experience time and time again,
regardless of their future” (H. Hellemans 2007). The presence of this conversion motive
in a Catholic island surrounded by seculars had an enormous impact on the opportunities
to evade. Seventy percent of all Jews living around Kerkhofs’ church escaped deportation
(see figure 11.9).
Kerkhof’s clandestine operations reached far outside of Liege. The most successful
rescue operation the Bishop of Liege activated was coordinated by Father Bruno from the
21Dagblad Gazet van Antwerpen 7/2/1931.
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Figure 11.9: Jewish evasion in Liege.
Emperors Abbey in the city of Leuven, again a city where Catholicism’s influence waning
(Torfs 1984).
After working for the Bishops’s group, father Bruno decided to split off and protect
local Jews whom he funneled to localities in seven of the eleven Belgian provinces. As
we can see in figure 11.10 this had a enormous impact on the survival chances of Jews
as 87 percent of all Jews living around the abbey was able to go underground and avoid
deportation.
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Figure 11.10: Jewish evasion in Leuven.
In building his network Bruno relied on individual Catholic families living in other
localities. Historian Hellemans has collected local level information of shelters for this
Louvain network based on the administrative records of father Bruno. It is revealing
that a there is a strong negative correlation between the presence of Jews sheltered with
individual families and the local strength of Roman Catholicism (r=-.76 and p=.024, n=11)
(H. Hellemans 2007). This suggests that a Catholic minority position was important for
setting up clandestine operations among Catholic households.(Vromen 2010).
The minority operations in Louvain and Liege seem to be representative of a more
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general pattern. Almost all famous Catholic rescue networks that made use of parish
structures in Belgium were located in areas were secularism was widespread such as
Namur (Thyange 1995), and, of course, Brussels (Inghelram 1992). The only exception
to this rule seems to be the rescue operation active in the town of Mechelen (Nowak
2000). Here however the main base of operation was located in a small castle about ten
kilometers outside of the city’s residential center, confirming that geographical isolation
could substitute for minority group status.
In all of these cases idiosyncratic or locally induced motives unrelated to pluralism ac-
tivated rescue operations. These motives often saw the persecution of Jews as an oppor-
tunity to convert through protection, something that was quite uncommon in the Nether-
lands (Evers-Emden and Flim 1996). However, other motives played a role as well. The
Namur network for instance was set up by pastor Andre, who had personal ties to Ju-
daism. Before the war, he was close friends with a Jewish couple and he had employed
a Jewish convert as a chaplain in his parish (Thyange 1995). The Catholics responsible
for rescue in Mechelen were friends with deserters from the German army who were
extremely hostile towards the Nazi regime (H. Hellemans 2007). In Brussels, Catholic
helpers were located in the middle of the Jewish district and confronted with waves of
help requests from their Jewish neighbors (Saerens 2015) which induced their assistance
(Varese and Yaish 2000). It is instructive to compare the rise and success of this network
with what we saw happened to clerics residing in the Jewish district of Antwerp. In this
Catholic bulwark, clerics were also triggered to engage in resistance activities but were
arrested during the early years of the war.
Taken together these illustrations provide suggestive evidence for the fact that re-
ligious resistance emerged in places where rescue motives unrelated to pluralism con-
verged with overall isolation due to secularization (Saerens 2000). The survey of Catholic
clerics introduced in section four of this chapter makes it possible to determine whether
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the relationship between Catholic isolation due to secularization and parish mobilization
holds true across a wider range of congregations . In figure 11.3 on page 266 I disag-
gregate the percentage of clerics who said they helped Jews during the war by the over-
all attendance at mass in the county in which their parish was located. There seems to
be a linear and negative relationship between cleric’s self-reported help and the overall
strength of Catholicism in their region. Whereas twenty percent of the 215 clerics active
in areas where Catholicism was still dominant helped Jews, more than twice as many did
the same in regions were Catholicism was practiced by a minority of the population.
[Table 11.8 about here.]
Of course, it is possible that this relationship is simply picking up the fact that secu-
larization was stronger in urban areas with distinct social dynamics which were home to
larger Jewish populations that required help from neighboring parishes. To take this into
account, I conduct a multivariate analysis that conditions on Jewish population and other
socio-economic background variables. In particular, I control for logged 1939 population
size, percentage of the population that was Jewish in 1941, the level of unemployment
in 1936, the level of urbanization in 1938, the percentage of the population working in
industry and agriculture in 1910 and whether a parish was located in Flanders or not.22.
In addition, I include province level fixed effects to limit regional level omitted variable
bias.
The negative correlation between Catholic strength, proxied by mass attendance, and
rescue by clerics is still in place after we control for Jewish presence and other socio-
economic background characteristics. Increasing mass attendance with one standard de-
22Data on unemployment is obtained from NDAW (1936). Maandblad voor arbeidsbemiddeling en werk-
loosheid. Brussel: Nationale dienst voor arbeidsbemiddeling en werkloosheid I would like to thank Guy
Vanthemsche for sharing digital scanse. Data on the Jewish population is culled from the sources described
in section 11.5. All other measures are from University of Ghent’s LOKSTAT. Urbanization is measured as
an 5 category ordinal variable.
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viation decreases self-reported rescue operations by Catholic clerics by six percent (figure
11.11). As with Protestant clerics, we can also compare other resistance activities and
support for New Order movements to get closer to the actual mechanisms underlying
the minority hypothesis. Mass attendance has a negative effect on (self-reported) resis-
tance activities and no effect on support for New Order movements. It is interesting to
note that, contrary to what we saw for Protestant clerics, the effect of Catholic strength is
somewhat stronger for resistance activities than for helping Jews. Together these correla-
tions might suggest that for Catholic rescue organizations clandestine capacity played a
more important role in explaining the minority advantage than ideological factors. This
confirms that it were often the personal motives of local elites unrelated to pluralism that
were instrumental in activating protection. Table 11.9 and figure 11.12 demonstrate that
results remain largely unchanged if we use strength of the Catholic party in 1925 instead
of mass attendance as a proxy for Roman Catholic dominance.
[Table 11.9 about here.]
ΔΔEffect of Increasing Mass Attendance one SD
DV: Support New Order (Y/N)
DV: Resistance (Y/N)
DV: Help Jews (Y/N)
-10 -5 0
DV: Help Jews (Y/N)
DV: Resistance (Y/N)
DV: Support New Order (Y/N)
Figure 11.11: Effect of increasing mass attendance one standard deviation.
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ΔEffect of Increasing Voting for Catholic Party one SD
DV: Support New Order (Y/N)
DV: Resistance (Y/N)
DV: Help Jews (Y/N)
-10 -5 0
DV: Help Jews (Y/N)
DV: Resistance (Y/N)
DV: Support New Order (Y/N)
Figure 11.12: Effect of votes for Catholic party, 1925.
Did Catholic mobilization in secular areas in the end result in higher rates of eva-
sion? Unfortunately, I have not been able to find systematic data on the exact location of
Catholic churches in Belgium during World War 2. As a consequence, it is impossible to
conduct a fine-grained geocoded analysis. Instead, I therefore aggregate Jewish evasion
data up to the county level and regress it against Catholic strength to see whether eva-
sion was higher in counties where the Catholic church took a more isolated position. The
somewhat counterintuitive logic behind this would be that evasion in areas dominated
by seculars was higher because Catholic elites were better able to mobilize. Regression
analysis with the same control variables as specified above are shown in the table below.
Increasing mass attendance with ten percent would decrease evasion with almost three
percent, while increasing votes for the Catholic party with ten percent would decrease
evasion with five percent. This does indeed suggest that evasion was higher in secular
areas. This however does not automatically mean that seculars were more likely to rescue
than Catholics. In combination with our survey data and case studies this finding actu-
ally suggests that evasion was higher in secular counties due to Catholics and not secular
mobilization.
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To test for the plausibility of such confounders I follow the approach suggested by
Oster to estimate corrected bounds on the coefficients (Oster 2014) . These conservative
bounds are created by allowing all the variation in the dependent variable of concern to
be explained (hence R2=1), while assuming that the potential confounders have the same
explanatory power as county level fixed effects, a plausible assumption given the already
high R2 of the estimated models. The bounds are presented in the bottom panel of the
table. The implied bounds of two models are very close to the normal estimates. This
suggests that including omitted variables will either strengthen or not affect our findings.
[Table 11.10 about here.]
11.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have taken a closer look at Christian rescue operations in Belgium. In
line with the minority hypothesis, we saw that in this almost completely Catholic country,
Protestant church communities were more likely to initiate and sustain rescue operations
as they were more sensitive to attacks on pluralism and could insulate their networks
from uncommitted defectors. As a result, Jews were more likely to evade deportation if
their networks spatially overlapped with those of Protestant enclaves.
This finding has important implications as it demonstrates that both minority mech-
anisms also operate in religiously homogenous settings where the persecuted are recent
immigrants, national church leaders remained silent and the strength of the persecuting
agents was checked by other authorities.
In addition, this chapter reveals that the Catholic rescue networks that did emerge,
did so in places where local religious leaders with rescue motives unrelated to plural-
ism could exploit isolated networks created by secularism. This finding dovetails nicely
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with the previous chapter which revealed that alternative forms of social isolation can
compensate for a lack of minority status. Like communist sects and majority congrega-
tions embedded in geographically isolated towns, Catholic communities in Belgium that
formed social minorities vis a vis secular majorities, produced the isolated hubs of com-




Table 11.1: Rescue, Resistance and New Order during World War Two:
Matched clerics.
Protestant) Catholic Difference T-Stat
% Rescuing Jews (Unmatched) 73.333 21.632 51.702 6.73
% Rescuing Jews (Matched w R) 73.333 20 53.333 4.09
% Rescuing Jews (Matched w/o R) 73.333 23.333 50 4.40
% Resistance (Unmatched) 65.217 25.498 39.719 4.29
% Resistance (Matched w R) 65.217 34.783 30.434 1.91
% Resistance (Matched w/o R) 65.217 30.435 26.0870 1.79
% Support New Order (Unmatched) 9.091 5.619 3.471 0.69
% Support New Order (Matched w R) 9.091 0 9.091 1.45
% Support New Order (Matched w/o R) 9.091 4.545 4.545 0.59
Based on 32 pairs matched on county.
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Table 11.2: Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis: effect of Protestantism
on helping Jews (matching with replacement).




















Table 11.3: Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis: effect of Protestantism
on helping Jews (matching without replacement).























Table 11.4: Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis: effect of Protestantism
on resistance (matching with replacement).





Table 11.5: Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis: effect of Protestantism
on resistance (matching without replacement).









Table 11.6: Auto-logistic regression of Jewish evasion in Belgium.
Auto-logistic regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Evasion Evasion
Prot churches 0.022∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Number of Jews/1000 −0.024∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 1.528∗∗∗ 1.564∗∗∗ 1.581∗∗∗ 1.605∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.096) (0.093) (0.094)
Autocovariate Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
county FE N N N N
Buffer 1.25 km 1.5 km 1.75 km 2 km
Counties 327 327 327 327
Jews 51570 51570 51570 51570
Log-Likelihood -33707.084 -33715.940 -33718.718 -33722.212
Entries are logistic regression coefficients.
county clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001.
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Table 11.7: Regression of Jewish evasion in Belgium: county fixed effects.
OLS
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Evasion Evasion
Prot churches 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.003 0.002∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Number of Jews/1000 −0.008∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.658∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.036) (0.039) (0.040)
Autocovariate Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
county FE Y Y Y Y
Buffer 1.25 km 1.5 km 1.75 km 2 km
Counties 327 327 327 327
Jews 51570 51570 51570 51570
Log-Likelihood −35151.535 −35166.548 −35172.608 −35177.264
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
county clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001.
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Save Jews Resistance New Order
% Mass Attendance −0.018∗ −0.017∗ −0.001
(0.009) (0.007) (0.014)
Population (log) −0.058 −0.200∗∗ −0.149
(0.117) (0.083) (0.192)
% Jews 9.780 12.693 18.643
(8.608) (8.253) (14.429)
% Unemployment 1.398 2.242 −6.951
(2.582) (2.200) (5.275)
% Industry −3.423∗ −2.374∗ 1.255
(1.796) (1.313) (2.601)
% Agriculture −0.023 −0.007 0.023
(0.014) (0.012) (0.025)
Flanders −1.324∗∗ −0.328 0.728
(0.565) (0.419) (1.246)
Constant 2.900∗ 2.172∗∗ −1.749
(1.301) (0.818) (1.776)
Province FE Y Y Y
Urbanization FE Y Y Y
Clerics 808 803 782
Counties 326 325 319
Log-Likelihood -345.122 -420.447 -157.442
Entries are Logistic regression coefficients.
County clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001.
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Save Jews Resistance New Order
% Votes for Catholic Party 1925 −0.019∗ −0.019∗ −0.010
(0.009) (0.010) (0.015)
Population (log) 0.045 −0.115 −0.140
(0.111) (0.091) (0.186)
% Jews 12.606 14.582∗ 17.549
(8.165) (8.571) (13.535)
% Unemployment 1.246 2.203 −6.866
(2.604) (2.255) (5.274)
% Industry −3.053∗ −2.007 1.214
(1.835) (1.285) (2.758)
% Agriculture −0.019 −0.003 0.030
(0.015) (0.012) (0.023)
Flanders −1.414∗∗ −0.385 0.850
(0.559) (0.461) (1.237)
Constant 1.073 0.523 −1.781
(1.224) (1.087) (2.429)
Province FE Y Y Y
Urbanization FE Y Y Y
Clerics 808 803 782
Counties 326 325 319
Log-Likelihood -346.221 -421.262 -157.233
Entries are Logistic regression coefficients.
County clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001.
299





% Mass Attendance −0.263∗∗∗
(0.052)
% Votes Catholic Party −0.543∗∗
(0.180)
Population (log) −0.881 −0.120
(2.808) (1.802)
% Agriculture 0.281 0.916∗
(0.179) (0.327)
% Unemployment −3.516 1.957
(39.504) (27.943)








Province FE Y Y
Counties 327 327
R2 0.779 0.807
% Mass Attendance (Selection corrected) −0.314
% Votes Catholic Party (Selection corrected) −0.618
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.






In the concluding chapter, I will explore whether the minority hypotheses travels to other
countries under Nazi occupation as well as to other episodes of mass-killing, to identify
the scope conditions of my theory. Drawing on secondary literature, post-war testimonies
and micro-level data on Jewish as well as Tutsi victimization, this analysis reveals the
robustness of the minority hypothesis throughout the Holocaust, to other episodes of
mass killing and beyond. In addition, it sheds light on several scope conditions which
limit the portability of my theory.
A striking pattern emerges when we look at resistance to the “Final solution outside
of the Low Countries. Religious minorities were over-represented among rescuers in all
but five of all the occupied countries: Denmark, Hungary, Bulgaria Poland and Lithuania.
Closer inspection of these cases reveals that the theory does not seem to travel to places
where rescue missions were highly individualized or the persecuting regime permitted
national elites to openly cooperate with leaders of majority congregations to safeguard
victims of mass persecution. Put otherwise, the theory does not work in cases where
resistance to Genocide was neither collective nor clandestine.
There is suggestive evidence that the dynamics described in this book also operate in
other genocides. The Rwandan case is particularly interesting because religious cleavages
did not reinforce ethnic differences in the predominantly Catholic country. Yet again there
is evidence that minority communities, such as the Pentecostals, Abarokore, Adventists
and Muslims, actively opposed mass killings. Islam on the other hand was a driving force
in the Armenian genocide, where the Young Turks used religion to mobilize the majority
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of the population against a small group of Christians. Consistent with what we saw in our
analysis of the Low Countries, help for persecuted Armenians often came from Kurdish
sects, western missionaries and small patches of Syrian Christians. Finally, in the US
context, Quaker and Methodist congregations were central to the Underground railroad,
providing shelter to runaway slaves. All in all the lessons learned in this dissertation
seem to travel beyond its unique geographical landscape and time-period.
12.2 Rescue of Jews in Nazi ruled Europe
The comparison of religious rescue patterns within the Netherlands and Belgium already
assures us that the minority mechanisms operate independently of whether countries
have a military or civil occupation regime, whether national church leaders openly protest
persecutions or not, whether victims of mass persecution are largely immigrants or na-
tives and whether the overall levels of resistance against the Holocaust were high or low.
Despite large differences in elite behavior, Jewish population and occupation regime, the
Netherlands and Belgium also had numerous characteristics in common that could act
as scope conditions. Both countries were liberal democracies with pillarized societies
where foreign occupiers conducted mass murder through well organized deportation
campaigns.
To explore whether these commonalities somehow triggered minority mobilization
making my finding unique to the Low Countries, I cull testimonies of 6,407 religious
rescuers living in twenty countries with different political traditions, where the “Final
solution” took different forms. I divide the share of minority rescuers in the body of
testimonies through the percentage of minority believers in a particular country to as-
sess whether religious minorities were under- or overrepresented among rescuers. An
overview of these ratios are presented for each country separately in figure 12.2.
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Below I discuss these each of these countries in more detail. I start with the Low Coun-
tries’ Southern neighbor France which lacked the pillarized societal structures that char-
acterized religious groups in the Netherlands and Belgium, move on to Germany were
mass killings were initiated by natives instead of foreign occupiers, and then to other
countries with different democratic traditions where mass killing took place through or-
ganized deportations. I then zero in on the more chaotic Bloodlands of Eastern-Europe
where mass-shooting rather than deportation was the modal form of murder.
12.2.1 France
A first important commonality between the two countries is that both were segmented






































Figure 12.1: Over and underrepresentation of religious minorities among
Rescuers in other Nazi-occupied countries.
303
ordination at the top, local populations of different denominations lived in separation.
Forced segregation might have increased the costs of minority membership and as such
activated isolated hubs of commitment that could be exploited for clandestine collective
action. France provides a first test of the minority hypothesis absent pillarization. In this
country, pillars failed to emerge because divisions between republicans and monarchists
had a strong disorganizing effect on the Catholic community. The hope for monarchi-
cal restoration among religious elites delayed the independent mobilization of lay men
into unions and political parties, inhibiting the formation of a strong faith-based mass
organization (Kalyvas 1996).
Despite the absence of pillars, but in line with the minority hypothesis, Protestant
groups were strongly overrepresented among rescuers in Catholic stronghold France. Al-
though Protestants made up only two percent of the French population, they provided
more than ten percent of all who resisted the Holocaust. Protestant mobilization had al-
ready started before the German occupation when CIMADE, a consortium of Protestant
youth movements mainly for woman, starting helping refugees from Alsace Lorraine,
which had just fallen to the Nazis (d’Aubigne´, Fabre, and Mouchon 1989). Solidarity
with Jews continued after the occupation began with Protestant, Unitarian and Quaker
welfare organizations coming together to organize help for interned Jews in prison camps
(Grynberg 2013).1
Initially, Protestant elites condoned the collaborating Vichy regime. This however
changed when the deportation of Jewish children was ordered. Although Marc Boehner,
president of the Protestant Reformed church, had enormous respect for state institutions
and was attracted to the national revolution the Vichy regime advocated, he empathized
with Jews early on. Already in 1933, he wrote the chief Rabbi of France: “The spiritual
sons of the Huguenots are stirred with emotion and sympathy whenever a religious mi-
1The Quaker organization, the American Friends Service Committee, won the 1947 Nobel peace prize
for the relief they provided Jews in France and other countries during the war (Benz and Wetzel 1998).
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nority is persecuted [...]. May god help your sorely tried co-religionists to find in Him
their strength and consolation, as did their frequently persecuted ancestors.” He repeated
this message during a series of protest meetings, including one in Paris in 1935: “I should
say that in light of what is going on in Germany-whether it be the persecutions of Jews or
of Christians- it is impossible for us not to add our most energetic protests. [...]Once you
believe in Christ, whatever ones denomination may be, it is impossible not to subscribe
fully to the words of that Jew of olden times, Saint Paul the Apostle, who having plumbed
the depths of Christ’s thought exclaimed: There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither
male nor female for all are one in Christ Jesus (Snoek 1969).”
When deportations were extended to those younger than sixteen, Boehner staged a
public protest meeting and secretly summoned leaders from CIMADE to set up rescue
networks for Jewish children in Protestant enclaves in the Ardeche and Cevennes region.
In this part of the country, generations of Huguenots, Ravenists and Darbyists had re-
treated in silence when it was not safe for those who were not Catholic. The secluded
nature of these communities gave this region its nickname pays de silence or land of si-
lence (Moorehead 2014).
Protestant sects were not only silent, but also defiant, especially when confronted with
the Shoah. Huguenots, Ravenists and Darbyists had always likened themselves to the
persecuted people of Israel as they were all willing to die for their faith. Historically,
Protestant minorities and Jews had therefore always supported each other. By inclination,
both were Republicans as the French revolution had granted them legal status and recog-
nition. During the Dreyfuss affair, most Protestants sided with the Jewish captain because
they understood all too well what discrimination felt like. Consequently, they empathized
with Jews when the Nazis rose to power and drew strong parallels between anti-Semitic
persecutions and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which unleashed Clerical attacks
on Protestants near the turn of the seventeenth century (Cabanel 2008). For instance Pas-
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tor Idebert Exbrayat, a Protestant minister in Rodez, for instance motivated his help to
Jews by saying: “As a calvinist, I understood the meaning of Persecution. That is why I
understood the persecution of the Jews and opened my doors to the Rabbi (Paldiel 1993).
Protestant minorities, like their fellows in the Low Countries, were characterized by
enormous group commitment.2 In Chambon-sur-Lignon, without doubt the most famous
example of a Protestant community protecting Jews in France, pastor Trocme organized
all his parishioners into daily Bible study meetings, during which he underlined the im-
portance of providing asylum to outsiders: “You will love the stranger, for you have been
strangers in Egypt.” Similar to what we have seen in the Low Countries, this combina-
tion of silence, empathy and commitment provided fertile ground for the interregional
welfare workers from CIMADE. Throughout the land of silence, a large number of rescue
networks, which involved twenty-four Huguenot pastors, along with several Ravenist
and Darbyist leaders, emerged, saving the lives of between 5,000 and 800 Jews (Moore-
head 2014).3
12.2.2 Germany and Austria
To assess whether the minority hypothesis also operates in cases where Genocide is not
driven by a foreign occupier, but rather by domestic authorities I turn to Germany. Over-
all, the religious landscape in Germany resembles that of the Low Countries in that it
2Suzanne Babut, for instance, was the widow of a Protestant pastor and gave dozens of Jews refuge
in her boarding house. The home was close to the local Gestapo headquarters. Her high esteem in the
community however prevented that people ratting her out (Paldiel 1993).
3There is also suggestive evidence that Muslims played an important role in protecting Jews in France.
It has been claimed that the head of what one could consider the most important Muslim institution in
Western-Europe, the Great mosque of Paris, saved the lives of many Jews by huddling them in the mosque’s
main sanctuary and providing them with certificates of Muslim identity. If true, this would be extremely
important evidence in favor of the minority hypothesis as Muslim leaders, as well as followers, were eager
to participate in anti-Semitic violence, plunder and propaganda in French colonies where they were the
dominant religious group (Satloff 2006). It would also reinforce the notion that the minority mechanisms
operate for non-Christians as well.
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consists of Catholic and Protestant dominated areas. On October 31, 1517 a relatively un-
known monk, Martin Luther, protested the a series of practices of the Catholic church in
the Saxony town of Wittenberg. Due to the recent invention of the printing press as well
as conflicts between the German emperor, the Pope and local princes, his protest spread
through Germany like wildfire. At the time, Germany was a loose federation of states in
which the Roman emperor and local lords vied for sovereignty. Several princes adopted
Lutheranism in an attempt to break Catholic hegemony, making the right to choose a
territories’ religious denomination an extremely salient part of these power struggles.
This conflict was resolved temporarily in 1555 with the peace of Augsburg, which
sanctioned local lords with the authority to impose the religion of their choice on their
subjects. This state ended however when the the newly elected emperor Ferdinand the
Second forced all territories to convert back to Catholicism, culminating in the Thirty
Years War. The war ended in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia, which declared that
the religious choice of citizens had to be accepted, forbidding forced conversion. As the
war had failed to deliver a clear winner, the country was split in a Catholic South-West
and a Protestant North-East, located closer to Wittenberg, the originial source of religious
division. The ban on forced conversion, however, resulted in the survival of minority
enclaves everywhere (Dixon 2008).
This landscape provides us with a similar research design as was used for the Nether-
lands. If the minority hypothesis travels to Germany, we would expect to see Catholic
rescue in the North East and Protestant rescue in the South West. I exploit local deporta-
tion data for all German villages collected by Voigtlander and Voth(Voigtla¨nder and Voth
2012) to see whether this is indeed the case. In table 12.1, I reproduce their main model,
with the addition of three variables. First, I add village level percentages of Catholics
in 1925. I then interact this variable with the percentage of Catholics living in the corre-
sponding German state. Finally, I add fixed effects for each of the twenty-four German
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states to reduce omitted variable bias.4
[Table 12.1 about here.]
Results of the analysis are visualized in figure 12.2. In line with the minority hypothe-
sis Catholicism has a negative effect on levels of deportation in Protestant German states
but a positive effect in Catholic areas. A one standard deviation increase in Catholic
strength reduces deportations with five percent in North-East but increases deportations
with almost twenty percent in the South-West of the country.



















Figure 12.2: The change in predicted probability of deportation with 90
percent confidence intervals as Catholicism village increases
one standard deviation conditional on Catholic strength in
German state.
4Three additional changes to the model are made. First, I include all German villages while Voigtlander
and Voth’s main analysis focussed on those who had a Jewish community in 1349. Second, I take out the the
variable tapping the proportion of Protestants in a county, as this is almost the same measure as the Catholic
percentages used in this analysis. Lastly, I take out all measures that capture legacies of anti-Semitism. Since
our empathy mechanism operates by reducing levels of anti-Semitism, they would effectively act like post-
treatment controls.
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In line with this correlational evidence, both Protestant and Catholic minority lead-
ers were among the first to protest anti-Jewish legislation. The first Protestant bishop to
openly express his concerns about the Jewish plight was Hermann Diem, from Bavaria,
a Southern region dominated by Catholicism. Despite his efforts, his colleagues from
Protestant areas failed to follow his example (J. Bank 2015). Following Diem’s lead sev-
eral small Protestant rescue networks emerged throughout Catholic Bayern (Kosmala and
Schoppmann 2002).
While none of the Catholic Bishops in Germany openly protested the introduction of
the anti-Semitic Nuremberg laws or the violence of Kristallnacht, one prominent Catholic
did step up: Bernard Lichtenberg, the provost of the Saint Hedwig Cathedral in Protes-
tant Berlin. Right after the outburst of anti-Jewish violence, he pointed out that there is
no difference between a Church and Synagogue as both are houses of God. This was
followed by a weekly prayer for persecuted Jews on Sundays, in which he encouraged
parish members to “love thy neighbor” (Gilbert 2010).5 Although Lichtenberg was ar-
rested October 1941, Berlin remained a hotbed of Catholic rescue activities, build around
dense networks of the Catholic Charitas (Phayer 1993), Women’s League and the nuns of
the Elizabeth Foundation (Phayer 1990).
The prevalence of Catholic rescue in Berlin dovetails nicely with the claim that
Catholics in Eastern Germany were in general more tolerant towards Jews due to their
minority position, especially compared to their co-religionists in predominantly Catholic
Austria, where anti-Semitism was remarkably influential (Pulzer 1988). At the turn of the
century, Austria had witnessed the successful rise of the Christian Social party, a move-
ment backed by local clergy that was both Catholic and anti-Jewish. Under German occu-
pation, Catholic bishops deemed anti-Semitism acceptable and lamented the “vile inher-
5Leaders of smaller religious communities such as the Quakers, Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Swedish
church went much further than their Protestant and Catholic counterparts, making Jewish rescue part of
official church policy (Paldiel 1993).
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ited characteristics” of “diseased Jews” who were responsible for the death of Christ (J.
Bank 2015). Although Cardinal Innitzer expressed concerns about the Jewish plight and
provided some help to converted Jews, his collegium of Bishops never spoke out against
the deportations and Catholic rescue was rare. Instead, Jews in Austria had to rely on
support from minority confines of Quaker, Lutheran and Swedish church communities
(Benz and Wetzel 1998).
12.2.3 Other Deportation Territories
There are striking similarities between Austria and homogeneously Catholic areas in East-
ern Europe, such as Slovakia and Croatia. In both these regions, political regimes emerged
that combined Catholic piety with nationalism, as such, blending cultural and religious
forms of anti-Semitism into a explosive mix of xenophobic violence (J. Steinberg 1994).
The Ustasa movement that ruled Croatia has been referred to as a “Croat Catholic brand
of fascism” (Hory and Broszat 1964) and actively endorsed the removal of foreign ele-
ments, including the Jews. Slovakia in turn was led by Catholic priest Tiso who was
responsible for ordering Jewish persecutions in 1941 and 1944 (Phayer 2000).
This process however is not unique to Catholicism. A comparable fusion of xenopho-
bic nationalism and religious anti-Semitism emerged among majority congregations in
Orthodox Romania. Although some individual Orthodox leaders helped Jews (Friling
et al. 2004), the Patriarchs called upon the nation to “fight the Jewish parasites” (Snoek
1969). A large numbers of helpers belonged to the the much smaller Roman Catholic
Church (Benz and Wetzel 1996), which, as we just learned, was one of the driving forces
behind persecution in nearby Croatia and Slovakia, where it was Orthodox communities
that were overrepresented among rescuers alongside other minority enclaves of Luther-
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ans, Baptists (Gilbert 2010), and Greek Orthodox (Snoek 1969). 6
In both Orthodox and Catholic parts of the Eastern Europe, Muslims displayed em-
pathy with Jews. The Archives of Military History in Belgrade are filled with protest let-
ters by Muslim dignitaries invoking Ottoman tolerance. These letters complained about
bloodshed and stressed that under Turkish rule tolerance for religious minorities, includ-
ing Catholics and Orthodox’s was the norm. Now, the same groups who had benefitted
from tolerance in the past were violating these norms in their treatment of Jews. Others
expressed fear that the dominant groups would turn on them once they had finished off
the Jews (Jelinek 1990). On a local level, “Bosnian angels of mercy” came to the rescue of
Jews (Paldiel 1993).
The Albanian case reinforces these cases, further suggesting that the empathy mecha-
nism is not distinctively Christian but instead operates the same for other types of minor-
ity religions. The population of this majority Muslim country staged the most successful
resistance operation against the Holocaust, saving almost all Jews living on Albanian
soil.7 This remarkable assistance to Jews is often explained by the existence of a strong
ethical code in Albania named Besa, prescribing neighboring love, help to refugees and
compassion with those in need (Sarner and Jay Weinstein 1998). However, religious mi-
nority mobilization seemed to have played an equally important role, as the largest rescue
operations in this country were produced by the Bekthasi movement, a small and secre-
tive sect grounded in Shia traditions (Gershman 2008).
Returning to Figure 12.1, when we look at the parts of Europe where the “Final so-
lution” was carried out through deportations in figure 12.1, a striking pattern emerges.
Religious minorities were overrepresented among rescuers in all countries but Denmark,
6The ways in which the dominant Orthodox and Catholic churches legitimized violence against Jews in
the Balkans during World War Two bears resemblance to the role they played during the Bosnian Geno-
cide fifty year later. This time not Jews but Muslims were depicted as Christ-killers who threatened the
nation(Sells 1996).
7Note that Jews living in Albania-ruled Macedonia were not protected (Gutman 2007).
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Hungary and Bulgaria. Although these countries are very different in terms of anti-
Semitic traditions and political culture, they do seem to have one thing common: they
were all what Hilberg, undoubtedly the most famous political scientist of the Holocaust,
labelled as “unwilling allies” or “autonomous entities” (Hilberg 2003). These countries
were exceptional in that they were both relatively independent of the German Reich and,
at the same, time reluctant to execute anti-Jewish legislation.8 As a result, majority church
leaders could easily cooperate with national elites to safeguard the Jewish population,
limiting the importance of clandestine collective action. In the absence of full foreign oc-
cupation, the congruence of majority religion and nation created a unified front against
the Germans instead of reinforcing boundaries with outsiders. The rescue of Jews as such
was in part a manifestation of a broader national revolt which aimed to limit the influence
of a somewhat remote foreign power (Yahil 1983).
This was very similar to what happened in Italy, another clear example of an unwilling
ally. Although, a very small number of Waldensian rescuers in this completely Catholic
country obscures the large role of majority rescue in figure 12.1, it is generally believed
that Italy was the only country where the mobilization potential of Catholic networks
was fully exploited to protect Jewish citizens. While hatred towards Germans provided
the motivation to rescue, the knowledge that everyone was sheltering Jews made the
clandestine collective action dilemma dissolve into thin air (Zuccotti 1987). As a result
minority empathy and capacity were less important for the production of rescue opera-
tions.




Mass-killing did not take the same form throughout occupied Europe. Whereas Jews in
the countries discussed above were mostly annihilated through deportation, the “Blood-
lands” of Eastern Poland and the Soviet Union (Snyder 2012) witnessed a “Holocaust by
bullets” (Snyder 2012). Territory brought under control of the Nazis was ruled through
terror and plunder. Local authorities were brushed aside and large parts of the native
populations were conceived of as racially inferior species that, together with the Jews,
had to make room to secure “Lebensraum” for the Germanic race. The war against Stalin
unleashed a violent energy that was at first directed to the Red Army, but later turned on
local populations, in particular the Jews, who were seen as natural allies of the Bolsheviks.
Through a process of controlled escalation, Himmler and Heydrich provided incentives
to Einsatztruppen and local Gentiles to engage in mass violence against the sons of Israel
(Browning 2014).
Despite differences in the method of killing, minority rescue was not unique to West-
ern Europe and is confirmed by evidence from Orthodox the Ukraine, where a large num-
ber of survivor records collected after the war came from people hidden by Evangelicals
(Berkhoff 2009), Greek Catholics , Catholic Poles, Christian Czechs (Spector 1990), Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses, 7th day Advenstists (Brandon and Lower 2008) and Baptists (Gilbert
2010). The pro-Jewish activities of Greek Orthodox Metropolitan Sheptytskyi stands out
in particular. Although he welcomed the German invasion as an opportunity to get rid
of Soviet influence, he always emphasized the importance of equality and pluralism.
Apart from sending out pastoral letters encouraging help to those in need, he also di-
rectly asked Himmler to stop murdering Jews. Most importantly, he personally sheltered
one hundred-and-fifty Jews in monasteries and the central Cathedral (Shimon 1990).
Sheptytskyi’s defiance stands in stark contrast with the behavior of the dominant Or-
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thodox church leaders who did nothing on behalf of the Jews. At a local level, Orthodox
ministers gave blatant anti-Semitic sermons. A priest in Kovel encouraged parishioners
to hand all Jews over to the Germans as they should be erased from the earth. Before
getting out to murder Jews, Ukrainian police officers prayed in church. Priests sprinkled
them in holy water and emphasized the importance of the war against Jewish Bolsheviks
(Arad 2009).
As figure 12.2 demonstrates, rescue in the Ukraine seems to reflect the same pattern.
While dominant churches remained silent or embraced anti-Semitism, minority Baptists,
Jehovah Witnesses, Catholics, Russian Orthodox (Cholawski 1998) and Karachay Mus-
lims (Gutman 2007) were overrepresented among rescuers in Latvia, Belarus and other
parts of the Soviet Union.9 This latter group is particularly interesting as it confirms that
the minority hypothesis applies to Christians as well as Muslims.
However, if we look at figure 12.1 we see minority rescuers were not overrepresented
in Lithuania and Poland. This is surprising given that, similar to what we saw in other
parts of the Bloodlands, anti-Semitism was quite prevalent among majority Catholics in
both countries. Clerics in Poland actively discouraged help to Jews (Tec 1987), while some
Bishops in Lithuania went even further by forbidding their followers to provide shelter
(Arad 2009).10
What then explains the absence of minority protection?11 Inspection of rescuer files in
9More than one third of rescuers in Russia were people to whom the Soviet Union had related with
great suspicion or actively repressed either for religious reasons or during the collectivization purges. This
includes large numbers of national minorities. This of course raises the question whether the minority
hypothesis can be applied to non-religious identity groups as well (Gutman 2007).
10However, Gross argues that clergy in general played a conciliatory role. Murders of individual jews
and pogroms taking place right outside Jebwabne area were stopped by a local priest. Clergy also calmed
down anti-Semitic agitation while survivors of the Jedwabne massacre could find a safe shelter at the house
of the bishop of Lomza. Contradicting his own conclusions Gross also cites statements by a Jewish survivor
from the pogrom in Razilow. According to this eye-witness, the priest Alexander Dogolewski was asked to
prevail upon his worshippers to take no part in the persecution of Jews He simply answered that all Jews
were communists and that he had no interest in defending them (J. T. Gross 2001).
11It needs to be highlighted that secondary literature provides numerous examples of minority rescue
operations that are not included in the files presented in figure 12.2. This could suggest that the absence of
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the two countries reveals that rescue missions hardly ever extended beyond one house-
hold. A coding of 4,119 testimonies by Linde reveals that only eighty-nine case involved
organized religion. A similar coding of 674 Polish post-war testimonies by Czerniawski
indicates that only forty-seven cases involved any form of collective action (Gutman
2005).
The individualist nature of rescue in both countries has been linked to the extremely
repressive nature of the Nazi regime, increasing the already high risks involved in helping
Jews (Tec 1987). For the Polish case, Norman Davies even goes as far as to say that: “the
Polish population at large moved under the formal threat of instant execution for the
entire family of anyone sheltering feeding or helping Jews. In this light it is as pointless
to ask why the poles did little to help the jews as to enquire why the Jews did nothing
to assist the Poles” (Davies 2005). An equally important factor in the absence of minority
protection might be that the largest religious minority group in both countries was the
Lutheran community. Their congregations were often home to German immigrants who
were less inclined to resist the Nazi occupation in general (Tec 1987).
Overall, the study of rescue operations for Jews outside of the Low Countries suggests
two sets of scope conditions. First, the minority mechanisms do not seem to operate
if open mobilization of majority elites creates a national resistance movement that did
not require clandestine collective action, and turn Jewish rescue into a manifestation of
broader discontent with German influence, as was the case in Denmark, Bulgaria and
Hungary. Second, minority operations did not emerge when minority groups identified
strongly with the Nazi occupiers and rescue was more individualized, as was the case in
Poland and Lithuania.
Often however the combination of clandestine capacity and empathy turned minority
minority rescue is due to measurement error. See for instance the rescue operations by the Baptists in Pod-
hajce (Gutman and Krakowski 1986) as well as several Evangelical and Methodist networks (Ringelblum,
Kermish, and Krakowski 1992).
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congregations into hotbeds of resistance against the Holocaust. For a particularly striking
example, we briefly return to Paris, where a strong religious network around the Dalian
family was imbued with a very a very distinct form of empathy. The oldest son explains:
“since we ourselves came from the Armenian community, an ethnic community which in
other times had gone through comparable misfortunes, it was only natural and our duty
to help those who would suffer” (Me´nager 2005). This brings us to the role of minority
communities in other genocides.
12.3 Religious Minorities and Resistance in Other Episodes of Mass
Persecution
There is suggestive evidence that the mechanisms described in this book also operate in
episodes of mass killing which were rooted in different types of cleavages and which in-
volved different forms of violence. The Rwandan case is interesting because religious
cleavages did not reinforce ethnic differences, as Hutus and Tutsis belonged to both
Protestant and Catholic church communities. Yet again, there is evidence that sects, such
as Pentecostals and the born again Abarokore actively opposed mass killings in the ma-
jority Catholic country.
Several post-war testimonies cite membership in one of these two church communities
as a reason individuals provided assistance to threatened Tutsis. In Butare, for instance, a
Pentocostal policemen charged with instigating violence refused to cooperate and trans-
ported several Tutsi children to a Red Cross sanctuary from where they were taken to
Burundi (Longman 2010). In the Northern prefecture Ruhengeri, a group of 7th Day Ad-
ventists harbored Tutsis in their church buildings, putting themselves between potential
victims and genocidaires. They were able to funnel the Tutsis to safe territory with the
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help of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the Tutsi liberation army (Fujii 2011).
In line with the minority hypothesis, Muslims also staged a coordinated challenge to
killers in northern Mabare, a region dominated by Christians. The small group differ-
entiated themselves from their neighbors through distinctive headgear and frequented
Islamic stores and restaurants. These dense networks were imbued with preferences
to resist Genocide as purification rested upon the same absolutist foundations that had
marginalized themselves. The day the attacks started Muslims confronted armed Hutus
and blocked their way. While the Muslims in Mabare resisted Genocide, co-religionists a
few miles to the north in Gahengeri did not protect their Tutsi neighbors. Interestingly,
the Muslim community here was much larger and more dominant, providing further
support for the importance of a minority status (Viret 2008).






















Figure 12.3: Death rate prefectures rural Rwanda by percentage popula-
tion that is Muslim.
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By combining information on the pre-Genocide population, surviving Tutsi popula-
tion, Gacaca courts and projections of natural death rates, Verpoorten has compiled local
level data on Tutsi victimization (Verpoorten 2012). Figure 12.3 plots provincial death
rates against the percentage of Muslims. As we can see, a strong negative correlation ex-
ists (r=.67), suggesting that the presence of Islamic minority communities indeed had a
dampening effect on violence. It is, of course, possible that other factors were driving this
relationship. The eastern provinces, where Islam was relatively stronger, were also more
isolated, ethnically mixed and less densely populated, all factors that can be plausibly
linked to lower death rates (Verpoorten 2012). Therefore I also conducted multivariate
analysis of sector level death rates and religious composition, controlling for population
density, RPF strength, distances to the nearest roads and towns, the rates of mixed house-
holds and the size of the Tutsi population. Results are presented in table 12.2. In line
with what we saw in figure 12.3, the presence of muslims is negatively and significantly
related to local death rates. The first row in model 2 shows that increasing the percentage
of muslims with one percent reduces killings by almost thirteen percent. In support of
the minority hypothesis, the presence of 7th day adventists and other Protestant churches
also has a negative effect on violence. However, their coefficients do not reach conven-
tional levels of statistical significance.
[Table 12.2 about here.]
Though reducing murder in Rwanda as well as Europe during the Holocaust, Islam
was a driving force in the Armenian genocide. Although the Young Turks were primarily
motivated by secular nationalism, they used the country’s dominant religion to mobilize
large groups of the population against small groups of Christians on a local level. Ar-
menians were often referred to as infidels, depicted as spies trying to destroy the empire
from within or as serving the interests of Christian European powers. This religiously in-
spired dehumanization increased acceptance of the mass brutalities. Often perpetrators
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performed Islamic rites while killing in order to bestow religious legitimacy on acts of
murder (Dadrian 2003).
Given this religious legitimization of violence, it is not surprising that very few mus-
lims were willing to sacrifice their lives to help Armenians (Tevosyan 2008). Consistent
with what we saw in our analysis of the Low Countries, help for persecuted Armenians
often came from minority congregations. Postwar testimonies from the Sassoun province
repeatedly refer to Kurds helping Armenian families evade deportation, while those who
miraculously escaped the death camps and desserts were often taken in by Bedouin com-
munities, Orthodox Greeks, Gregorian groups, small patches of Syrian Christians, Evan-
gelicals and Arabs. All these groups sympathized with the suffering Armenians because
of their own precarious position within the Ottoman empire (Tevosyan 2008; Hovannisian
1992). In Marash, similar sentiments motivated the Protestant pastor Eskidjian to build
a large Christian network of underground workers providing relief for Armenian depor-
tees with the help of Swiss missionaries who, together with their American, German and
Scandinavian counterparts, activated rescue organizations throughout the whole empire
(Kieser 2008).
The Armenian region of Mardin deserves special attention. This region was a religious
hodge pudge of Yezidi sects, Syriac Christians, Jacobites and Armenians whose pasts had
been fraught by Ottoman persecution and conflict with mainstream Muslims. This shared
memory of maltreatment created a strong bond between the different minority groups
and, when the genocidaires came for the Armenians, an unified front emerged. The Jaco-
bites refused to partake in any killing and helped Armenians flee, the Syriac bishop was
able to spare his local community from persecutions, while Yezidi sects created a safe
haven for the persecuted in the surrounding Sinjar mountain range (Ternon 2008; Gaunt
2015).
Closer to home, we find evidence for the fact that religious minorities also provided
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assistance to victims of non-Genocidal forms of mass persecution. Quaker congregations
played an impressive role in organizing abolitionist societies and running the under-
ground railway to places in ante-bellum America. Secretive cells, stretching northwards
from Southern Pennsylvenia all the way though Upstate New York to Canada, made it
possible to funnel fugitives who had crossed the Mason-Dixon line. Although there was
no official statement from any Quaker body saying that followers had to help, slaveries’
illegitimacy was clear to all members as a violation of the individual right to freedom of
expression. (Foner 2015).12
It is important to highlight minority membership did not insulate everyone from en-
gagement in mass persecution. Kurdish sects played an enormously important part in
the Armenian massacres as organized killing squads (Suny 2015), while some important
killings in Rwanda were facilitated by Presbyterian and Adventist pastors who, under the
false guise of shelter, lured Tutsis to killing sites within their church buildings (Gourevitch
1998). Looking at minorities who did partake in violence more closely suggests minority
perpetrators were often entrenched in elite networks and had an interest in defending the
status quo. As a consequence, genocidal regimes could occasionally incorporate minority
congregations into their repressive killing machines when violence broke out.
Before the outbreak of the Armenian massacres of 1915, Sunni Kurds had already been
deployed as allies of the state to police lands contested by Shi’a groups and other dissident
groups, including Armenians for a long time. Through this role, several Kurdish tribal
leaders had gained powerful positions in eastern parts of the Ottoman empire where a
lot of Armenians lived. More informally, Turks often pitted Kurds against Armenians in
local conflicts over land. As a result, Kurds had a lot to gain by Armenian persecution
and were natural allies of the Young Turk movement. The spoils of plunder provided
12Interestingly, these sentiments were echoed more recently by Hindu and Sikh groups in the United
states in response to Muslim persecution in the US after 9/11 and attacks against minorities in San
Bernadino (12/20 2015)
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additional motivation for the Kurds to remove Armenian neighbors from their properties.
(Suny 2015).
Like the Kurds in the Ottoman empire, some Protestant elites in Rwanda relied on
the Hutu regime to maintain power. They had used state resources to fend off attacks
from democratization movements within their own congregations. When Rwandan elites
turned to ethnic politics to regain public support, these church leaders associated with the
regime were willing to go along and affiliated themselves with Hutu nationalism despite
the presence of Tutsis among their flock (Longman 2010).
12.4 Non-Religious Minorities
When looking at Armenian rescue networks embedded in networks of Syrian Christians,
Iranian Sects and Greek Orthodox, it is striking that religious minority status was often
reinforced by an additional minority status. This raises the question whether the mech-
anisms outlined in this dissertation also apply to non-religious minorities such as ethnic
groups, immigrants or political factions.
Of course the empathy and clandestine capacity mechanisms limit the value of the mi-
nority hypothesis to deviant groups that have a some form of organizational segregation
and depend on pluralism for survival. Still, religious minorities might have just provided
a concrete site through which organized minority status was studied (Guhin 2014). If this
is the case, the empathy and clandestine capacity mechanisms would operate for other
minority categories as well. On the other hand, religions’ strong organizational infras-
tructure and defining powers might make it more distinctively robust in the creation of
resistance than other organized minority categories (Brubaker 2015).
In the Dutch case we already saw that that radical socialists, communists and immi-
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grants working in the mining industry were also able to set up early evasion networks.
Often these groups functioned as religious sects in that they combined discipline with a
solemn commitment to the group (Hilbrink 1989; Rens 2013). They also relied on plural-
ism for survival. Communist cells were important for arresting the Holocaust throughout
Western-Europe (Gutman 2005) while the Holocaust in other parts of occupied Europe
also provides numerous examples of ethnic minorities stepping up on behalf of the Jews.
The above mentioned Poles in the Ukraine, Hungarians in Rumania and Byelorussians
in Latvia come to mind alongside with the Swedish mission churches in Germany and
Austria.
12.5 Omissions and Research Plans
The most glaring omission of this project is that it tries to explain resistance against Geno-
cide without addressing variation in the behavior of victims of genocides themselves.
Why did some Jews resist, some try to escape, some cooperate with the perpetrators,
some work with bystanders and some simply do nothing (Finkel 2012)? In a new re-
search project that I am working on together with Ben Frommer and Joerg Spenkuch, the
role of Jewish resources in the production of rescue operations takes center stage.
An additional motivation for this project is that Holocaust scholars are ambivalent
about whether segregation in market-based activities helped or hindered Jews ability to
evade deportation. On the one hand, it has been argued, that middlemen were resented
by the surrounding population and that they were less likely to receive help from by-
standers. On the other hand, historians have observed that Jewish traders and creditors
were more likely to evade as they had strong ties with local customers.
The current gap in knowledge derives from the fact that Holocaust scholars generally
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rely on single case studies that lack the systematic comparative focus required for (careful)
generalizations. By deploying techniques developed in this dissertation, we hope to rem-
edy this problem. In particular, we plan on constructing a unique micro-level database
containing information on over 292,000 Jews who were living in the Low Countries and
the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. This new data set will enable us to conduct
the first large-scale, systematic empirical study of how Jews embeddedness in the local
economy affected their chances to survive the Holocaust.
The Low Countries and the Protectorate provide a unique opportunity to explore the
relationship between occupational segregation and evasion for two reasons. First of all,
Jews were relatively well integrated in these countries and employed in a wide range
of professions. This creates sufficient variation on the independent variable and allows
us to compare the fate of Jewish market workers with non-market workers who have a
similar amount of economic resources. Second, the process of mass-extermination in both
places was executed by the same strongly organized administrative apparatus, which left
an astonishing paper trail that we will exploit for our research.
The registrations used in this dissertation which, in addition to geospatial locations,
provide information on Jewish professions are also available for the Protectorate. By de-
ploying techniques developed in this dissertation we hope to assess whether Jews active
in market professions were more or less likely to evade deportation, and whether these
processes depend on the structure of the local economy. The fine-grained nature of our
data will enable us to shed light on the processes underlying ethnic segregation and vio-
lence and help us better understand violence towards other middle-men minorities such
as Muslims in South Asia, the Ibos in Nigeria, Marwari in Burma, the Chinese in the
Philippines, the Lebanese in Sierra Leone or the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.
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12.6 Conclusion
This chapter has revealed that the central thesis of this dissertation, that religious minori-
ties are more likely to resist Genocide because they are better able to set up clandestine
organizations imbued with pluralism and empathy for victims of mass persecution, trav-
els beyond the borders of the Low Countries to World War Two France, Germany, Yu-
goslavia as well as the Ottoman empire, Rwanda and the United States. But to conclude,
I would like to briefly return to the puzzle which formed the starting point of this project.
Remember that in Almelo, a Catholic rescue operation was able to shelter Jews from the
Nazis, while Catholic rescue attempts were thwarted early on in the neighboring Borne,
five kilometers to the east. In this project I have argued that religious minorities are more
likely to impede campaigns of mass-violence.
Figure 12.4: Back to Almelo and Borne.
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Figure 12.4 reveals that the minority theory offers significant leverage in explaining
the variation between Almelo and Borne. Because Almelo was located in the predom-
inantly Protestant part of Twente, Jews happened to live in proximity of a Catholic mi-
nority community which proved able to set up and sustain an underground movement
coordinated by Chaplains Bodde and Middelkoop, who were motivated to defend plu-
ralism (Weustink 1985). Borne however was overwhelmingly Catholic. As a result, the
nearby majority churches could not produce the empathy or the isolated hubs of commit-
ment required for prolonged clandestine resistance against the Nazis.
In this chapter we have explored the extent to which the importance of minority mo-
bilization can be extended to different countries during the Holocaust, different episodes
of mass persecution and non-religious groups. All in all there seems to be considerable
evidence that the empathy and clandestine capacity mechanisms are broadly applicable
in a wide range of contexts. However, the exploration also brought to light three impor-
tant sets of scope conditions that limit the theories’ portability. First of all, the minority
hypothesis does not travel to contexts where majority elites, both secular and religious,
openly object to persecution and cooperate to arrest its implementation. In this case a gen-
eral resistance mentality and ability to resist in the open make both the clandestine capac-
ity and empathy advantages of minority congregation redundant for resistance against
genocide. Second, the minority argument does not operate in situations where rescue
behavior is so individualistic that it does not require coordination. Third, minority mo-
bilization against killing does not take off if the community in question is closely aligned
with the repressive apparatus undertaking the violence.
This dissertation started with the ambivalence of the sacred, discussing the strong
role that religion has played in both producing and impeding violence. My research
has identified an important underlying factor that determines (under most conditions)
which side of the sacred prevails by studying religious resistance against Genocide. As
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the Almelo and Borne comparison illustrate central message from this dissertation is that
religious minorities are more likely to resist violence because they are attached to plu-
ralism, emphasize with victims of mass persecution and have the networks to translate
defiant norms into the collective action required to arrest aggression.
This leads to the sobering conclusion that in most cases exceptional behavior is only
displayed by exceptional communities, which are rare by definition. Mainstream society
hardly ever steps up in times of need. Heroes in times of crisis, on the contrary, are often
the dissidents, deviants and marginalized outsiders, who in normal times, are ridiculed,
looked down upon or persecuted. What makes people successful in peacetime is exactly
what makes them unsuccessful in times of crisis and vice versa. As such, this disserta-
tion is not as much a story of hope as of tragedy. The theory reveals how strong, rapid
collective mobilization in the face of genocide depends upon relatively strong social ties
among well screened community members with strong moral values. The necessity to re-
strict channels of recruitment to trusted ties however prohibits the expansion of collective
rescue efforts beyond a narrow set of like-minded actors who take exceptional positions
in society. In other words, being a religious minority does not only explain mobilization,
but also its disjointed nature as segregated networks only have limited carrying capacity
to provide assistance. While deviants try to mobilize but eventually fail to have an impact
because they lack mainstream access and legitimacy, the majority that can really make a








Population, 1933 (log) 0.047
(0.079)
Jews, 1933 (log) 1.011∗∗∗
(0.075)
% Jewish, 1933 −0.047
(0.038)
% Catholics village, 1925 −0.272∗
(0.146)








Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
Stare clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001.
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% Muslim, 1991 −12.799∗
(5.207)
% Protestant, 1991 −0.076
(0.171)
% 7th day ad., 1991 −51.705
(65.027)
% Other minorities, 1991 13.557
(8.232)
% Secular, 1991 −1.082
(0.714)
# days under RPF, 0.101∗∗
(0.027)
Population density, 1991 1.467∗∗
(0.491)
% Tutsi, 1991 61.392∗
(23.043)
Population, 1991 (log) −2.774
(3.418)
Distance town km (log) 2.007
(2.681)
Distance road km (log) 5.294∗
(2.809)







Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.
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